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ABSTRACT
This thesis proposes an account of the effects achieved by the
poetic use of rhetorical tropes and schemes in the light of
recent developments in pragmatic theory. More specifically it
discusses and attempts to develop the relevance theory
account of poetic effects.
Much recent debate in literary studies has centred on the
question as to whether literary communication is best
explained in terms of text-internal linguistic properties or
socio-cultural phenomena. This thesis considers such views in
the light of the theories of language and communication they
assume. It then proposes an alternative theoretical account of
literary communication grounded in cognitive pragmatic
theory. It argues that the relevance theory account of poetic
effects may make a significant contribution to such an
account. A brief outline of relevance theory is followed by a
more detailed analysis of metaphor and a brief consideration
of epizeuxis and various verse effects, insofar as they
contribute to poetic style.
it is natural for pragmatic theory to concentrate on the
communication of assumptions, propositional forms with a
logical structure over which inferences can be performed.
Although the account of poetic effects and poetic thoughts
developed here will be partially characterised in such terms,
an attempt will also be made to account for the communication
of affective and other non-propositional effects. Any theory of
stylistic effects in general, and poetic style in particular,
must, it will be argued, include such an account. This will
necessitate a broader philosophical discussion of issues having
a bearing on the question of what it is that is communicated
non-propositionally. More particularly it will require some
discussion of emotion, phenomenal experience and aesthetic
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experience. This discussion will lead to a characterisation of
poetic thought or poetic representation.
The thesis aims, then, to make a contribution to literary
studies by characterising a new theoretical notion of
literariness in terms of mental representations and mental
processes. It also aims to make a contribution to pragmatic
theory, specifically to the pragmatics of poetic style and
rhetoric within a relevance theory framework.
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'No one can have read at all deeply in the anti-essentialist
literature on art without recognising the extent to which they
tend to flatten the works they address out under
interpretation - how all the works addressed are finally
deconstructed in such a way that they all more or less say -
more or less "really" say since these theories only give deep
interpretations - the same thing over and over. The message
is always one of oppression or of subversion. And I have often
felt it a tragedy that those who went into the study of
literature or art out of love for painting or poetry should have
fallen under the spell of "theory" and to find themselves
dealing only and always with the same flat grey deep
substance underlying the works whose surfaces theory has
enabledthem to penetrate..................................................................But
my theory, being philosophical, leaves things as they are.'
(Danto 1993:207)
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INTRODUCTION
The main aim of this thesis is to examine a problem that is
relevant to literary criticism and literary theory, as well as to
pragmatic theory. The problem can be expressed in terms of the
following question: how is literary (or poetic) communication
successful and distinctive qua literary communication? This
question, covering both literary prose and poetry, is a version
of the one that l.A.Richards asks at the beginning of Principles
of Literary Criticism: 'What gives the experience of reading a
certain poem its value?' (Richards 1924:1).
Literary criticism is centrally concerned with evaluating
works of literature. The aesthetic value to be obtained from
works of literature derives from a particular kind of reading
experience. This reading experience may be said to involve a
particular kind of thinking, what Les Murray calls 'the only
whole thinking' in his poem On Religion and Poetry. What, then,
is this particular kind of thinking? What are the characteristic
properties of a poetic thought?
Pragmatic theory is concerned with developing an account of
verbal communication, with the questions: what is verbal
communication and how is it achieved? As poetic thoughts are
communicated verbally, pragmatic theory should have
something to say about the communication of poetic thoughts
or poetic effects, as well as about more general aspects of
style. It should be able, in principle, to provide a theoretical
answer to a literary critical question.
The main problem that pragmatic theory faces in answering
this question follows from widely accepted intuitions about
the nature of poetic effects. Poetic effects cannot be
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characterised simply in propositional terms: poetic thoughts
do not just consist of sets of assumptions or propositional
forms. They involve the communication of nonpropositional
effects of various kinds (though what precisely these effects
are is difficult to determine). Pragmatic theory provides an
account of how certain assumptions come to be represented in
the mind of an addressee during communication, how those
assumptions are placed in the context of other assumptions,
and how inferential rules (of some specific kind) operate over
these sets of assumptions to yield further assumptions. There
seems to be no place for nonpropositional effects in any
workable pragmatic theory. If it is the case that pragmatic
theory deals in propositional effects and that literary
criticism! literary communication is primarily concerned with
nonpropositional effects then it would follow that pragmatic
theory cannot offer a genuine theory of style or, in particular,
of poetic style.
This thesis was initially inspired by the relevance theory
account of poetic effects found in Sperber and Wilson (1986a).
Not only does relevance theory offer a more sophisticated
pragmatic account of poetic effects in terms of implicatures,
and hence propositional forms, it also recognises and offers an
explanation for the problem of the communication of
nonpropositional effects.
Mainstream literary stylistics seeks to explain the meanings
communicated by poems in terms of the lexical and syntactic
choices made by poets. The other main attraction of relevance
theory is that, as a cognitive pragmatic theory, it can offer
genuine theoretical explanations for the linguistic choices that
poets make (as well as for our stylistic intuitions as readers)
in terms of mental representations and processes, in terms of
thoughts and thinking. I hope to show how this kind of approach
can reveal more about the nature of aesthetic experience and
aesthetic value.
The pursuit of such issues should reflect back upon the
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pragmatic theory in the light of which intuitions are examined.
As Sperber and Wilson (1987:710) wrote, concerning the status
of the ideas developed in Sperber and Wilson (1986a):
'in assessing a new approach to human
communication.......the following questions
should be kept in mind. How does it compare
with other current approaches in terms of
explicitness,	 plausibility,	 generality,	 and
explanatory power? Does it throw new light
both on the very rich and diverse data available
to all of us as individuals involved in
communication and on the narrower but more
reliable data gathered by scholars? Does it
suggest new empirical research? Is it relevant
to more than one of the many disciplines
involved in the study of human communication -
linguistics, pragmatics, philosophy, cognitive
psycho 109 y, artificial intelligence, social
psychology, literary studies, anthropology, and
sociology - and could it foster fruitful
interactions among them?'
This thesis will attempt to show that relevance theory is,
indeed, relevant to literary studies. When l.A.Richards asked
the question, quoted above, he was interested in developing a
theoretical answer - just as, in Richards (1929), he asked the
same question from the non-theoretical perspective of a
literary critic. He attempted to develop a theory of literature
in terms of the psychological and communication theories and
approaches available to him at the time. The revolution in such
theories - the development of cognitive psychology, cognitive
science, and now cognitive pragmatics - permits a new
theoretical approach to Richards' question, and one which has a
much better chance of making progress.
Rather than attempt the same ambitious programme as
Richards (1924), I wish here to make a modest contribution to
such a programme, focussing on small-scale poetic effects. I
am interested here in the effects achieved by individual
rhetorical devices rather than by complete poems or extended
passages of literary prose. In particular I am interested in the
poetic use of metaphor, epizeuxis and metrical variation.
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Despite this narrow focus I hope that the approach I develop
will ultimately prove applicable to literary communication in
general, that it will provide the basis for a theory of
lit era ri ness.
Although the inspiration for this thesis derives from
pragmatic theory, I will be drawing upon arguments, ideas and
theories from a number of other disciplines concerned with
human communication. In particular I will be developing my
ideas in relation to ideas in literary studies, the philosophy of
mind and aesthetics.
In Chapter 1 I refer to arguments in aesthetics in order to
establish the groundwork assumptions upon which a
theoretical approach to literary studies and literary
communication may be developed. In Chapter 2 I discuss a
range of approaches to literary theory within literary studies
and argue for a new approach grounded in cognitive pragmatics.
In Chapter 3 I provide a brief outline of relevance theory as the
cognitive pragmatic theory in which a literary theory (and
general theory of literary communication) may be grounded. In
Chapter 4 I develop an account of metaphor and, more
particularly, an account of poetic metaphor. In Chapter 5 I
discuss the poetic use of epizeuxis, metrical variation, rhyme
and alliteration. In the next two chapters I develop the notion
of poetic effects in the context of theories of emotion
(Chapter 6) and the notion of qualia (Chapter 7). In the
conclusion (Chapter 8) I return to the questions raised at the
beginning of this introduction: in particular I return to the
question of aesthetic value and provide a characterisation of
the notions 'poetic thought' and 'poetic representation'.
For ease of exposition I will adopt the following conventions. I
will use the pronoun 'she' to refer to the communicator and 'he'
to refer to the addressee. I will use capital letters for Literary
I.heory intending a range of contemporary, relativistic, anti-
essentialist and anti-theoretical approaches to literature.
(Literary Theory is thus to be distinguished from literary
theory, to which it is opposed.)
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CHAPTER ONE
LITERARY STUDIES AND LITERARY THEORY
1.1.	 Introduction: Approaches to literary studies.
Literary studies encompasses many different kinds of enquiry.
For some years it has been a matter of intense debate as to
how each line of enquiry should be pursued, which of them
should take precedence, or which are, indeed, legitimate. There
has always been a measure of uncertainty and confusion, with
periodic attempts to put literary studies back on the right
track, or to suggest radical new directions. It is possible to
argue, as John Crowe Ransome did, for example, that literary
studies has no proper discipline of its own, that the student of
literature is part historian, part philosopher, and part social
reformer. As time has passed other roles have been suggested
for the student of literature, other ways in which the field of
studies might be divided up. This thesis will argue the case for
the development of yet one more line of enquiry and indicate
how it relates to other legitimate areas of interest within
literary studies.
It would be useful to begin by drawing some basic distinctions
between possible approaches to literary studies. The first
distinction should be drawn between lines of enquiry that are
intrinsic and those that are extrinsic to the nature of
literary communication and literary experience. In many
literature courses time is given to questions of cultural or
social history, for example, or to the history of ideas.
Dostoyevsky might be taught in the context of Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche in a course concerned with the nature of
Existentialism. A course on Romanticism might give time, say,
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to Coleridge's Monologue to a Young Jack Ass, simply because it
expresses certain key Romantic ideas in a clear and interesting
way. It may be tacitly acknowledged that the poem is not a
great literary achievement, but literary quality is beside the
point for the purpose in hand. The text, in this instance, is
interesting on account of the ideas it communicates or to
which it alludes, not as an instance of literary or poetic
communication. The uses of literature to illustrate issues in
social and cultural history or the history of ideas are
legitimate uses, as long as the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction
is kept in mind. It must be clear that the interest in literature
qua literature is a quite distinct interest.
Jefferson and Robey (1982:2) draw a similar, though not
identical, distinction between 'literary criticism' and 'literary
scholarship'. Criticism involves 'discussions of literary works
that focus upon the experience of reading' and is concerned
with 'describing, interpreting and evaluating the meaning and
effect that literary works have for competent but not
necessarily academic readers.' Scholarship, on the other hand,
is concerned 'with factors in one way or another external to
this experience: the genesis of the work, its textual
transmission' and so forth. Scholarship here represents the
attempt to establish a niche for the literary academic, an area
of expertise, beyond that of the competent 'common reader'. It
takes a literary canon as given and gets to work on textual,
historical and philological matters, for all of which scholarly
expertise is required. Again, these traditional 'scholarship'
pursuits have their place. They only have their place, however,
after it has been decided what texts they should get to work
on. That decision does require thinking about questions of
literary value, questions to do with the nature of literature,
questions that are concerned with what is intrinsic to
literature and literary communication.
Works of literature, and artworks more generally, have value
and interest for many reasons other than purely aesthetic ones.
Abuladze's Repentance was an important film, at least in the
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early days of glasnost in the former Soviet Union. Clearly its
impact owed a great deal to its political content, to its
exposure of the horrors and injustices of the Stalinist period.
The question as to whether it was also a good film artistically
was almost a secondary issue. Similarly, although the novels
of Alexander Solzhenitsyn won him a Nobel Prize for
Literature, the question has been raised as to whether the
value of these novels lies as much in their historical and
political importance as in their literary achievement, and
perhaps even more so.
A poem or novel might otherwise be interesting because it is
written by someone one knows. It might be valuable because it
evokes memories of a place in which one has lived. It may
contain interesting ideas. There are countless reasons, some
trivial, some significant, as to why one might value, or gain
pleasure from, an artwork. Some of these reasons might be
worth exploring in an academic context.
1.2.	 Artwork and aesthetic experience.
'Of course it's a work of art. It's in an art gallery'.
Attributed to Damien Hirst, May 1994.
Having distinguished intrinsic from extrinsic approaches to the
study of literature, it is important to make a further
distinction between two types of intrinsic approach. There are
two important questions that an intrinsic approach to literary
studies might address, which correspond to well-known
questions in aesthetics. One concerns the nature or concept of
'artwork': what, for example, distinguishes an artwork from
something that is not an artwork? (This question can be
phrased as: what distinguishes an artwork from a mere thing?
In the case of literature the question can become, as it does
for Fodor (1993): what distinguishes an artwork from
rhetoric?) A different question, and one that is amenable to a
theoretical approach is: what is the distinctive nature of
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aesthetic communication and experience? 'What is a literary
work of art?' and 'What is the nature of literary
communication?' are quite distinct questions. The answers to
these questions lead potentially to quite different kinds of
enquiry within literary studies.
In introducing the question about the nature of artworks Fodor
(1993) refers to Wittgenstein's question in Philosophical
Investigations (paragraph 621): what, more than my arm's
rising, is there to my raising my arm? This question
highlights interesting philosophical problems concerning the
nature of the properties that distinguish these two types of
happening (an event and an action). Wittgenstein presents us
with a twin case where the twins share exactly the same
physical properties and therefore must differ in terms of their
non-physical properties. It is an interesting question in the
context of the present discussion, according to Fodor, because
it can be parallelled by similar examples that illustrate the
problem of the nature of artworks.
Fodor argues that an event and an action, identical in every
physical aspect, must differ in terms of their relational
properties. Arguing from the perspective of intentional
realism, the relation has to be defined with respect to
intentional states. As Fodor puts it: 'what makes a motion an
act of F-ing is that it is caused, in the right sort of way, by an
intention to F' (Fodor 1993:44). in like manner Fodor
distinguishes artworks from 'mere things' in terms of their
intentional etiology. Referring to an example discussed by
Danto (1981), he argues that what distinguishes Warho's
BrilI p Boxes from mere brillo boxes is Warhol's intention that
the former be an artwork. An audience's recognition of Brillo
Boxes as an artwork is a consequence of that audience's
recognition that Warhol intended Brillo Boxes to be an artwork.
Such twin case examples are familiar from discussions in
philosophy of art as to what constitutes an artwork. Ground
(1989) cites as an example a Henry Moore sculpture, entitled
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Recumbent Figure, on display in an open air exhibition, next to
which a meteorite lands from the sky, identical to the
sculpture in every physical detail. The difference between
these two objects is one of intentional relations. The sculpture
was deliberately conceived as and fashioned to be an artwork.
The audience recognises that it was intended to be an artwork.
As a result they view it in a special way and ascribe to it a
range of stylistic predicates, which it would be impossible to
apply to the meteorite: it is witty, perhaps, or ironic, or sad,
or joyful - evidence, in other words, for a state of mind which
the artist wished (to some extent) to communicate.
Objects not actually shaped by artists, such as Danto's (1981)
example of Warhol's Brillo Boxes, or Duchamp's urinal, are,
according to Danto, works of art that are about the nature of
works of art. The artist removes an everyday object from its
usual surroundings and declares it to be a work of art. Such
self-consciously philosophical works of art invite a special
form of attention. Visitors to the exhibition do not confuse
Duchamps' 'artwork-urinal' with a real urinal; anyone using it
as one would presumably be engaged in a dramatic piece of art
criticism rather than genuinely confused.
Fodor argues that his 'Cartesian aesthetics', based on the
claim that artworks should be defined in terms of their
intentional etiology, already has some substance. The maker of
an artwork must possess the concept 'artwork'. This means
that artworks cannot historically pre-exist the concept
'artwork', and they cannot just happen by accident. They can
only exist in societies and cultures where 'artwork' is a shared
concept. They probably do not get created by other species, or
machines. For this aesthetics to have any real substance,
however, the concept 'artwork' needs to be defined. An artwork
can be (partially) defined in terms of the intention that it have
an audience. Brillo Boxes was intended to have an audience;
brillo boxes are not.
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Turning to literary artworks, it is clearly not enough to argue
that literary artworks are artworks insofar as they are
intended to have an audience, even if this is qualified to 'any
audience who cares to take an interest' as opposed to some
specific audience that the writer has in mind. It can even be
argued that it is not necessary for a literary artwork that it
be written with an audience in mind. Fodor accepts that there
are such cases but argues: 'Perhaps, in these cases, intending
that something be an artwork is intending that it should belong
to a kind of which the paradigms are intended to have
audiences.' (Fodor 1993:54, fn.9).
Literary artworks, for Fodor, are intended to affect an
audience in a certain way. The twin case problem occurs with
the question: how is a literary artwork to be distinguished
from rhetoric? Both are constituted by their intentional
etiology, both are intended to have certain kinds of effects on
audiences. Fodor's example of an artwork/rhetoric twin is
Antony's funeral oration from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar and
Antony's funeral oration as delivered by the historical Antony
to the Roman crowds. (Notice here that Fodor assumes that the
effects achieved by artwork and rhetoric are of the same kind:
'I think that the important difference between art and rhetoric
is not in the effects they aim at, but in the means that they
employ to make their effects.' (Fodor 1993:47; Fodor's
italics)). The problem with this example is that the speech in
Shakespeare's Julius Caesar is not in itself an artwork, but is
part of a literary artwork and only makes sense, as
Shakespeare intended it to make sense, within the context of
the play as a whole. Also, in the play, there are several layers
of communication: (an actor as) Antony is communicating to
(other actors as) the Roman people on one level; Shakespeare is
communicating with his audience on another level. This
introduces complications which Fodor does not consider.
Fodor's argument relies on Grice's analysis of what it is for a
speaker to mean something by an utterance, i.e. his analysis of
meaning-nn, in Grice (1957;1989: 213-223). According to this
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analysis, in verbal communication an utterance is produced (i)
with the intention to cause certain effects on an audience (to
cause the audience to have certain beliefs) and (ii) with the
further intention that it causes these effects partly by virtue
of the audience recognising the speaker's intention that the
utterance cause these effects. The difference between literary
artwork and rhetoric (by which Fodor intends language used for
persuasion, as in political oratory or advertising) is, for Fodor,
a difference in the relative importance of these two
intentions. In the case of rhetoric the first intention is
primary, and the second intention, if present at all, only there
to subserve the first. In the case of literary artworks, on the
other hand, the second intention is primary. This seems to be
equivalent to saying that rhetoric may engage in covert
communication, or that, in terms of the analysis provided by
Sperber and Wilson (1986a: Chapter 1, sections 11 and 12), the
informative intention is more important than the
communicative intention. It is sufficient in advertising, for
example, for the audience to be affected in a certain way, for
it to come to hold certain beliefs about a certain product and
then desire to go out and buy it. The audience does not even
have to be in the presence of the advertisement for the
advertisement to have its intended effect. You can tell me
about the Carling Black Label advertisement and that might be
enough to convince me to stop off at the off-licence on my way
home from work the next day. Artworks, on the other hand, can
only be successful, in the sense of 'have their intended
effects', if the audience is present. A Ia Recherche dti.. Temp
Percfjj or Recumbent Figure cannot be successful, in the
intended way, if somebody tells me about them over a cup of
coffee.
It is clear that in the case of rhetoric (advertisements,
political oratory, etc.) the first intention is primary and the
'reflexive' intention secondary. The - important point is, in
terms of the reanalysis offered by Sperber and Wilson (1986a),
that the informative intention is fulfilled, that the addressee
comes to have certain beliefs. It is not so clear what Fodor
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intends by suggesting that in the case of literary artworks the
'reflexive' intention is primary and the first intention
secondary, unless he means that it is important that the
'reflexive' intention be recognised irrespective of whether the
first ('informative') intention is fulfilled. But that does not
seem to provide a satisfactory account of what distinguishes
literary artworks from rhetoric, or indeed, from verbal
communication in general.
Another problem relates to the issue of 'presence'. I have to be
in the presenceof Recumbent Figure to appreciate its intended
effect; I probably do not have to be in the presence of Brillo
Boxes to appreciate its intended effect. Fodor invents the
category of 'failed artwork' to describe such instances of
'word of mouth art'. But 'failed artwork' seems to be
equivalent to 'artwork that does not communicate aesthetic
effects'. The question of presence is an interesting fact about
aesthetic experience; it is not an interesting fact about
art works.
I would like to suggest that most of the interesting facts are
about aesthetic experience rather than artworks. If one is not
going to accept that 'artwork' is an evaluative concept, then it
would seem to be the case that 'artwork' becomes a true
family resemblance term. The intention that something be an
artwork may, in fact, be a range of different intentions.
Accepting a liberal view of ariworks one has to accept that
historical and cultural factors play a role. It is difficult to
imagine, for instance, that any Renaissance artist could have
intended (a sixteenth century equivalent of) a urinal as an
artwork.
Fodor's other twin case literary artwork example is
Hem ingway's Over the River and Into the Woods. It becomes
possible to view it as a twin case if we consider the
possibility that, as a late novel, it could be read as self-
parody. If it were an early novel it could not be read in that
way. The two novels as text-tokens share the same physical
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properties but differ in their relational properties (defined in
terms of intentions). Readers who recognise the intentions of
the author towards these two texts read the one as a serious
novel and the other as a parody.
Each twin in this example is an artwork, though a different
type of artwork with different kinds of effects. It would be
more illuminating to invent examples that parallel the 'brillo
box' and 'urinal' examples mentioned above. Culler (1975) takes
an article from a newspaper and considers it as a poem. He
does in fact arrange it in verse lines, but maybe that is largely
equivalent to the placing of a urinal in the room of an art
gallery. Culler's 'poem' reads as follows:
Hier sur Ia Nationale sept
Une automobile
Roulant a cent	 I heure s est jetee
Sur un pla lane
Ses quatre occupants ont 6té
Tu6s.
Culler uses this example to argue that the same utterances can
be read differently, given different meanings, depending on
whether they are first recognised as a piece of journalism, for
example, or a poem. As a poem, Culler argues, a new set of
expectations and a different set of conventions are called into
play.
"Hier', for example, takes on a completely
different force: referring now to the set of
possible yesterdays, it suggests a common, almost
random event. One is likely to give new weight to
the wilfulness of 's'est jete' (literally, 'threw
itself') and to the passivity of 'its occupants',
defined in relation to their automobile. The lack of
detail or explanation connotes a certain absurdity,
and the neutral reportorial style will no doubt be
read as restraint and resignation. We might even
note an element of suspense after 's'est jete' and
discover bathos in the possible pun on 'platane'
('plat' = flat) and in the finality of the isolated
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'tu6s'.' (Culler 1975: 161-162).
Fish (1980) reports on a similar twin case experiment. This
involved tricking a group of students into believing that a list
of names (of linguists and literary critics) that he had written
on the board in his room during a previous class, was a 17th
century religious poem. The students were, apparently, taken in
by this piece of deception and proceeded to analyse it in the
way they had been trained to analyse 17th century religious
poems. They managed to do this, according to Fish, with a fair
measure of success. The list/poem Fish used is as follows:
Jacobs-Rosenbaum
Levin
Thorne
Hayes
Ohman (?)
Fish (1980: 323-324) gives a fairly lengthy account of the
interpretation procedures that his students used to transform
this list into a poem. The point of the exercise was to show
how certain special purpose reading strategies are brought
into play irrespective of the nature of the text. Texts may be
given a special kind of attention, of a kind that they would not
otherwise receive. Culler and Fish would not subscribe to the
Cartesian aesthetics espoused by Fodor. For them a literary
artwork is to be characterised in terms of a special discourse
strategy, which operates in the absence of any concern for
either actual or virtual intentions. Literary works of art are
not out there to be identified in the world, they are to be
defined in terms of the way we relate to them. But the way we
relate to them is in terms of sets of rules, conventions or
strategies that we learn (to a large extent in literature
classes). These strategies or conventions are social or cultural
in origin. The very term 'literary artwork' becomes suspect.
There are only texts to be invested with meanings. Texts are
not born literary; they have literariness thrust upon them.
In Fodor's paper the notion of 'artwork' is recognised as quite
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distinct from the notion of aesthetic response and value.
(Fodor suggests, quite reasonably, that Brillo B.s may be
considered an artwork without evoking any aesthetic response,
whereas Chartres Cathedral and Greek vases, although not
considered artworks, may evoke aesthetic responses.) If an
account based on intentions is not accepted, then the question
what is an artwork? will be answered in terms of social
conventions. What causes an object to be a literary artwork, as
opposed to a piece of journalism or a list of names, is a
relationship between a text and a set of social conventions.
Only if 'artwork' is seen as an evaluative concept, or if one
simply concentrates on the question of aesthetic response, can
the crucial relational properties be seen in cognitive terms as
the relation, in the case of literary artworks, between texts
and specific mental representations and processes.
If 'artwork' is not an evaluative concept, I have suggested, its
definition becomes open-ended and fuzzy. In practice one
either ends up with the question of what fits into the category
of artwork being determined by a group of experts, or, more
democratically, one agrees to accept as an artwork whatever
anyone/people-in-general decide to call an artwork. In the case
of literary artworks the issue may even be decided by
conventions of reading.
This has important implications for how literature is studied
and what kind of discipline it is considered to be. What I am
suggesting is that 'artwork' is an interpretive term (in the
sense used in Sperber 1985, Chapter 1). Sperber uses the term
'sacrifice' as an example of an interpretive term that refers to
a range of different practices in different cultures. Such an
interpretive term is useful to ethnographers in their attempts
to convey some sense of what certain cultures are like, but it
is not a useful term to anthropologists who are interested in
developing anthropology as a theoretical discipline. As in the
case of 'sacrifice', it might be of interest to discover what the
concept 'artwork' meant to different people in different
historical periods, or to discover what it currently means to
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different people in different cultures. Because of the
interpretive nature of the concept the question what is a
(literary) artwork? can never be a theoretical question. The
question of aesthetic response, however, may be tackled
theoretically if it is possible to characterise the literary
reading process in terms of distinctive cognitive properties.
There is great pressure on any move towards a theoretical
approach to such issues. The view of literature as a social
institution has been accompanied by the view that there is
nothing intrinsically distinctive about aesthetic experience or
the literary reading process. There has been a reversal of the
idea that aesthetic experience should define artwork: the
aesthetic itself, in current Literary Theory, is seen as socially
constructed. The shift encouraged by such views has been away
from an intrinsic approach to literary studies. The argument
that I will develop in this thesis will, therefore, represent a
challenge to much currently fashionable and influential
thinking in literary studies.
Fabb and Durant (1987:4) provide a summary of the current
arguments with regard to this issue. They argue that it is 'no
longer possible to consider questions about language and
literature without taking into account the social and political
context in which aD forms of discourse operate.' They go on to
argue the case that calls into question the validity of the
literary canon:
'Over the last twenty-five years there have been
repeated assaults on the idea that literature can
be usefully separated off from other kinds of
written text. In the first place, it is difficult to
identify any formal properties of literary language
which do not also appear in non-literary language.
Secondly, in much modernist literature 'literary
language' achieves its effects by code-switching
between registers, including those of speech, and
so embeds - and works largely by contrast with -
varieties usually classified as non-literary
language. Thirdly, it appears that both
traditionally 'literary' and 'non-literary' kinds of
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discourse share a common range of properties
when considered pragmatically, from the point of
view of the kinds of communicative acts they
perform.' (Fabb & Durant 1987:6).
The main point I would wish to question here is the third one.
If the focus is on literary communication, rather than on an
ill-defined collection of texts that may or may not have
literary qualities, then literary communication does indeed
differ in its pragmatic properties from non-literary
communication, as I hope to illustrate in some detail later. The
main problem may again be that Fabb and Durant are, here,
focussing on the artwork issue rather than the aesthetic
response issue. Even if one agrees with the general argument
that Fabb and Durant are putting forward, one may still
consider it to be irrelevant to the much more interesting and
substantive issue of aesthetic response.
The interest in developing intrinsic approaches within literary
studies has a long pedigree. As I mentioned in the Introduction,
l.A.Richards (1924:1) focussed his attention on the question:
'What gives the experience of reading a certain poem its
value?' Richards (1929) showed just how difficult this was as
a practical criticism question when applied to particular
poems. He attempted to develop a theoretical approach to the
question based, as he argued that it would need to be, on
theories of communication, emotion and value, all of these
grounded in psychological theory. Although his questions were
interesting and general intuitions sound, Richards was
severely constrained by the state of psychology at the time he
was writing. It is now time to ask the same questions, but
within frameworks provided by cognitive psychology and
cognitive pragmatics.
Both prior to and since Richards (1924) there have been several
moves to develop intrinsic approaches within literary studies,
both theoretical and critical. The practical criticism
movement with its emphasis on evaluation, New Criticism
with its emphasis on 'verbal icons' and 'well-wrought urns',
and Formalism, with its emphasis on literary language, were
all attempts to understand and respond to what was
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essentially
'I ite ra rifles s'.
unfocussed,
to develop
interests.
literary, to what Jakobson referred to as
They were reactions to what was seen as an
unprincipled literary studies that used literature
what were essentially extrinsic non-literary
New Criticism and Formalism have both been extremely
influential on the way literature has been viewed and taught,
the former influencing and shaping practical criticism, the
latter influencing the growth and development of literary
stylistics. Despite their differences they both represent a
movement to establish a clear intrinsic approach to literary
studies. The New Critics sought to attack traditional academic
scholarship, to develop a theory of criticism that would
separate literature off from history, sociology and philosophy,
to create a new way of talking about literary works that would
replace discussions of background, social usefulness and
intellectual content with analysis of structure. Formalists,
likewise, rejected biographical, psychological and sociological
approaches to literature. In Russia, where the formalist
movement began, theorists turned against social critics such
as Belinsky and philosophical-religious critics such as
Berdyaev. They believed that it was possible to develop a
scientific approach to literature through linguistic analysis.
As Eichenbaum wrote: 'the original group of Formalists was
united by the idea of liberating poetic diction from the fetters
of the intellectualism and moralism which more and more
obsessed the symbolists.' (Eichenbaum 1927; 1981:106). A
linguistic orientation, on the other hand, allowed a criticism
based on 'the scientific study of facts'. Intrinsic approaches to
literary studies (both theoretical and literary critical) are
nothing new, then, despite the current reaction to them (for
reasons which will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 2).
A 'poetic thought' is a special kind of thought (involving a
special kind of thinking) that is difficult to express and
communicate accurately. At least, this is the view of many
poets. Seamus Heaney has made the point (in discussion during
a poetry reading at the Kent Arts Festival in 1986) that poets
have to balance the conflicting claims of 'accuracy' and
25
'decency'. By this he meant that poets are primarily concerned
with the accurate expression of 'poetic thoughts' and only
secondarily with making such expression accessible to an
audience.
One of the main aims of this thesis is to answer the question:
what is a poetic thought? Literary critics treat this as an
interpretive question, one that depends on the subtlety and
clarity of their stylistic intuitions, on their ability to
experience poetic thoughts themselves (and then report back on
the experience). Here, by contrast, I want to treat the question
as a theoretical question, as l.A.Richards, Roman Jakobson and
the Russian Formalists, for example, tried to do. I want to
abstract away from actual poetic thoughts and ask: what
really are poetic thoughts in cognitive terms?
I began this chapter by discussing Fodor (1993), because he
raises interesting issues in aesthetics from the point of view
of intentional realism. Intentional realism, he argues, offers
'perhaps the major lesson that aesthetics has to learn from the
philosophy of mind.' (Fodor 1993: 43). Fodor's Cartesian
aesthetics, I believe, is potentially richer than current
accounts that view literature as a social institution, or that
seek to explain literature in terms of social context. I have
argued, however, that a more interesting and theoretically
substantive approach may follow from focussing on the
question of aesthetic experience. This question must be
grounded in cognitive pragmatics, which also provides major
lessons from which aesthetics might learn.
To develop a theoretical approach it is important to
concentrate on literariness as a form of aesthetic experience,
which is universal, rather than literature which is a cultural
notion. Sperber (1975) makes a similar point when he argues
that it is important to concentrate on symbolism rather than
the notion of symbol. He argues:
'The semiological illusion aside, there is no need
for an analysis of the symbolic phenomenon into
symbols. The notion of a symbol is not universal
but cultural, present or absent, differing from
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culture to culture, or even within a given culture.'
(Sperber 1975:50).
Just as 'the very notion of symbol is a secondary and cultural
development of the universal phenomenon that is symbolism'
(Sperber 1975:49), so the notions and concepts of 'artwork' and
'literature' are secondary and cultural developments of the
universal phenomenon of aesthetic experience.
This theoretical approach to aesthetic experience or
literariness must be an account of real mental representations
and real mental processes that are triggered when a literary
text is read, or, on a smaller scale, when a rhetorical device is
used to create poetic effects. The assumption underlying this
approach is that there is something special about the mental
representations and processes involved in the communication
of poetic effects that distinguishes them from those
representations and processes involved in other kinds of
communication.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL AND ANTI-THEORETICAL POSITIONS
WITHIN LITERARY STUDIES.
2.1.	 Introduction.
What is the object of literary theory? Is there such a thing as
literariness that can be defined and explained? Those who
think there is have usually sought to define literariness in
terms of formal linguistic properties of texts, or in terms of
sociocultural codes or conventions. Those who think there is
not have argued that there is nothing essentially literary in
'literary' texts or the 'literary' reading experience, and that
theoretical approaches are, in consequence, impossible. The
former I will refer to as literary theorists; the latter I will
refer to as Literary Theorists.
This chapter will briefly consider a range of these theoretical
and anti-theoretical approaches. The discussion will not
attempt to be comprehensive; it will merely aim to suggest a
range of ways in which it is possible to formulate answers to
the question What is literariness? I will go on to develop the
argument that a theoretical account of literariness grounded in
cognitive pragmatics might form the basis for a new research
programme that challenges many generally accepted and
established views concerning the nature of literary studies as
a discipline. Such a theory would be directly concerned with
what is intrinsically literary in literary communication, with
questions of aesthetic value and aesthetic response.
The present focus on small-scale poetic effects, largely as
they occur in poems, raises an important issue as to the
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relation between literary communication in general and poetic
communication in particular, but it is an issue that lies
outside the scope of this thesis. In this chapter the discussion
of literary theoretical positions is relevant to the general
argument in that such positions are grounded in theories of
language and communication which can be adequately
illustrated, and countered where necessary, by reference to
small scale poetic effects.
2.2	 Literariness as a linguistic property of texts.
Language is the medium of literary art, so it seems reasonable
to consider the possibility that there is something special
about the way language is organised in literary texts, and to
proceed to define literariness in terms of linguistic
properties. This was, in effect, the possibility explored by
Opoyaz (the Petersburg 'Society for the study of poetic
language') and the Moscow Linguistic Circle in what became a
body of theory known as Formalism. It was also explored by
Prague School theory, and by later developments in the theory
of Roman Jakobson. Jakobson's account of literariness in terms
of texts that are highly structured linguistically, producing a
'set towards the message', is generally seen as a (if not the)
classic essentialist theory. Just as Prague School theorists
such as Mukarovsky emphasised linguistic deviation as the
hallmark of the poetic text, so Jakobson emphasised the
functional role played by structural parallelisms and contrasts
on all linguistic levels. In the case of poetry, phonologically or
syntactically related items are repeated to form complex
symmetrical patterns. These patterns, Jakobson argued, can be
discovered through objective linguistic analysis:
'Any unbiased, attentive, exhaustive, total
description of the selection, distribution and
interrelation of diverse morphological classes and
syntactic constructions in a given poem surprises
the examiner himself by unexpected, striking
symmetries and anti-symmetries, balanced
structures, efficient accumulation of equivalent
forms and salient contrasts...' (Jakobson
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1968:603.)
In his most famous formulation, which may be termed the
projection postulate, he states that 'the poetic function
projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of
selection into the axis of combination.' (Jakobson 1960:358).
Such an approach, for Jakobson, grounds a theory of
literariness in linguistic theory. He expressed the view that
anyone with an interest in the workings of language should be
interested in the way language works in literary texts, that
literary theory was a natural subpart of linguistic theory.
It has been claimed, for example by Kiparsky (1987), that
Jakobson's linguistics is outdated and pre-theoretical.
Kiparsky argues, however, that Jakobson's programme remains
valid, when reformulated in terms of current linguistic theory.
The projection postulate, itself, has received several recent
reformulations. Kiparsky (1981:11) has referred to it as 'the
observation that various aspects of [poetic] form all involve
some kind of recurrence of equivalent linguistic elements.'
Others have repeated or reformulated more general formalist
ideas about the foregrounding of linguistic elements in poetry.
Jackendoff, for example, stresses the importance of formal
patternings in his comparison of music with the use of
language for artistic purposes:
'All of a sudden the phonological and syntactic
levels become of crucial significance. One counts
syllables; one matches phonological segmentations
in rhyme and alliteration; one makes use of
calculated deviations from normal word order.
Thus, the understanding of poetry, like the
understanding of music, makes use of all the
relevant levels of representation.........The
generalization appears to be that artistic activity
and artistic appreciation in any faculty may make
use of formal properties of all levels of
representation in that faculty.' (Jackendoff
1987:234).
If it is indeed the case that the multilayered symmetrical
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patternings in poetic language serve to foreground the
linguistic message, then it becomes pertinent to ask how it
does this and to what ends. The parallelisms and oppositions
Jakobson discovers in his analyses are partly directly
perceptible, especially in the case of sound patterns (metre,
rhyme, alliteration, etc.) and obvious syntactic parallelisms,
and partly not directly perceptible (grammatical categories
and classifications only recoverable after analysis by
linguists). Riffaterre (1966), in his discussion of Jakobson and
Levi-Strauss's analysis of Baudelaire's Les Chats, criticises
Jakobson for not explaining how parallelisms and contrasts
that are not directly perceptible can affect the reader. In his
analysis of one of Baudelaire's Spleen poems (discussed in
Culler 1975:58-61), Jakobson argues, according to Culler, that,
among many other such symmetrical patternings, 'adjectival
participles are symmetrically distributed in the odd stanzas'
(Cutler 1975:60). It is, indeed, difficult to see how symmetries
of this kind could have an effect on the reader. Certainly it
would be extremely unlikely that they would be monitored on-
line (NPs of a particular kind, pronominal forms of a particular
kind, etc.) and kept in short-term memory on the off-chance
that they might fit into some overarching pattern. Even were
this highly implausible idea true, there remains the question
as to the effect such patterning would have. A further problem
is that all types of patterning would presumably have exactly
the same aesthetic consequences. Were this the case it would
lead to a greatly impoverished account of the nature of
aesthetic effects.
Jakobson does offer a number of observations about the nature
of these effects. He argues that certain aesthetic effects
result from the satisfaction of a basic desire for regular
symmetric patterns, whether these be perceived consciously or
unconsciously. Part of these effects involve the creation of
further unexpected meanings, as the formal parallelisms
encourage a search for corresponding parallelisms at the
semantic level.
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There is a further suggestion, familiar from Prague School
writings and from the discussion of the notion of
defamiliarisation in Russian formalist writings, that 'the set
towards the message' leads to a new, fresh perception of
reality. Defamiliarisation was the basic aim of art, according
to Shklovsky.
'Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture,
one's wife, and the fear of war.......And art exists
that one may recover the sensation of life; it
exists to make one feel things, to make the stone
stony. The purpose of art is to impart the
sensation of things as they are perceived and not
as they are known. The technique of art is to make
objects 'unfamiliar', to make forms difficult, to
increase the difficulty and length of perception
because the process of perception is an aesthetic
end in itself and must be prolonged............A work is
created 'artistically' so that its perception is
impeded and the greatest possible effect is
produced through the slowness of the perception.'
(Shklovsky, 1917, Art as Technique.)
Strange language, archaisms, 'phonetic roughening' through the
repetition of identical sounds all contribute to this process of
defamiliarisation. There are many valuable intuitions about
how poetry works in Shklovsky's writings, some of which will
be discussed later, when I shall expand upon the idea that
works are created artistically by increasing the difficulty and
length of perception. I also hope to show how and why art
exists to make us feel things.
Here it is sufficient to point out that the link that Jakobson,
Shklovsky and others draw between linguistic organisation and
aesthetic effects was always, and necessarily, vague and
intuitive. The formalists had a clear, precise way of analysing
the formal linguistic properties of texts, but no
correspondingly clear, precise way of analysing the aesthetic
effects in psychological or cognitive terms. The gap between
linguistic organisation and effects could not be filled in the
absence of pragmatic and psycholinguistic theory.
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Jakobson, for example, adduces no real evidence for the
psychological reality of the supposed response to symmetry.
There is a similar explanatory gap in the more recent
comments of Jackendoff. There must be a point to the counting
of syllables and the matching of phonological segmentations in
rhyme and alliteration. Presumably, the phonological and
syntactic patterns to which Jackendoff refers are there
because they have certain effects and we need to turn to
psycholinguistics and cognitive pragmatics for a processing
rather than a structural account of these effects.
Among other criticisms that have been levelled at Jakobson's
approach is the argument that any text can be analysed for
structural parallelisms and contrasts, especially if one adopts
an ad hoc approach to the particular categories one is prepared
to use. Culler, for example, argues that 'linguistic categories
are so numerous and flexible that one can use them to find
evidence for practically any form of organisation' and attempts
to illustrate the claim that 'using Jakobson's analytical
methods one can find the same symmetries of odd and even,
external and internal, anterior and posterior in a given piece of
prose.' (Culler 1975:62,63; see also Werth (1976) for similar
arguments and a sample analysis). But, as Kiparsky points out,
one cannot multiply or invent categories at will: ' .......the
linguistic sames which are potentially relevant in poetry are
just those which are potentially relevant in grammar'.
(Kiparsky 1981:13). A Jakobsonian programme remains valid
when revised in the light of contemporary linguistic (and
pragmatic) theory, if one accepts that grammatical categories
are in some sense psychological givens (see Kiparsky 1987).
For Kiparsky the theoretical programme becomes one of
developing 'a counterpart in the theory of literature to
universal grammar in linguistics'. (Kiparsky 1981:11).
Even if there is some real basis for measuring patterns of
parallelisms and contrasts, it is still possible to argue that
such organisation can be found in non-literary texts.
Advertisements, for example, frequently exhibit such patterns.
33
Jakobson would accept that the poetic function is present in
such texts, but would also argue that it is not the dominant
function. In the case of advertisements, and persuasive
rhetoric in general, the poetic function would be secondary to
the conative function. The key to poetic texts is not the
presence of the poetic function, but the dominance of this
function over other secondary functions (for example, over the
expressive function in lyric poetry, the referential function in
realist fiction and the conative function in didactic poetry).
Jakobson is careful not to confuse the poetic function with
poetry, or literariness with literary works of art. With regard
to the importance of the distinction between a theory of
literariness and a theory of literature, Jakobson argues:
'The subject of literary science is not literature,
but literariness, i.e. that which makes a given
work a literary work.....Neither Tynyanov, nor
Shklovsky, nor Mukarovsky, nor I have declared
that art is a closed sphere.......What we emphasise
is not the separatism of art, but the autonomy of
the aesthetic function'. (Jakobson, quoted in
O'Toole and Shukman (1977:17; 1977:19)).
The problem remains for Jakobson, however, that these kinds
of judgements about functions cannot be made without also
eliciting judgements from readers that go beyond the evidence
provided by linguistic data.
Jakobson goes so far as to argue that there is a correlation
between literary value and linguistic organisation (as in his
paper on Yeats, for example, in Jakobson (1985)). But the non-
poetic verses found in Christmas cards are as highly patterned
as most actual poems in terms of perceptible and salient verse
features. Such patterning is not sufficient for the achievement
of poetic effects. As Hollander says of verse effects, they
refer to 'the formal structures which are a necessary condition
of poetry, but not a sufficient one.' (Hollander 1989:1).
Jakobson, of course, goes beyond what Hollander would
naturally consider to be verse features when he makes a
further appeal to the symmetry of grammatical categories, a
symmetry only available for inspection after linguistic
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analysis. But such symmetries, whether patterns of
grammatical categories or the more obvious metrical,
alliterative and rhyming patterns, cannot provide the grounds
for aesthetic experience. Anyone might deliberately and
mechanically manufacture a piece of verse; a linguist could
take one of Jakobson's most subtle linguistic analyses of the
poetic function and also manufacture a piece of verse with the
same 'hidden' linguistic symmetries. Even if it were possible,
then, to measure the symmetrical patterns in any objective
sense (which most people doubt) it is still not clear that they
make a contribution to poetic effects or aesthetic value in the
essential way that Jakobson suggests that they do.
The ways in which verse is structured, as well as the degree of
structuring, may differ considerably. This leads one to ask:
how much patterning must there be for the poetic function to
make its presence felt? Are some kinds of patterning superior
to others? Certainly the type of formal organisation used can
vary both geographically and historically, as Kiparsky (1981)
notes. All poetry has used roughly the same elements of formal
organisation. Variation occurs with shifts and differences of
emphasis between elements that are obligatory and elements
that are optional. For example, the nature of some languages
makes rhyme more suitable as an obligatory structural element
than alliteration, and vice versa. In Old English, where stress
fell regularly on root syllables, alliteration was obligatory; as
stress rules changed then the forms of poetic organisation
changed and English poetry switched to rhyme. But given the
existence of free verse (which itself may, of course, be more
or less highly structured) and of poetic prose, it is important
to separate poetic effects and aesthetic value from a strict
identification with any kind of linguistic organisation. Verse
is just one (important) way of achieving poetic effects, and
whether or not it does must crucially depend on pragmatic
factors.
The problems with any such attempt to characterise
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literariness in terms of text-internal linguistic features are
manifold. There is the problem of weighting: how much formal
patterning is necessary? Are some kinds of formal
organisation more significant than others? (for example, sound
patterns versus distribution of NPs). There is the problem of
how formal features correlate with aesthetic value. There is
the problem that the projection postulate, as it stands, is
impossible to test. The main problem, however, seems to be
that there is a descriptive and explanatory gap between the
linguistic patterns and the various loosely described aesthetic
effects to which Jakobson and others allude. It would seem
that a linguistic theory (or a descriptive grammatical
analysis) is not enough. What is needed is not a structural
'spatial' analysis of poem as object or well-wrought urn, but
an analysis of the poem from an on-line pragmatic processing
perspective.
2.3.	 Literary Codes and Conventions.
The view that literariness could be accounted for in terms of
the linguistic properties of texts was supposed to have the
advantage of dealing with objective and incontrovertible
linguistic facts as data. Linguistic analysis, it was claimed,
would be able to show that the patterns predicted by the
projection postulate are really there. Unfortunately the data
have proved to be neither incontrovertible, nor the right sort of
data. Some further appeal always has to be made to what
readers understand to be literary. Some link has to be made
between regularity of pattern, or deviant (syntactically,
semantically or pragmatically anomalous) language use and the
meanings intuitively communicated. Most contemporary
stylistics does just this: it links (usually foregrounded)
linguistic features of literary texts with the meanings
purportedly communicated by the poem or piece of literary
prose. In developing a theory of literary or poetic style,
however, linguistic foregrounding, either through patterns or
deviations, is not sufficient in itself to cause poetic or
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aesthetic effects. Whether or not it is necessary returns us to
the tricky question of what counts as foregrounding and how
much.
Some idea is needed of how the observable linguistic data
affect the reader. How are literary meanings produced? There
are (at least) two ways of answering this question. One is to
argue that we need to go into the mind of the reader for data
and answers, looking in particular at language processing and
utterance interpretation. The rest of this thesis will follow
this route. The other is to argue that we should look to literary
codes, conventions or systems to provide the answer, thereby
avoiding psychological issues altogether. This possibility will
be considered in the next few sections of this chapter.
In encouraging the search for literary codes and conventions
semiotics and structuralism have formed the basis for another
major attempt to redefine the discipline of literary studies.
Semiotics, following Saussure's suggestion, sought to extend
the methods and goals of structural linguistics to a range of
disciplines dealing with social and cultural phenomena, that
had hitherto lacked clearly defined methodologies and aims.
Saussure encouraged the idea that principles of linguistic
analysis, such as the etic/emic distinction, could be extended
to these other areas of enquiry, and help to promote a new
discipline concerned with the nature and operation of signs.
The attraction of such an approach was, as in the case of
formalist theory, that it promised to turn diffuse, vaguely
defined areas of enquiry such as literary studies into
respectably theoretical (i.e. systematic, rigorous, objective)
academic disciplines.
Semiotics and structuralism do not present one unified
approach to literary studies, or any other discipline. The aim of
this section is not to give an overview of how they can be used
to redefine literary studies, but to consider one basic idea that
is suggested by these movements, namely the idea that
literariness can be explained in terms of underlying codes or
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conventions. These codes or conventions are generally
considered to be social or cultural in origin. They are arbitrary
systems of rules that have to be learnt or acquired. They
differ, however, from the rules and conventions of sports like
rugby or games like chess in that they are tacit and hidden,
rather than explicit, and need to be discovered through
analysis.
One of the first areas which was subjected to such analysis
was the study of myths and folklore. Stories that appear to be
quite different in their surface details can be shown to have a
common deep structure. Levi-Strauss (1969) quotes an example
of three events from European folkioric ritual. They all concern
events that happen at weddings which relate to unmarried
elder sisters. In one story the elder sister is placed on an oven.
In another she is made to dance barefoot. In the third she is
made to eat onions, roots and clover. All three seemingly
different events can be related by means of Levi-Strauss's
deep structural distinction between 'raw' and 'cooked'. The
first version represents a symbolic cooking and the other two
represent the 'raw' status of the unmarried sister. The
raw/cooked distinction corresponds to the distinction between
nature and culture. Levi-Strauss discovers in these stories
underlying systemic parallels that are expressed in terms of
idiosyncratic surface variety. This is a standard approach in
structuralist analysis, adapted from structuralist linguistics,
that can be applied to a wide variety of fields: it is one that
Barthes employs, for example, in his analysis of the fashion
system. It is important to point out that Levi-Strauss, unlike
Barthes and most other structuralists, was interested in
structuralist analysis for what it could reveal about the human
mind. (See Sperber (1985: Chapter 3) for discussion of this
point.)
In the case of literature structuralist analysis has sought to
uncover basic plot types and sequences and basic character
types that underlie all idiosyncratic narrative surface
structures. One of the seminal structuralist works is Propp's
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Morphology of the Folktale (Propp 1968). The folk tale was
considered by Propp to be the prototype for narrative in
general. He analyses seven basic 'spheres of action' or
character-types: hero, villain, donor, dispatcher, sought-for
person, helper and false hero. It may be that in a particular
story two or more characters at the concrete 'etic' level fulfil
the same deep structure role at the 'emic' level. Alternatively
one character in the tale can fulfil two roles at the 'emic'
level. This structuralist programme of research for literary
studies, it should be noted, is not concerned with questions of
style, aesthetic experience, or value. The structures that
constitute narrative underlie all narratives, not just literary
narratives. Literature is seen (like 'language', or 'langue') as a
system, consisting of structures (e.g. narrative) and related
structural elements, which underlies a reader's ability to make
sense of literary texts. Literariness, in this view, can be seen
in terms of such a literary system (or, as some have called it,
a 'grammar' or a 'competence'). This system exists
independently of human minds (and so should, perhaps, be
referre to as 'literary langue' rather than 'literary
competence').
A semiotic programme, studying the operation of individual
signs in literary texts as opposed to broader elements of
textual or discourse structure, emphasises the way in which
meanings are produced and organised into various areas of
experience through binary oppositions. Oppositions between
words are deliberately exploited by literary texts to extend
and multiply meanings. For example, the opposition between
'sun' and 'moon' is such a powerful one that it can signify
almost anything. It has been used to signal the following
distinctions: male/female, strength/weakness, reason/
emotion, constancy/ fickleness. In D.H.Lawrence's England. My
England Egbert's fair hair and blue eyes contrast with
Winifred's nut-brown hair and nut-brown eyes to signify an
opposition between idealism and earthiness, for example. I
take it that this example illustrates one of Eco's main points
(e.g. in Eco 1979) that literary texts typically 'overcode'. In
39
Eco's terms, in 'open' literary texts the process of semiosis is
given free rein. Key words, or signifiers, in such texts come to
generate a wide range of further meanings or signifieds.
According to this view there is a literary convention by which
differences between signs (such as binary oppositions) are
exploited to allow meanings to proliferate. Literariness may,
therefore, be defined in terms of such conventions. (In
poststructuralist terms this is not so much an agreed
convention, or a specifically literary convention, as a fact
about language: signs are naturally slippery). There are many
problems with such an approach when one comes to look at the
reading process from a psychological point of view. For
instance, one might ask: Do we always extend meanings
whenever possible? (If not, how do we know when to do this
and to what extent to do this?) Why do we extend meanings in
the way we do? What is the motivation for open-ended
semiosis?
Structuralist approaches generally seek to discover literary
codes for specific genres. The social nature of such codes is
emphasised by the fact that it is also generally considered to
be the case that these codes differ between cultures and over
time. Conceiving of codes in terms of a set of principles or
conventions radically changes the way in which it is possible
to account for literariness. As Cutler puts it:
'One need not struggle, as other theorists must, to
find some objective property of language which
distinguishes the literary from the non-literary
but may simply start from the fact that we can
read texts as literature and then inquire what
operations that involves.' (Culler 1975:128-129).
Culler (1975) proposes the notion of literary competence to
explain how it is we interpret literary texts and why we
interpret them in the way we do. He suggests that the
conventions that produce literary meanings and constitute
literary competence may be seen as a set of literary reading
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conventions. Culler makes the following suggestions for the
kind of conventions, or rules, which help readers to make sense
of poetry:
(i) The rule of significance/primary convention: read
the poem as expressing a significant attitude to
some problem concerning man and/or his relation to
the universe.
(ii) The rule of metaphorical coherence: attempt through
semantic transformations to produce coherence on
the levels of both tenor and vehicle.
(iii) Inscribe the poem in a poetic tradition.
(iv) The convention of thematic unity: read the poem as
coherent.
(v) The convention of binary opposites: look for terms
'which can be placed on a semantic or thematic axis
and opposed to one another.'
(vi) The fiction convention: read the poem as fiction.
(from CuIler 1975: Chapter 6.)
These suggestions are vague and ad hoc. Examples (ii) and (iv)
do not apply exclusively to literary discourse. Example (iii)
applies more or less strongly, or not at all, depending on the
poem. Example (vi) is completely vacuous. They clearly can
form no part of a serious pragmatic account of literary
communication, partly because of their lack of explicitness,
and partly because they do not operate as general principles:
some further decision has to be taken as to when the
conventions apply, to what degree they apply, and in what
sense they apply. They are best considered as a set of
heuristics rather than a set of special conventions. They are
the kind of heuristics (perhaps worded differently) that
literature teachers would use to encourage interpretations in
the classroom, or that readers make appeal to post hoc to
justify particular interpretations. They are generalisations
that are more or less useful depending on the read1r and the
poem. They are useful as an aid to interpretation rat!er than a
guarantee of full understanding. Culler, however, makes a
41
radical claim for the notion of literary competence. Whatever
the shortcomings of his actual proposals, it is worth
considering the independent merits of this idea.
The term 'literary competence' is often used in a loose sense,
roughly equivalent to the way in which Leech and Short (1981),
for example, use the term 'stylistic competence'. For Leech and
Short stylistic competence is like linguistic competence in
that it is 'a capacity which we possess and exercise
unconsciously and intuitively', but unlike linguistic
competence in that it is possessed by different people to
different degrees. (Leech & Short 1981:49). It is more a matter
of capacity or general ability in this usage, than of knowledge.
(Later I shall argue that stylistic effects follow automatically
from the way in which we are led or encouraged to process
utterances and that it is potentially misleading to talk of
stylistic competence as a capacity, unless its special loose
sense is emphasised.) Culler would appear to be suggesting a
rigorous and more radical analogy with the notion of linguistic
competence.
In linguistic theory competence refers to a native speaker's
knowledge of a language. The question what do you need to
know in order to know a language? can be answered for each
of the different linguistic levels. A native speaker has to know
the syntactic rules of a language for example, this knowledge
being implicit in his ability to judge whether token-sentences
in the language are grammatical. It does not seem to make
reasonable sense to talk of literary competence in this sense.
The only area in which it has been taken seriously is in
metrics, where various attempts have been made to provide
rules that describe the metrical competence that underlies a
reader's ability to judge whether a line is metrically
acceptable. So far the case for attempting such a task is
unproven. (Attridge (1982) provides detailed analysis and
criticism of generative metrics.) If it is a valid enterprise, one
should note that it is concerned only with metrical
competence. As metre is neither necessary nor sufficient for
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poetry, it follows that this research programme has nothing to
say about literary or poetic competence. Metrics is a self-
contained and well-defined area, however, and it is hard to see
how such an approach could apply to other areas that form part
of literary practice. Certainly it is hard to imagine any rules in
the same kind of format.
Any talk of literary competence is also questionable on the
grounds that 'literary' covers too wide a field. Should we not
be talking about a variety of different competences at the
level of practices like metrics? It is difficult to see how rules
of sufficient generality could define the knowledge which
enables us to make sense of any text that is literary. Culler,
himself, makes basic divisions between narrative fiction and
poetry.
The idea that literary practice is based on a special body of
competence knowledge might be thought to suggest a mental
faculty or module. It would be totally absurd, of course, to
suggest that such a faculty might share any of the properties
that Fodor (1983) argues that the language faculty shares with
other sensory input systems. It might, however, be (slightly)
less absurd to consider the possibility that there is a central
system literary faculty, as has been suggested, say, for music
or mathematics. Fodor (1987) argues that central system
modules stem from the nature of a particular task ratherAfrom
the architecture of the mind. Chess in this sense is modular,
i.e. 'in the sense that only a very restricted body of background
information (call it chess theory) is relevant to rational play
even in principle.' (Fodor 1987:36,n.1). Because of this
'restricted body of background information' computer
programmes can be programmed to play the game with a fair
measure of success.
It is impossible, however, to conceive of literature in this
way. The comprehension of literary works clearly requires
potential access to anything that is stored in memory, as does
language understanding more generally. Culler would seem to
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be suggesting little more than the idea that we know certain
things about literature, literary genres, etc. (and, therefore
come to have certain expectations on the basis of this
knowledge). In cognitive terms we might simply say that we
have certain information about literature collected together
and stored at a certain place or address in our minds. We are
likely to use this information when we think about 'literature';
we are not likely to use it on-line and all the time as we read
literary texts.
If we assume that special purpose reading conventions do
enable us to make sense of literary texts in the appropriate
way, which is essentially what Culler (1975) argues, then the
question arises as to how and when they become involved in
the interpretation process. The talk of 'competence', although
clearly misleading, does suggest that Culler was thinking in
terms of a capacity 'which we exercise unconsciously and
intuitively' (in the terms Leech and Short (1981) used to
describe their notion of 'stylistic competence'). There are two
basic possibilities regarding the operation of such special
purpose conventions: they are either triggered by features of
the text, or they are pre-triggered in some way by the
knowledge that the text one is about to read is a novel or a
poem.
If they are triggered, say, by verse features or line layout then
they would also have to work for the kinds of verse found in
birthday cards. But the strategies that Culler suggests would
not be particularly helpful in this case. How can a birthday
card verse be inscribed within a poetic tradition? What is the
point of insisting on thematic unity? Why should we read the
birthday card verse as expressing a significant attitude to
some problem concerning man and/or his relation to the
universe? If they are pre-triggered then one has to face the
possibility that any text can be read as literature, which is a
possibility that some Literary Theorists are happy to accept.
The structuralist enterprise has in fact served to encourage
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the loosening of boundaries between the literary and the non-
literary that I referred to in Chapter 1. Eagleton (1983)
accepts that the same kinds of deep structures can be found in
Mickey Spiltane as in Sir Philip Sidney. Other (conventionalist)
theoretical programmes have similarly worked to remove
boundaries between the literary and the non-literary. Insofar
as this loosening is accepted, the very existence of aesthetic
experience and aesthetic value are called into question. The
claim is often made that structuralism helps to 'demystify'
literature. In so doing, however, it ignores and fails to provide
an account of the rich stylistic intuitions that the literary
reading process may offer; it also ignores the whole issue of
aesthetic experience, which must be the main reason for there
being artworks. People have an aesthetic sense just as they
have (or do not have) a sense of humour. It seems reasonable to
want to find out how and why this sense works and how and
why readers have the stylistic intuitions that they do.
There are those who darkly suspect that much modern
theorising about literariness is done by those without strong
literary stylistic intuitions. Such theories ignore aesthetic
experience simply because it is not seen to be an important
issue. This, I take it, was the point behind Kermode's inclusion
of the following comments by Paul Valry at the beginning of
his book An Appetite for Poetry:
'As bad luck will have it, there are among these
men with no great appetite for poetry - who don't
understand the need for it and who would never
have invented it - quite a number whose job or
fate it is to judge it, discourse upon it, stimulate
and cultivate a taste for it; in short, to distribute
what they don't have. They apply to the task all
their intelligence and all their zeal - with
alarming consequences.'
Valery could not have had current theorising in mind when he
wrote this, but Kermode probably did.
The idea that structuralist and semiotic approaches produce an
impoverished or reductive account of literary communication
may equally apply to other disciplines. A similar point is made
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by Sperber (1975) with regard to the study of myth and
symbolism in anthropology. He argues that semiotic accounts
of symbolism fail because there is no straightforward
message/interpretation pairing that corresponds to the
signifier/signified distinction. A range of semiotic accounts of
myth have been developed that argue that myths communicate
some kind of hidden meaning. They argue, for example, that
certain elaborate myth-stories may reduce to questions of land
rights. Sperber argues against the kind of reduction that
semiotic approaches encourage on the grounds that the
richness of the myths discussed far outweighs the poverty of
meaning it is claimed that they convey. On the semiotic
account there is a marked disproportion between the elaborate
means used and the modest ends supposedly achieved.
Structuralist and semiotic approaches to literature may also
be guilty of the same impoverishment of meaning.
Structuralism may have something to offer narratology, but it
seems to have little to offer the study of literariness. It may
be fair to say now that semiotics and structuralism have
failed to have any significant lasting effect upon literary
studies. Many former proponents of a structuralist poetics,
such as Culler, have abandoned the project as essentially
flawed. Most of these structuralists have moved in the
direction of poststructuralism, but that is a story for a later
section of this chapter.
2.4.	 Literary Reading Conventions as Maxims.
Before leaving the discussion of social conventions as the
answer to the problem of explaining literariness I would like
to consider one further approach in the same tradition. A more
detailed account of literary reading conventions is offered by
Schmidt (1982) who proposes the existence of two
conventions: the E (for aesthetic) convention and the P (for
polyvalence) convention. They may be characterised as follows
(paraphrasing and quoting from Meutsch & Schmidt (1985:551-
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574). The aesthetic convention: 'releases the reader from the
accepted mode of reality'; it suspends the need to fix reference
or determine practical usefulness; it de-emphasises the fact
convention. The polyvalence convention: allows the reader to
attribute multiple meanings to a simple text; it replaces the
monovalence convention; 'text receivers have the freedom to
produce different Kommunikate (representations of a text)
from the same text in different times and situations ( = weak
version of the polyvalence convention hypothesis) or in the
same reading process ( = strong version of the polyvalence
convention hypothesis).'
Schmidt argues that:
'When participants in a communicative situation
receive a presented surface text as an aesthetic
communicative text, they must be able (or believe
themselves able) to attain different satisfying
results on different levels at different times; and
they do not expect all other participants to attain
the same results as themselves.' (Schmidt 1982:
111,69).
The aesthetic convention is a necessary precondition for the
polyvalence convention. If the need to fix the factual truth of
assertions in a text and its practical usefulness is overridden
by other needs, then it becomes possible to allow texts with
diffuse functions (111,75). 'Conventions thus figure as laws by
virtue of statistically predictable regularities comparable to
the occurrence of events defined in inductive laws.' (lV,8).
The E and P conventions are social and have to be learned or
acquired. Schmidt suggests that they might be seen as maxims
or conventions of the Gricean or Searlean type. They are
special occasion conventions that require suspension of the
standard conventions that operate for 'normal discourse'. If the
conventional maxims, or other general pragmatic principles,
are suspended, this raises the problem of whether it is
possible for the special conventions to guide interpretation on
their own - in other words, do a completely distinct set of
conventions (however defined) guide the interpretation of
literary texts?
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It is highly unlikely that the E and P conventions could operate
in this way, even if their definitions were tightened up. If the
P convention were given free rein, allowing readers the
freedom to multiply meanings, things would quickly get out of
control. Not all interpretations are valid, or equally valid. On
the simplest level, one does not read 'Juliet is the sun' as
'Juliet is gaseous' or 'Juliet is 90 million miles from the
earth'. There must be another constraining principle to direct
and curtail the endless proliferation of meanings. As it stands,
the 'read polyvalently' convention is simply too wild.
The motivation for these conventions is also left obscure, as it
is in most theories that provide accounts of literary
communication in terms of social conventions. Why do we need
to attribute multiple meanings to certain texts? Of Grice's
maxims one might well question their provenance, but their
motivation is clear: they are used to explain how we
communicate more than we say. Linguistic meaning, or what is
said, falls short of a speaker's intended meaning. In Grice's
view only by accepting that tacit standards are being met is it
possible to bridge the gap.
Likewise the motivation for the E convention is left obscure. In
formulating this convention Schmidt clearly borrows from
Speech Act Theory, in particular, from Austin (1962). Austin
makes the following point about 'not serious' speech acts:
'There are aetiolations, parasitic uses, etc.,
various 'not serious' and 'not full normal' uses. The
normal conditions of reference may be suspended,
or no attempt made at a standard perlocutionary
act, no attempt to make you do anything, as Walt
Whitman does not seriously incite the eagle of
liberty to soar.' (Austin 1962:104).
Such 'not serious' uses are much more widespread than in
literature, however: there is nothing essentially literary about
being 'not serious'. As Eagleton might have said, Mickey
Spillane is just as non-serious as Sir Philip Sidney.
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Another question, already raised in relation to Culler's
conventions, is how are special conventions triggered, what
brings them into play? This might be accompanied by the
equally important question: what turns them off again? Other
questions that arise relate to individual conventions. Is every
utterance in a text to be read potyvalently? Is polyvalence
never to be found outside of literary texts? Is every utterance
in a literary text to be read as non-factual? Is the aesthetic
convention not to be found outside literary texts, for example
in jokes or children's make-believe? These questions, which
call into question the plausibility of the E and P conventions as
described by Schmidt, can be asked of any special literary
reading conventions. It does not seem likely that conventions
will be found that work consistently and only for literature,
that provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
literariness.
More radical claims have been made on Culler's and Schmidt's
behalf than are warranted by the detail of their particular
proposals for literary reading conventions. It is no doubt the
case that readers do appeal to some such body of generally
accepted ideas if called upon to justify interpretations of
particular literary works, and that teachers appeal to the same
body of ideas in their attempts to help or encourage the
understanding of particular texts. In the latter case which of
the Cullerian conventions is emphasised will depend on the
particular text being read. Here though we are dealing with ex
post facto rationalisations, with intuitive generalisations and
interpretations of what readers do, not with descriptions of
actual processes. We are not dealing, in other words, with the
kind of proposals which can generate serious empirical claims.
Certainly no definition of literariness can develop out of such
generalisations.
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2.5.	 Reader-Response and Text-Response.
In this section, after some preliminary remarks about the
phenomenological tradition in literary studies, I will trace the
development in Fish's ideas concerning the process of
understanding literary texts. This will allow brief
consideration of two major approaches in literary studies to
the question of how readers make sense of literary texts: a
reader-response view and Fish's later more radical
conventionalist view.
The phenomenological tradition in literary theory focussed on
the subjective experience of the individual reader. In that
sense the perspectives it adopted were totally opposed to
those of structuralism, which was neither interested in the
intentions of authors nor the reading experience of readers, but
in some supposedly objective social code or set of conventions.
Theories of literary meaning and reading within the
phenomenological tradition, as in Ingarden (1973a; 1973b) and
Iser (1978), are concerned to develop an exhaustive description
of the phenomenon of literary meaning as it presents itself
during the reading process. Phenomenological approaches make
a contribution to the philosophy of literature rather than to the
development of a genuinely theoretical approach to literary
studies.
Whereas the formalist position was essentially that one could
have a theory of literariness by focussing on objective, mind-
independent linguistic properties, and the semiotic/
structuralist position was that one could have a theory of
literariness by focussing on objective, mind-independent
literary codes, conventions and reading strategies, the
phenomenological position was that you could not sensibly talk
about literature without focussing on the way individual minds
(re-)constructed meanings from texts. The emphasis was not
on independent linguistic, textual or social structures, but on
the process of reading. Intuitively this seems a reasonable
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line to take, and the insights and intuitions developed within
the phenomenological tradition seem to be much richer and
more valuable than any of the 'discoveries' made within
structuralism or semiotics. The phenomenological position
seems to be much closer to, and to have more respect for, the
true nature of literariness, aesthetic experience and literary
value.
It is important to note, however, that the phenomenological
approach to the study of literature was developed at a time
when truly theoretical approaches to literary communication
were not possible. Many of lngarden's key concepts, such as
'concretisation' and 'spots of indeterminacy' refer intuitively
to what might now be termed 'conceptual enrichment' and be
dealt with in cognitive pragmatic terms (in a way that will be
discussed in Chapter 3). A theoretical approach that was not
formerly conceivable now is, given the development of
cognitive psychology and cognitive pragmatics.
Many reader-oriented approaches to literary criticism grew
out of the phenomenological tradition. Again it is important to
remember that there are many different positions within the
phenomenological tradition and within reader-oriented
approaches to the study of literature. My aim here is not to
provide a fair or comprehensive overview of such approaches,
but to take one or two key ideas as representative of a
different possible approach to answering the question: what
is literariness? Here I am merely going to consider some
ideas about reader-oriented approaches suggested by Fish, as a
prelude to discussing his more influential and provocative
conventionalist views.
Fish's reader-oriented approach to literary criticism was
explicitly anti-formalist. Formalist approaches to literary
meaning, he argued, by taking a 'spatial', distanced view of the
literary text, suppress or ignore what really happens in the act
of reading. One of Fish's favourite types of example is the
moment of hesitation at the end of a line of verse 'when a
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reader is invited to make a certain kind of sense only to
discover (at the beginning of the next line) that the sense he
has made is either incomplete or simply wrong' (Fish
1980:147). Such cases of semantic garden-pathing are not
recognised by formalist analysis which typically ignores the
fact that the act of reading is a temporal phenomenon.
Insofar as this does represent a new focus on the on-line
reading experience rather than on the poem as object (and
there is probably some degree of exaggeration here - the
position adopted by a number of formalist writers was more
flexible than this view suggests), such reader-oriented
approaches are valuable. They help readers and literary critics
to develop insights and intuitions into how literary works
communicate and what they communicate. Fish follows and
develops one line in the phenomenological tradition in arguing
for a process-oriented approach to the interpretation of poems.
To illustrate these ideas I will briefly consider a couple of
Fish's examples from Interpreting the 'Vartrurn (Fish 1980:
147-173). The following are the concluding lines from Milton's
sonnet 'Lawrence of virtuous father virtuous son':
What neat repast shall feast us, light and choice,
Of Attic taste, with wine, whence we may rise
To hear the lute well touched, or artful voice
Warble immortal notes and Tuscan air?
He who of those delights can judge, and spare
To interpose them oft, is not unwise.
The word 'spare' at the end of the penultimate line has been
interpreted in two ways by literary critics - as meaning 'leave
time for' or 'refrain from'. According to one interpretation, he
who can allow time for those delights is not unwise; according
to the alternative interpretation, he who can refrain from
those delights is not unwise. Is the poet recommending the
delights described or warning the reader against them?
Evidence used in the dispute here takes the form of appeals to
'both English and Latin syntax, various sources and analogues,
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Milton's "known attitudes" as they are found in his other
writings, and the unambiguously expressed sentiments of the
following sonnet on the same question.' (Fish 1980:150).
Scholars are still divided on this point of textual
interpretation. Fish concludes that such controversies,
focussed upon textual meaning, can never be settled because
the evidence will always remain inconclusive. If one
concentrates on reader rather than text, however, the problem
disappears. "Spare" is ambiguous and readers pick up both
meanings of the word. According to Fish readers of the poem
are encouraged to debate:
'the judgement the poem makes on the delights of
recreation; what their debate indicates is that the
judgement is blurred by a verb that can be made to
participate in contradictory readings. (Thus the
important thing about the evidence surveyed in the
Variorum is not how it is marshalled but that it
could be marshalled at all, because it then
becomes evidence of the equal availability of both
interpretations.) In other words, the lines first
generate a pressure for judgment - "he who of
those delights can judge" - and then decline to
deliver it; the pressure, however, still exists, and
it is transferred from the words on the page to the
reader (the reader is "he who"), who comes away
from the poem not with a statement but with a
responsibility, the responsibility of deciding when
and how often - if at all - to indulge in "those
delights" (they remain delights in either case).
This transferring of responsibility from the text
to its readers is what the lines ask us to do - it is
the essence of their experience - and in my terms
it is therefore what the lines mean .....' (Fish
1980:150-15 1).
This argument can be extended to ambiguity in literary works
in general, and to other aspects of propositional indeterminacy.
The indeterminacy becomes part of the meaning.
Whether or not one agrees with Fish's treatment of this
particular example, the emphasis on reading experience does
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potentially allow richer interpretations of poems (and other
literary artworks), and it does shift the emphasis back to what
is going on in the mind of the reader. It also provides support
for Fodor's point (in Fodor 1993) that literary artworks are
distinguishable from rhetoric in that they require the audience
to be present. The poem has to be read (and experienced) as
written.
Fish later rejects this reader-oriented approach on the grounds
that it too is based on conventions of reading that impose
meanings on texts, rather than discover meanings in texts.
Just as formalist analyses assume that there is one correct
analysis, so, Fish argues, reader-oriented approaches assume
that there is one correct reading experience. Both positions are
naive about the role of conventions: the reality is that the text
responds to the reader's conventions rather than the reader to
the text.
Fish rejects this approach in favour of an extreme
conventionalist view, according to which there is no meaning
in texts prior to the interpretive conventions which the reader
brings to bear upon them. Conventional reading strategies, it is
argued, direct us to focus attention on certain features of
texts. In discussing our interpretations we assume that these
formal features are responsible for the interpretations. In fact
the opposite is the case: such features are 'created' by our
interpretive strategies. In this sense the text responds to the
reader rather than the reader to the text.
He considers, for example, the way in which the following
example from Milton's Lycidas (11.42-44) may be interpreted:
The willows and the hazel copses green
Shall now no more be seen,
Fanning their joyous leaves to thy soft lays.
After coming to the end of line 43 the reader will be able to
complete a proposition, the assertion that the death of Lycidas
has so affected the willows and green hazel copses that they
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will die and be seen no more. At this point the reader will have
'performed an act of perceptual closure' in Fish's terms.
Fish argues that one is led through 'the bias of one's critical
language' to assume that poems are agents acting upon readers.
'What really happens, I think, is something quite
different: rather than intention and its formal
realization producing interpretation (the NnormalN
picture), interpretation creates intention and its
formal realisation by creating the conditions in
which it becomes possible to pick them out.' A
reader sees what his critical training has directed
him to see. In the examples above the reader may
work with a model that 'demands... .perceptual
closures', because 'line endings exist by virtue of
perceptual strategies rather than the other way
around.' (Fish 1980:166).
This leaves the question as to what motivates our interpretive
strategies. There are large areas of agreement about
interpretation, so it cannot be the case that readers follow
arbitrary or idiosyncratic strategies. To explain this
agreement Fish develops the notion of interpretive
communities. An interpretive community is a group of readers
who share the same interpretive assumptions and who employ
the same interpretive strategies. Insofar as we do agree on our
interpretation of a given poem it is because we belong to the
same interpretive community. (Perhaps we attended the same
literature classes.) Insofar as we disagree we belong to
different interpretive communities.
The exercise, referred to in Chapter 1, in which a group of
unsuspecting students were encouraged to analyse a list of
names as if it were a 17th century religious poem, was used as
evidence by Fish that a text not intended as literary can
become literary if the appropriate conventions are applied to
it. He had trained his students in the rules or conventions of a
particular interpretive community. He could now let them loose
on any text and they would find in the text the kind of things
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they had been trained to find.
Fish's answer to the problem of literariness, then, is that
literature is 'a conventional category' (Fish 1980:6). He argues
that 'what will, at any time, be recognised as literature is a
function of a communal decision as to what will count as
literature' (Fish 1980:10). In other words, literariness is a
purely institutional matter.
One might ask why poets have to 'wrestle with words', or why
they take the trouble to revise work which will, in any case, be
read as literary in the light of an independent set of
conventions. Why can a poet not simply cut out articles from a
newspaper (or, in the tradition of Fish, names out of a
telephone directory) and send them off to the publisher? (This
would be the poetic equivalent of Warhol's Brillo Boxes or
Duchams urinal.) The names-as-poem exercise that Fish uses
to illustrate his point about conventional reading strategies
and interpretive communities can be challenged on the grounds
that he is only able to turn the names into concepts and
establish semantic links between them because the names he
selects are ambiguous or partially ambiguous. Whether one
could take the list of surnames of those working in any
linguistics department, say, and interpret them as a poem
(perhaps a seventeenth century religious poem) with the same
degree of success is highly dubious. But even if one were to
concede the point that this exercise has a wide application -
that any text could be read as a (certain kind of) poem - it is
still possible to argue that Fish is not saying anything about
aesthetic experience. In fact, Fish never shows how aesthetic
experience is achieved through the imposing of conventions on
texts. It is a topic he conveniently ignores.
Fish's position leads to an extremely impoverished view of
literary communication and of communication in general. There
is no way to distinguish good writing from bad writing. There
is no way to distinguish good or insightful interpretations
from weak interpretations. There is no way of discussing
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Iliterary value. There is no sense of what aesthetic experience
is or of what it is that literary works communicate. For Fish
they just communicate old reworked ideas. Or rather, they do
not communicate anything; they simply allow old rewoilced
ideas to be imposed upon them. Context as a pre-formed
coherent body of ideas comes out on top in Fish's view of
communication; the author comes out worst: she has no say in
what pre-formed context it is that the reader imposes on her
words.
Fish's theoretical position seems to be wilfully provocative
and fanciful (as Kiparsky (1987) also argues). His main
argument can, perhaps, be summed up in the following
quotation: '....it is not that literature exhibits certain formal
properties that compel a certain kind of attention; rather,
paying a certain kind of attention (as defined by what
literature is understood to be) results in the emergence into
noticeability of the properties we know in advance to be
literary.' (Fish 1980:10). This position is not merely
counterintuitive, it assumes a totally simplistic, if not
incoherent, view of how communication takes place. Language
in communication has a semantics as well as a pragmatics, and
the role of context in communication is much more subtle than
Fish appreciates. A context is not simply a connected set of
ideas. (These points will be developed in Chapter 3.) More
fundamentally, utterance interpretation is not a totally top-
down process, not even in the reading of literary works. Fish
gives the impression of being a New Look cognitive
psychologist without the cognitive psychology.
2.6.	 Literary Theory.
'Show me a cultural relativist at 30,000 feet and I'll show you
a hypocrite.' Richard Dawkins. Letter to the Independent, 8th
January 1992.
57
'All cultural relativism is an act of condescension towards all
actual cultures.' Les Murray. The Paperbark Tree, 'The Suspect
Captivity of the Fisher King.' (1992:334).
Current Literary Theory has, for the most part, abandoned any
attempt to establish a theoretical programme within literary
studies. Few Literary Theorists would agree with Kiparsky
(1987) that Jakobson's programme for a theory of literature
might be revived by replacing Jakobson's structuralist
linguistic theory and semiotic communication theory with
contemporary linguistic and pragmatic 'theory within a
cognitive framework. The more common view would be that a
cognitive framework is the wrong kind of framework and that
current poststructuralist ideas about language show that it is
impossible to have a genuine theory of linguistics and,
therefore, a genuine theory of literature. As Young argues:
'poststructuralist thinkers, such as Derrida, Foucault and
Lacan, have questioned the status of science itself, and the
possibility of the objectivity of any language of description or
analysis....' (Young 1980:viii). The impossibility of the
objectivity of any language of description results from the
slipperiness of the linguistic sign. Language, it is claimed, is
simply a system of differences: there is no way to ensure
stability in the relations between signifiers and signifieds or
in the relations between signifieds; there is no way to fix or
stabilise reference.
This instability not only makes theory impossible, but denies
the traditional literary critical claim to interpret the author's
meaning in a text. As Barthes argues:
'We know now that a text is not a line of words
releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the
message of the Author-God) but a multi-
dimensional space in which a variety of writings,
none of them original, blend and clash.........Once the
author is removed the claim to decipher a text
becomes quite futile.' (Barthes 1977a: 145-7).
Poststructuralist thinking about language, then, forecloses (to
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use a poststructuralist term) both on the possibility of
engaging in literary criticism and on the possibility of
developing a theoretical account of literariness. There no
longer is anything that is distinctively and essentially
literary.
Birch (1989) makes a similar point about theory when he
distinguishes between the 'idealised' worlds of theory and the
'actual' worlds of messy reality:
'By actual or real world I mean a world that is
culturally, socially and institutionally determined;
that is messy, noisy and full of disturbances,
surprises and instabilities - I do not see reality as
a psychological reality at all, but in relativist
terms.' (Birch 1989:1).
He argues later that the structures of language:
'do not pre-exist social and cultural processes;
they are not encoded in some sort of psychological
imprint......The forms, and hence meanings of
language are shaped and determined by
institutional forces.' (Birch 1989:167).
Many points are raised here which illustrate the wide gulf in
basic assumptions between ideas about language and
communication in Literary Theory and ideas about language and
communication in linguistic theory and cognitive pragmatic
theory. Given this gulf these points cannot be adequately
answered without raising a host of fundamental philosophical
questions in the area of metaphysics as well as philosophy of
mind and language.
Fabb and Durant (1987) claim that the two disciplines of
linguistics and literary studies adopt different positions with
regard to theories. Whereas linguistics adopts a position of
basic realism, literary studies adopts a position of unrealism
about theories. But this difference follows from opposed and
contradictory views about the nature of language and
communication. It follows that either linguistics is wrong to
adopt a position of realism, or that literary studies is wrong
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to adopt a position of unrealism. My position will be that the
study of literary style and communication should be able to
receive theoretical treatment in the context of contemporary
linguistic and pragmatic theory.
What I will do in the rest of this section is simply note a
number of key arguments used within current Literary Theory.
The points discussed will be answered indirectly, for the most
part, in the next chapter, where a non-relativist, non-messy
cognitive account of communication will be outlined. The main
point here is to consider ideas about language and
communication that lead to the view that a theory of
literariness is impossible.
Though his works have undergone re-interpretation, the central
figure from linguistics in Literary Theory circles remains
Saussure. Fabb (1988) sets himself the task of explaining to
Literary Theorists why the Saussurn view of language has
long been superseded in the discipline of linguistics. He points
to the influential New Accents Series as a body of publications
that promotes a new perspective on literary studies by
adopting and adapting Saussurean perspectives on language
while generally ignoring the development of linguistics as a
theoretical discipline. This is done despite expressed
intentions. Hawkes, in his 'General Editor's Preface', claims
that:
'one aspect of New Accents will be firmly located
in contemporary approaches to language, and a
continuing concern of the series will be to
examine the extent to which relevant branches of
linguistic studies can illuminate specific literary
areas.'
Unfortunately, the 'contemporary approaches' manage to ignore
almost everything that has happened in linguistic and
pragmatic theory since the 1950s. The problem is not that
Hawkes' understanding of 'contemporary' is rather too liberal,
however, but the fact that he looks to an alternative tradition
(represented by structuralism and poststructuralism) for his
theories of language. It is a tradition that Eagleton also
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appeals to when he writes about 'the 'linguistic revolution' of
the twentieth century, from Saussure and Wittgenstein to
contemporary literary theory.' (Eagleton 1983:60).
Fabb argues that Saussure's approach to language contributes
to what is essentially an a priori discipline, 'existing in
advance of (and creating) its object rather than being derived
from its object' (Fabb 1988:59). The real revolution in
linguistics, however, has turned it into a theoretical
discipline, concerned with testing hypotheses against
linguistic data. As a result of this 'revolution' a lot more has
been learned about the complex and sui generis structure of
language.
The Saussurean view that the signified is unstable in its
relations to other signifieds does not call into question the
idea that there is only one kind of unitary meaning. Another
recent theoretical development has emphasised the need to
distinguish linguistic meaning (the domain of semantics) and
the full meaning that is communicated (the domain of
pragmatics). The confusions caused by the failure to
distinguish between semantics and pragmatics can be briefly
illustrated with an example from Birch (1989). Birch discusses
Empson's discussion of the use of the word 'sense' in
Wordsworth's Prelude in the context of the poststructuralist
argument that final meanings and definitive interpretations of
texts are impossible. He writes of Empson's essay:
'In his essay on William Wordsworth, 'Sense in The
Prelude', William Empson makes the point that if
an analyst were to follow a particular word
through a text (as I suggested earlier for a
dictionary) then there is a strong likelihood that
its meanings will shift and alter, allowing no
single meaning to dominate. He takes as an
example the word 'sense' in The Prelude and looks
at the 35 occuinces of it. The resuJt is a range of
meanings associated with the word 'sense' that
suggests for Wordsworth an incoherence of a
degree not normally associated with such a
vatorised writer.' (Birch 1989:11).
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(It should be noted that Empson actually claims to have found
'35 uses of sense at the end of a line and 12 elsewhere'; he
suggests there may be more.)
Empson was not a proto-deconstructionist who believed that
meanings shift and alter beyond the author's control. He does
not criticise Wordsworth for using the word 'sense' in a
variety of ways or for using it in new ways. (Nor does he
criticise Shakespeare for his varied use of the word 'honest' in
Othello, which Empson analyses in another essay.) Empson is
generally positive about Wordsworth's varied use of the word
'sense'. Where Empson does become critical it is because a
meaning is left vague. The important point here, though, is not
that Birch misreads Empson, but that he assumes that if words
do not always bear exactly the same meaning in every
occurrence then this provides evidence for the
poststructuralist claim that signs are inherently unstable and
beyond the control of the communicator.
It has long been noted that concepts, or word-meanings, can be
subject to variation in context (in ways that will be discussed
in Chapter 3) without them being inherently unstable. It is not
too difficult to grasp the different meanings Wordsworth
intends in the various contexts in which he uses the word
'sense'. (Empson manages to articulate most of these varied
meanings reasonably successfully.) It is reasonable to assume
that Wordsworth was aware of what he was doing and that he
placed the word in those contexts with the intention that
readers recognise these different senses. There is nothing to
prevent Wordsworth deliberately using a word in a variety of
senses, white at the same time remaining 'valorised'.
The point that Birch makes about the instability of the
linguistic sign is a familiar and popular one. Selden (1989:71),
for instance, argues that: 'Poststructuralist thought has
discovered the essentially unstable nature of signification'.
The problem is that ststructuralism has no serious account of
the role of context in utterance interpretation, so for
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poststructuralists concepts either have a fixed meaning or
their meanings are unstable. If context plays a role it is as a
fixed body of ideas imposed from the outside.
One of the reasons given for the instability of language is its
essentially metaphorical character, which, the argument goes,
renders truth inaccessible because it becomes impossible to
refer directly to states of affairs in the real world. As
Eagleton puts it:
'Since metaphors are essentially 'groundless', mere
substitutions of one set of signs for another,
language tends to betray its own fictive and
arbitrary nature at just those points where it is
offering to be most intensively persuasive.'
(Eagleton 1983:145).
Again it is only by holding a simplistic and restricted view of
the nature of linguistic signs that it is possible to sustain this
kind of argument. Later, in Chapter 4, I will argue that the
thoughts communicated by metaphors (rather than
metaphorical utterances in themselves) are able to refer
directly to states of affairs in the real world. Another point I
shall be making later concerns the range of stylistic effects
that metaphorical utterances can convey. Without a theory of
pragmatics current Literary Theory has no way of accounting
for such stylistic effects.
Many contemporary anti-realists combine the Kantian idea that
our knowlege of the world is partly constituted by the human
mind (i.e. in part by "things-in-themselves" and in part by the
imposition of a priori concepts such as causality, time and
spatial relations) with relativism. Whereas for Kant the
concepts imposed to constitute the known world were
universals, common to everyone, Literary Theory/
poststructuralisrn drops the idea that these concepts are
universal and argues that there are a range of socially
constructed and relativistic 'texts' that intervene between
language-users and the world. According to Devitt and Sterelny
(1987:206) this relativistic neo-Kantianism 'has some claim
to being the dominant metaphysics of our time, at least among
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intellectuals.' There may be some exaggeration in this claim,
though it is certainly an established and influential position in
Literary Theory.
Language is considered to be an autonomous system without
relation to the world, defined purely in terms of its internal
relations. In Saussure own words: 'Language is a system of
interdependent terms in which the value of each term results
solely from the simultaneous presence of the others...'
(Saussure 1966:114). This definition, according to Devitt and
Sterelny (1987:213) is 'the most surprising and objectionable
feature of structuralism, for it omits reference.' As an
autonomous system, Saussure argues, language may be
compared to chess. 'In chess, what is external can be separated
relatively easily from what is internal......everything having to
do with its system and rules is internal.' (Saussure 1966:20).
In response to this Devitt and Sterelny have the neat answer:
'....chess is like language as the structuralists view it, but it is
importantly different from language as it really is.' (Devitt and
Sterelny 1987:216).
This rejection of reference has serious consequences, not only
within philosophy of language, but also for metaphysics.
Language cuts us off from the world. As Derrida puts it: ii n'y a
pas d'hors texte. Devitt and Sterelny comment on this:
'If taken literally, this talk of language's power
over the world is mysterious and inexplicable, if
not absurd. Taken metaphorically, it seems to
leave us without a world at all.' (Devitt and
Sterelny 1987:219).
The influence of such ideas on contemporary Literary Theory
may be illustrated with a few quotations from Hawkes (1977):
'Language.......allows no single, unitary appeals to a
"reality" beyond itself. In the end it constitutes
its own reality' (p26); 'Writing.......can be seen to
cause a new reality to come into being' (p149); 'all
societies construct their own realities' (p56);
'since [language] constitutes our characteristic
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means of encountering and of coping with the
world beyond ourselves, then perhaps we can say
that it constitutes the characteristic human
structure. From there, it is only a small step to
the argument that perhaps it also constitutes the
characteristic structure of human reality' (p28).
According to this view, then, the 'realities' constituted by
language (including 'human reality') are socially constructed.
The mind is not in itself interestingly structured or law-
governed; it is merely the site for competing ideologies,
including competing reading strategies and institutionalised
literary reading conventions. The idea that there is no such
thing as an essential human nature, that everything is cultural,
is a pervasive one. This was the position held by many
structuralists, especially in opposition to the
phenomenological tradition. Eagleton criticises Husserl for
speaking of a private sphere of experience, as all experience
involves language 'and language is ineradicaUy social'
(Eagleton 1983:60).
Eagleton's view of language is, he claims, inspired by Saussure
and Wittgenstein, as well as more recent contributions from
Literary Theory:
'The hallmark of the 'linguistic revolution' of the
twentieth century, from Saussure and
Wittgenstein to contemporary literary theory, is
the recognition that meaning is not simply
something 'expressed' or 'reflected' in language: it
is actually produced by it. It is not as though we
have meanings, or experiences, which we then
proceed to cloak with words; we can only have the
meanings and experiences in the first place
because we have a language to have them in......
(Eagleton 1983:60).
Saussure's view that language itself enables thought by
creating the concepts we use to think with is expressed as
follows:
'Our thought - apart from its expression in words -
is only a shapeless and indistinct mass......without
the help of signs we would be unable to make a
clear-cut, consistent distinction between two
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ideas. Without language, thought is a vague
uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas,
and nothing is distinct before the appearance of
language.' (Saussure 1966:111-112).
Meaning not only does not refer, it also does not exist as
intentions in minds, according to Eagleton. Again he argues:
'To believe that meaning consists of words plus a
wordless act of willing or intending is rather like
believing that everytime I open the door 'on
purpose' I make a silent act of willing while
opening it.' (Eagleton 1983:68).
Certainly we do not 'cloak' thoughts with words. As will be
emphasised in the next chapter, there is a gap between what
words mean and what they communicate in context. But it is
not possible to pass from this to the conclusion that thoughts
cannot pre-exist, or be independent of, language. If we look at
language processing from the perspective of production it is
intuitively absurd to suggest that thoughts arise at the same
time as language. If we accept the view that Eagleton is
expressing, we would also have to reject the possibility of
having thoughts which we cannot express because we lack the
language to express them. From the hearer's point of view we
recognise the thoughts people are trying to express even if the
language they use is elliptical or contains slips of the tongue.
Utterances only make sense if caused by an intention to
communicate. Even in the case of opening doors the complex
state that the body is put in to achieve the task, if taken as
rational behaviour, can only be explained as caused by a desire
to open the door. Another problem for Eagleton's view is that a
further argument would be needed to explain why other species
and pre-linguistic children do not have thoughts.
I have only made the briefest of references, largely through
quotation, to a few of the ideas in current Literary Theory.
These few ideas should suffice to illustrate the wide gulf that
exists between thinking influenced by poststructuralist theory
and thinking in linguistic and pragmatic theory and philosophy
of mind and language. The authors I have cited, apart from
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Saussure, are not mainstream poststructuralists, but authors
of popular and influential books many of whose ideas have been
influenced by poststructuralist thought. A fairer treatment of
the above points would require much more detailed argument
and the recognition that there are different
poststructuralisms. In the next section a new basis for a
theoretical approach to literariness will be suggested, and in
the next chapter a theory of communication will be outlined
which will underpin this theory of literariness.
2.7.	 Conclusion.
Two major attempts have been made to establish a theoretical
discipline within literary studies, one focussing on the
linguistic properties of literary texts, the other focussing on
social codes, conventions or reading strategies. The
phenomenological tradition in literary studies I take to be
philosophical rather than genuinely theoretical. Current
Literary Theory has rejected both the kind of approach
developed by phenomenologists and the kind of approach that
attempts to develop a theoretical discipline. Could it be that
the kind of Saussurean a priori approach to the discipline of
linguistics while no longer valid for linguistic theory is still
appropriate for literary studies, as Fabb (1988) suggests?
I would like to suggest that literariness does possess
properties which can be approached theoretically. These are
real cognitive properties: mental representations and mental
processes. The development of a theoretical approach to
literariness, then, must seek a basis not in linguistic theory,
as did formalism and structuralism, but in a cognitive
pragmatic theory. Indeed, one might argue that, just as
Jakobson thought that the study of literariness should form
part of linguistics, so the newly conceived theoretical study of
literariness should form part of cognitive pragmatics. Literary
communication is one kind of communication; poetic effects
are one kind of stylistic effects.
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Literary Theory has sought to limit or restrict the types of
questions that it is possible to ask within literary studies. As
we saw above, both theoretical questions and literary critical
questions to do with evaluation and interpretation are no
longer considered legitimate. There are some who even argue
that the increased dominance of poststructuralist ideas should
influence the way poetry is written. Easthope, for example,
writes:
'the sooner traditional criticism is deposed and
poststructuralism becomes a hegemony (which it
certainly is not yet), the better for contemporary
poetry.' (Easthope 1985:36).
While Literary Theory has denied the legitimacy of both theory
and evaluative criticism, traditional literary criticism has
been equally suspicious of theory. Most traditional literary
critics, for example, would be in broad sympathy with the
following remarks of DH Lawrence:
'Literary criticism can be no more than a reasoned
account of the feeling produced upon the critic by
the book he is criticising. Criticism can never be a
science: it is, in the first place, much too
personal, and in the second, it is concerned with
values that science ignores. The touchstone is
emotion, not reason. We judge a work of art by its
effect on our sincere and vital emotion, and
nothing else. All the critical twiddle-twaddle
about style and form, all this pseudo-scientific
classifying and analysing of books in an imitation-
botanical fashion, is mere impertinence and
mostly dull jargon.'
Given much of what has occurd in recent theory, which has
generally shown a fair degree of hostility towards traditional
literary criticism, literary critics have every reason to be
suspicious. While what Lawrence was objecting to here was
bad generalising and classificatory criticism rather than
theory, his statement serves as a valid account and
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justification of the critic's task. This task is to describe the
effect of a particular experience, in this case a reading
experience. The value of doing this is to extend the range of
one's experience, to extend the range of one's ability to feel
and think, and the range of one's ability to empathise with
what others feel and think. The literary writer attempts to
articulate her feelings and experiences; the critic and reader
do the same with the writer's assistance.
It is instructive to compare the task of the critic with that of
the ethnographer, who similarly has to interpret subjective
experience. Sperber writes:
'The main task of ethnography is to make
intelligible the experience of particular human
beings as shaped by the social group to which they
belong. In order to achieve that aim, ethnographers
have to interpret cultural representations shared
by these groups.....Even though they make a lesser
use of imagination and a greater one of experience,
ethnographers achieve relevance in the manner of
novelists: If War and Peace is so relevant to us, it
is not because Tolstoy developed here and there
some general remarks, but because the personal
experience of a few individuals caught in the
upheaval of early nineteenth century Europe
contributes, through Tolstoy's interpretation, to
the experience of every reader. Similarly, if
reading Maknowski's Argonauts, Bateson's Naven,
or Evans-Pritchard's Nuer Religion contributes to
our understanding of ourselves and of the world in
which we live, it is not because of the interpretive
generalisations these works contain; it is because
they give us an insight into some fragments of
human experience, and this, by itself, makes it
worth the journey.' (Sperber 1985:34).
The reason for this lengthy quotation from Sperber (1985) is to
make the point that the types of questions that literary critics
ask are similarly focussed on fragments of human experience
and are similarly valid. Any critical generalisations that stand
in the way of articulating such experiences are, as Lawrence
claims, 'mere impertinence and mostly dull jargon'.
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I would like to argue that it should be possible to ask a wider
range of question-types within literary studies than is
currently thought possible or permissible. These would include
philosophical questions such as what is tragedy? and what is
lyric?, the kinds of question that interested Stephen Dedalus
towards the end of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.
They would include literary critical questions concerning 'the
feeling produced upon the critic by the book he is criticising.'
In addition they would now also include genuinely theoretical
questions such as what mental representations and mental
processes are peculiar to poetic communication? All of these
questions are directed at what is essentially and intrinsically
literary.
The new kind of theoretical approach I am proposing will seek
to account for the stylistic intuitions that literary works give
rise to. It is the business of literary criticism, as a humanistic
discipline, to articulate these intuitions. For a theory of
literariness to succeed it is important that literary criticism
be an independent activity engaged in interpretation and
evaluation, of the kind envisaged by Lawrence. Literary theory
should recognise the independence of literary criticism, in
other words and not seek to impose upon it. (Sperber (1985)
similarly argues for a necessary divorce between an
interpretive ethnography and a theoretical anthropology.)
If theory seeks to control criticism it leads to impoverished
readings. Lodge's (1986, chapter 2) discussion of Hemingway's
Cat in the Rain is a clear example of (bad) theory dictating to
and impoverishing criticism. Lodge discusses Hagopian's
interpretation of the man in the rubber cape in Hemingway's
story as a symbol of contraception and concludes that such an
interpretation is impossible because rain can symbolize
fertility only 'when defined by opposition to drought'.
Immediately prior to this Lodge states: 'Here, it seems to me,
the structuralist notion of language as a system of differences
and meaning as the product of structural oppositions can
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genuinely help to settle a point of interpretation.' (Lodge
1986:30). This seems to me to be an absurd argument. Leaving
aside the question of whether one accepts this definition of
language and meaning - which presumably most contemporary
linguistic theorists do not - theory should surely be describing
and explaining reading experiences, not dictating what those
readings should be. The idea that meanings are locked up in
literary works, until structuralism (or some other theory or
method) finds the key to unlock them, suggests that all those
readers who have read and enjoyed literary works prior to the
invention of structuralism (or whatever theory), and all those
benighted present day readers who have not taken courses in
structuralism, were or are at a distinct disadvantage when it
comes to interpreting literary works.
A literary studies interested in the intrinsic nature of literary
communication should comprise at least two distinct but
related disciplines. On the one hand interpretive and evaluative
criticism is an essentially humanistic discipline. Its insights
are intuitive and subjective. It is studied and written to share
experiences of reading which it considers valuable and to
enhance appreciation. On the other hand, a theoretical
discipline, based on a theoretical literary pragmatics that
seeks to describe and explain poetic effects in terms of
characteristic mental representations and mental processes,
should also be possible. The theoretical discipline depends on
and must respect the separate existence of the humanistic
discipline because theory necessarily needs to work with,
describe, and explain the readings that criticism produces, as
well as the intuitions that such critical work encourages one
to develop.
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CHAPTER THREE
PRAGMATIC THEORY
3.1.	 Introduction.
All theories of literature or literariness have been grounded,
with greater or lesser degrees of explicitness, in theories of
language and communication. The underlying views as to the
nature of language and communication affect how literary
theory is conceived and, indeed, whether it is conceivable.
Formalist theories drew inspiration from structural linguistic
analysis, although certain ideas or assumptions about the
nature of communication were also expressed. Structuralist
and semiotic theories made appeal to structural linguistic
theory and semiotic code-model theories of communication.
The central figure for these theories is Saussure, whose ideas
still play a significant role in current Literary Theory.
Some theoretical positions, which emphasise the role of
literary conventions or discourse strategies, make further
specific assumptions about communication, which is assumed
to operate in accordance with institutionalised rules. Little or
no attempt is made to work out the consequences of such rules
in psychologically plausible terms. Nor is there any real
consideration of the possibility that psychologically-based
pragmatic principles, that operate for communication in
general, might also explain the communication of specifically
literary effects.
Phenomenological and reader-oriented theories have
concentrated on the effects of the literary reading process
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within the mind of the reader. These effects, however, were
based on intuitions about - or interpretations of - what went
on in the reader's mind. There was no genuinely theoretical
attempt to characterise what happened in terms of mental
representations and mental processes. A theoretical pragmatic
account of the reading process was not considered possible.
(This is not intended as a criticism of reader-oriented
approaches, which represent a legitimate alternative approach
within literary studies - an approach that has developed many
rich and valuable intuitions about aesthetic effects.)
Finally, current approaches within Literary Theory have
rejected the legitimacy or possibility of a genuine theoretical
approach to literary studies. This is largely due to the fact
that the relativist and anti-essentialist philosophy of language
endorsed by Literary Theory does not accept the legitimacy of
a genuine cognitive theory of linguistics or pragmatics.
In the last chapter I argued that a theory of literariness must
be grounded in pragmatic theory rather than linguistic theory,
and specifically in cognitive pragmatic theory. Any particular
linguistic features or structural peculiarities of literary texts
are only significant insofar as they encourage characteristic
kinds of pragmatic processing.
When Kiparsky (1987) argued that Jakobson's programme for a
theoretical account of literariness could be continued, but only
within the context of contemporary linguistic and pragmatic
theory, he specifically referred to relevance theory as the
pragmatic theory that should replace the code model theory of
communication that Jakobson espoused. I will first briefly
consider (versions of) the code-model theory. The main part of
this chapter, however, will be devoted to outlining the
cognitive pragmatic theory - relevance theory as developed in
Sperber and Wilson (1986a) - which might provide the
framework for a genuine theory of literariness. The outline
should answer many of the points raised in Chapter 2 and
provide the basis for an account of poetic effects which will
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be developed in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.2. Code and Context.
Many literary theorists have assumed the generally held
semiotic view that verbal communication can be adequately
explained with reference to a code-model of communication.
Literary Theorists, on the other hand, have stressed the need to
account for the instability of the linguistic sign and the lack
or failure of communication. Their notion of an unstable sign,
however, is based on the notion of linguistic sign familiar
from code-model accounts.
It is first important to distinguish between the idea that
language itself is a code and the idea that verbal
communication is a code. In the latter case communication is
viewed as a process whereby the communicator encodes her
thoughts directly into linguistic signs, and the addressee
decodes these linguistic signs back into thoughts. Semioticians
have either not distinguished between the two, or have
assumed that the code-model can be readily extended from
language to verbal communication.
Most linguists would accept that language itself is a code,
though there would be a large measure of disagreement
concerning the nature and detail of the semantic output. This
code can be seen as one that links a stream of speech sounds or
graphological marks to semantic representations consisting of
structured sets of concepts. The simple utterance in (1),
whether in spoken or written form, might be said to decode,
for those who know the English language, to the semantic
representation (loosely expressed) in (2):
(1)	 She's here.
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(2) some particular female is in some particular place
(defined in relation to the speaker/writer) at som
particular time (relative to the time of utterance).
The utterance in (3) decodes to the same semantic
representation for those who know French.
(3) Elle est ici.
The linguistic form in (1) always decodes to the semantic
representation in (2), no matter who is speaking/writing or
what the circumstances are. As long as the utterance is
recognised as spoken or written English, and as long as this
part of the code of English is known, then the decoding process
will be automatic and straightforward for an interpreter of the
code. The nature of the linguistic code is largely
psychologically determined, for example with regard to syntax
and conceptual structure. The only clearly social and
conventional elements are the aspects of the code that link
word-forms to concepts, for example 'dog' to the concept DOG
in English and 'chien' to the concept DOG in French.
The revolution in linguistics initiated by Chomsky (1957) has
characterised language as a psychologically determined code
and as a system of mental representations. This is the point of
Chomsky's distinction between I-language (or internal
language) and E-language (or external language) - a distinction
he elaborates on in Chomsky (1986), especially Chapter 2. E-
languages are convenient fictions which are non-theorisable,
whereas I-languages are (psychologically) real and theorisable.
Although it is necessary to study both E-languages and I-
languages, it is important to realise that these studies respond
to different kinds of questions and have different goals.
For Saussure language was a social code, the nature of which
was fixed by convention. This conventionality determined the
way that signifieds or conceptual categories were formed, as
well as the way that signifiers linked to signifieds. It was a
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relatively simple code that focussed upon the linguistic sign,
as little was then known about the complexities of syntactic
structure. It was simple also in the sense that it assumed a
unitary notion of meaning: signifieds as concepts were fixed
directly by the code. Because the linguistic code was
considered to be relatively straightforward, it was not
considered problematic (at least, by Saussure) to extend it to
all forms of communication and information transfer. Saussure
predicted the development of a new discipline - semiotics or
semiology - to study the nature and operation of all sign
systems. However, the development of linguistics has led to
the recognition that grammar as a sign system differs
considerably in its nature and complexity from other sign
systems. Also, many of the fields that were analysed as sign
systems, such as literature, are clearly not systems of signs:
any attempts to classify them as such leads to a grossly
impoverished view of their nature. These differences are
highlighted when these systems, and non-systems, are viewed
within a cognitive framework, as real psychological
phenomena.
In this chapter I am concerned with verbal communication,
where a communicator uses a linguistic signal with the overt
intention of communicating some message to an addressee. In
the case of the utterance in (1), it is clear that it can be used
to communicate an infinite number of messages. It can
communicate as many messages as there are females and
places (real or invented). The precise message can only be
determined by bringing non-linguistic contextual information
to bear upon some linguistically decoded semantic
representation. It is clear, then, that utterances do not
directly decode into thoughts. Utterances decode into semantic
representations which underdetermine the thoughts
communicated. To maintain the code model view of
communication a more sophisticated account of the decoding
process has to be developed which explains this further step
from semantic representation to thought communicated in
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terms of an extension of the linguistic code or by means of a
further code.
Consider the following model of the constituents that go to
make up a speech event:
context
message
addresser-------------------------addressee
contact
code
(Diagram from Jakobson 1960: 353.)
In Jakobson's model the meaning communicated depends on
contact, code and context. The language code contributes to the
meaning but is part of a larger coding process. The contact is
the medium used. The context helps to fix the meaning provided
by the linguistic code, but here is treated as pre-given, a fixed
component of the overall speech event. In other words, given a
particular utterance in a particular language, and given a
context in which that utterance occurs, then a particular
meaning will be communicated.
There are such instances of communication where signals do
convey stable messages in given contexts. In the case of
traffic lights, the green light signal decodes to the message
'go', and the red light signal to the message 'stop'. There is no
room for negotiation here. It is important that the message is
unambiguous and the same for everyone, whatever else happens
to be passing through their minds. There is one kind of context
- traffic moving along a road - in which this code has the
meanings it does, and within that context the meanings are
stable. Other possible aspects of context - the weather, time
of year, type of vehicle, sex of driver - are irrelevant.
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If a cricket umpire raises his arms as he faces in the direction
of the scorers, this gesture means that six runs have been
awarded to the batsman; if he raises his arm in front of him in
the direction of the batsman and points his finger, this gesture
means that the batsman is given out. Again, the signal is clear
and the same message is decoded whatever else is happening or
has just happened in the context of the cricket match.
These signals can, of course, convey different messages in
other contexts (as semioticians readily appreciate). A red light
might elsewhere signify danger. A raised finger might, in a
different context, signify warning or direct attention. In the
examples above, however, 'context' establishes a pre-given
framework within which a code operates. One has to be
familiar with (aspects of) the Highway Code, or with the laws
of cricket in order to decode appropriately. For anyone who is,
the decoding process is straightforward and unambiguous: a
particular signal is directly associated with a particular
message. If you do not know the code, then it is unlikely that
you will be able to work out the message.
But these examples are far from typical. A code model does not
seem to work so easily for other signals used to communicate
on the cricket field. There was an incident in 1990 when the
English cricket team were batting second in a one day match
against the West Indies. They were scoring freely, but the
quality of light was deteriorating fast. When the umpires
offered to suspend play because of bad light the batsmen
looked to the balcony for instructions. The captain gave them a
thumbs up signal. There is no pie-given code that links this
signal with either the message 'carry on batting' or the
message 'accept the umpire's offer'. They had to infer from the
state of the game that they were being encouraged to carry on.
Raising one's thumb is a general signal of encouragement that
means nothing specific in the pre-given context of cricket; it
can convey many different messages in different contexts, like
the verbal signal in example (1).
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More recent deliberations by some semioticians see the role of
context in communication as more problematic than was
previously thought. Sebeok, for instance, argues: 'Context is
often the crucial factor in resolving the significance of a
message'. (Sebeok 1991:29). He goes on to argue that:
'Receivers interpret messages as an amalgam of
two separate but inextricably blended inputs: the
physical triggering sign, or signal itself, but as
unavoidably shaped by context. The latter plays a
cardinal role, yet the concept has eluded
definition; too, it is generally unknown how
destinations Ntake account of context. In
semiotics, the term is used both broadly and
loosely to encompass preceding messages
(anaphoric presuppositions), 	 and probably
succeeding messages (cataphoric implicatures),
environmental and semantic noise, all filtered by
short and long-term memory, genetic and cultural.'
(Sebeok 1991:17).
Transactions are seen as 'embedded' in context, but 'just how
an organism takes its environment into account remains
unclear.' (Sebeok 1991:29). It is surely somewhat surprising
that such a recent contribution to the study of semiotics
should admit, and be content to admit, complete ignorance
about what it terms 'a crucial factor' in the communication
process.
The dominant role that context plays in fixing meanings is now
sometimes used as evidence for the view that textual
meanings themselves are empty or inherently unstable. In
Literary Theory this idea is encouraged by the view that
context is an independent constituent of the speech event. The
notion of iterability involves the idea that linguistic signals
are re-interpretable in different contexts and that by bringing
a new context, en bloc as it were, to bear upon the
interpretation of a text, new meanings are imposed upon this
text. Poststructuralists deliberately focus attention on
written texts, rather than on speech events. in the case of
writing the author cannot be present to insist on a particular
contextualised meaning. Context can never be determined and
meanings can never be fixed.
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In this view, writing becomes what Fabb and Durant (1987)
refer to as 'the dissociated text par excellence'. It typifies the
text cut off from its origins and emphasises the textual nature
of all language as an autonomous system of differences. As
Fabb and Durant (1987:8) go on to argue:
'Texts.......are signifying entities or practices
which operate through a system of differential
relations between sounds or letters - and in some
degree are thus independent from the
consciousness or authorship which appears to
produce them.'
If these texts are just meaningless systems of differences,
how then are meanings actually assigned to texts? As seen in
the last chapter, Fish (1980) argued that a reasonable degree
of agreement about the meanings of literary texts is only
possible because interpretive community membership
encourages similar reading strategies and the use of shared
context. This institutionally defined context, seen largely in
terms of strategies of reading ('look for symbols', etc.), but
also in terms of acceptable outcomes (certain Christian
messages, for example, in the exercise Fish describes) is used
to obtain meanings that readers can, for the most part, agree
on. Where disagreement occurs, there is no point in appealing
to textual evidence to support a particular reading because the
disagreements are the result of belonging to different
interpretive communities, which encourage different textual
'facts' to be noticed. Essentially Fish is arguing that the
context plays the dominant role in textual interpretation.
Contexts impose meanings on texts from the outside.
Contexts can thus be seen as constraining, repressive. Barthes
considered freedom from context, conceived in this way, to be
both erotic and liberating. Barthes (1977b) finds pleasure, for
instance, in reading the following postcard message, a text
with no known author:
(4)	 'Monday. Returning tomorrow. Jean-Louis.'
In the author's absence there is no need to worry about
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restrictive intentions or contextual constraints. Barthes
wonders: which Jean-Louis? which of the various Mondays on
which the message might have been penned? His imagination is
free to wander. Can we not imagine, he asks:
'the freedom and so to speak, the erotic
fluidity......which would speak only in pronouns and
shifters, each person never saying anything but I,
tomorrow, over there, without referring to
anything legal whatsoever, and in which the
vagueness of difference (the only fashion of
respecting its subtlety) would be language's most
precious value?' (Barthes 1977b:1 65-166).
Communicators who use referential expressions, however,
usually have particular referents in mind and addressees
usually feel frustrated or confused if they cannot readily
assign reference. The person to whom the postcard was
actually addressed probably would not have found the utterance
in (4) erotic and liberating if it proved impossible to assign
reference appropriately. This utterance serves to show how
language cannot refer without a context (reference needs to be
assigned to 'Jean-Louis' and 'Monday') What is linguistically
given falls short of the complete thought communicated.
Eagleton draws attention to another way in which linguistic
signals underdetermine the message communicated. He asks us
to consider the following sentence written as a notice
displayed in Underground Stations (Eagleton (1983:6:78)).
(5) 'Dogs must be carried on the escalator'
He comments: 'This is not perhaps quite as unambiguous as it
seems at first sight: does it mean that you must carry a dog on
the escalator? Are you likely to be banned from the escalator
unless you can find some stray mongrel to clutch in your arms
on the way up?' The point here is that language does not encode
thoughts or meanings directly, that sentences may be
ambiguous and open to a variety of interpretations.
The observations that Barthes and Eagleton make are perfectly
valid. The way that they interpret these observations and the
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conclusions that they draw from them are not. The view of
context as socially sanctioned packages of thoughts or ideas,
having a constraining force on linguistic messages, is a very
limited one, which shows no appreciation of the real role of
context in utterance interpretation. The importance of this
role has been increasingly stressed by semioticians and code-
model theorists. Their lack of progress in providing an account
of how context affects interpretation results from their
failure to view context within a cognitive framework.
Utterance interpretation is a psychological phenomenon. The
search for plausible psychological models of how
interpretation works on-line is likely to be more revealing
about the real nature and role of context.
3.3.	 Code, Inference and Intention.
An alternative means by which context can play a role in
communication is through inferencing. Sperber and Wilson
(1986a:12-13) characterise such a process in the following
way: 'An inferential process starts from a set of premises and
results in a set of conclusions which follow logically from, or
are at least warranted by, the premises.' If the premises are
true and the argument is sound then the conclusion will also be
true. If a false premise is used in the argument, however, the
conclusion may be false. (In the case of a simple code such
considerations do not enter: signal-message pairs are linked by
direct association.)
If it is to play a role in inferential processes context must be
seen in terms of sets of contextual assumptions having logical
structure. Then it can enter into the kind of argument
described above, together with the assumption obtained from
the utterance (which also has to be constructed on the basis of
contextual information). These contextual assumptions are
taken from memory, constructed on the basis of other
assumptions stored in memory, or constructed from
information derived through sensory input.
Consider the following example (taken from Sperber and Wilson
82
1987):
(6) A: Would you like some coffee?
B: Coffee would keep me awake.
A's interpretation of the proposition expressed by B's
utterance provides her with the information that 'a drink of
coffee would keep B awake'. If A uses the contextual
assumption in (7a), taken from memory (i.e. from the
encyclopaedic entry attached to the conceptual address for B),
and either derives or constructs (7b) on the basis of
assumptions she has stored in memory concerning (from the
encyclopaedic entry attached to the conceptual address for)
'night-shifts', then a straightforward deductive argument may
operate over the propositions expressed by these assumptions,
using universal elimination to derive (7c) and modus ponens to
derive the conclusion in (7d). A is then in a position to
construct a similar sequence of deductions, using (7d) and the
assumptions expressed in (7e) and (7f) (obtained from the
encyclopaedic entries attached to the recently activated
conceptual addresses for 'coffee' and 'staying awake') as
premises in an argument that provides the conclusion in (7g).
(7g) serves as an answer to her original question. The
construction of the argument has also provided a reason for
that answer.
(7a) B works night-shifts.
(7b) Anyone who works night-shifts, wants to stay
awake.
(7c) If B works night-shifts, then B wants to stay
awake.
(7d) B wants to stay awake.
(7e) Anyone who wants to stay awake, wants a coffee.
(7f) If B wants to stay awake, then B wants a coffee.
(7g) B wants a coffee.
This sequence gives a rough indication of the kind of deductive
reasoning that A might perform as she interprets B's utterance
in (6). The deductive rules she uses operate automatically and
speedily over the assumptions that are brought together.
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(Sperber and Wilson (1986a: Chapter 2) provide a detailed
discussion of what is termed the deductive device and the
nature of the deductive rules used in utterance interpretation).
The overall process is to be characterised as non-
demonstrative because of the relative freedom involved in
accessing premises. The fact that there is no straightforward
code to rely on means that the communication process is risky.
A may misinterpret B's utterance if she selects or constructs
the wrong assumptions in the course of this argument. Maybe B
is not on night-shift this week and is looking forward to a good
night's sleep.
I will return to this example later. For the moment it is
sufficient to see how inferencing works, using context in the
form of mentally represented assumptions. Many Literary
Theorists assume that it is not necessary to view context in
psychological terms. Context refers to the general situation in
which the utterance exchange takes place. Hawkes (1977:83),
in discussing Jakobson's (1960) constituents of a speech event
argues, for example, that 'the context of the present
discussion enables individual phrases and sentences to be
meaningful where otherwise (uttered at, say, a football match)
they would not.' It is difficult, at first, to see the point of this
example. If Hawkes were to talk to a colleague about
Jakobson's speech event constituents at a football match,
there is no obvious reason to suppose that the colleague would
understand him any differently than he would reading his book
at home. More importantly, the general argument that physical
context inevitably influences utterance interpretation is a
weak one. Short of telekinesis, thoughts do not interact with
physical objects. Context can only play a role in utterance
interpretation as mentally represented contextual
assumptions. Physical context is only significant insofar as it
is possible to mentally represent states of affairs taken from
that context, which may then play a role in inferencing.
The use of contextual assumptions in inferencing might not be
seen as a problem by code-model theorists, given a more
sophisticated code-model. A coding process could include an
inferential process as a subcomponent. If, for example, in
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example (6) the relevant contextual assumptions were pre-
given and 'mutually known', then the communicator would be
sure that her message would be interpreted accurately by the
addressee. She would know that her verbal signal would
automatically provide a specific message in a pre-given
context. Just as a certain gesture by the umpire means 'six
runs' in the context of the rules in operation during a cricket
match, B's utterance in (6) could mean 'B wants some coffee'
in the context supplied by the contextual assumptions in (7).
This more sophisticated version of the code-model depends on
the pre-existence of mutual knowledge. For communication to
be failsafe and code-like, it has been argued, it is not enough
for A and B to share contextual assumptions. A has to know
that B knows that p; A has to know that B knows that A knows
that p; A has to know that B knows that A knows that B knows
that p; and so on ad infinitum. (For discussion of mutual
knowledge see Clark and Marshall 1981; Sperber and Wilson
1986a:15-21.)
Although it would seem, for the code-model at least, that the
mutual knowledge hypothesis is necessary, it does present a
number of problems. The most well-known is the fact that it is
simply not possible for two interlocutors to carry out an
infinite number of checks along the lines just suggested. (Does
B know that p?; does B know that I know that p?; does B know
that I know that B knows that p?; ......etc. ) One of the
remarkable facts about on-line utterance interpretation is its
speed: even a moderate number of such checks creates
problems for any psychologically plausible account.
It is easy to find counterexamples to the idea that context has
to be pre-given or mutually known. One example might be the
case, already discussed, of the cricketers having to recognise
the intention behind the "thumbs up" sign: the contextual
assumptions needed to interpret the signal have to be
constructed as part of the interpretation process. Consider
also the following case of verbal communication. A visits B for
the first time and notices, as she approaches the house, a
restaurant called 'Lincostas' on the corner of the Street. On
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meeting, B suggests that they go out for lunch. Then the
exchange in (8) takes place.
(8) A: Let's go to Lincostas.
B: I don't like fish restaurants.
In interpreting B's utterance A has to use the contextual
assumption in (9):
(9) Lincostas is a fish restaurant.
This is an assumption A has to construct for the occasion:
indeed, she has no way of knowing beforehand what kind of
restaurant Lincostas is.
Mutual knowledge is supposed to ensure the success of
communication. Another argument against the hypothesis is
that sometimes communication does break down and need to be
repaired. Sometimes people do use the wrong contextual
assumptions, as might easily be the case in (6), and end up
with the wrong interpretation. Clearly in cases where
communication takes place between people who do not know
each other, such as literary communication, mutual knowledge
as a pre-requisite for communication makes no sense at all.
In relevance theory the notion of mutual knowledge is replaced
by the notion of mutual manifestness. It is enough, Sperber
and Wilson argue, for the contextual assumptions needed in
interpretation to be mutually manifest to communicator and
addressee in order for communication to take place.
Manifestness is defined as follows: 'A fact is manifest to an
individual at a given time if and only if he is capable of
representing it mentally and accepting its representation as
true or probably true.' (Sperber and Wilson 1986a:39). The
communicator and addressee do not need to mutually know the
contextual assumptions needed for interpretation. The
addressee does not even have to have these assumptions stored
in his memory. He must simply be able to construct them,
either on the basis of what he can perceive in his immediate
physical environment, or on the basis of assumptions already
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stored in memory. In the case of literary communication the
contextual assumptions needed for interpretation have to be
made available through the text itself, in a way that will be
explained shortly.
According to this account it is the communicator's
responsibility to judge what contextual assumptions are
manifest to the addressee. Where she judges them not to be
manifest she must make them available through the language
she uses. She will be more or less explicit depending on what
contextual assumptions she judges to be manifest to an
addressee on a particular occasion, and depending on who her
addressee happens to be. In the case of literary communication
this detailed attention to the needs of a particular addressee
does not apply. The text is carefully shaped by the author with
a view to the effects it will have upon a reader, but this reader
is, in the term familiar from literary theory, an implied
reader. The context needed by the implied reader must be
determined by the text itself. Any particular real reader has
problems either when he does not have the assumptions he
needs for interpretation stored in memory (i.e. in the
encyclopaedic entries attached to conceptual addresses that
are triggered by words in the text), or when he is not able to
construct them easily from such assumptions.
The instability of communication that Literary Theorists refer
to depends on the idea that contexts and language are totally
separate entities. The addressee supplies different contexts
and obtains different interpretations. This point may be
countered by the simple observation that the communicator
adjusts what she has to say to the needs of the addressee and
therefore has some control over the contextual assumptions
the addressee uses. The attention paid to what contextual
assumptions are manifest to the addressee is matched by what
Cutler (1987) refers to as 'hearer-coddling' at phonetic and
prosodic levels of speech production. Even literary works are
organised such that the meanings potentially communicated
are communicated through the use of contextual assumptions
that the writer makes manifest through the language used. The
reader has to supply readily accessible contextual assumptions
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(made available via concepts linked to lexical items in the
text) that allow the kind of interpretation that may have been
intended. The real reader has to manoevre himself into the
position of the implied reader by supplying contextual
assumptions that provide a rich poetic or literary
interpretation.
If inference does play such an important role in communication
and if contextual assumptions have to be constructed as part
of the process of utterance interpretation, then the question of
intention becomes of crucial importance. It becomes
important for communicator and addressee to make decisions
about what the other 'has in mind'. Recognising intentions is a
crucial part of interacting with others. With regard to
Wittgenstein's twin case example, discussed in Chapter 1, one
might wonder whether a person's arm is merely rising (in an
involuntary act of yawning, for example), or whether it is
being raised with some intention (to take something down from
the top shelf, perhaps, or to communicate, for example to a
taxi driver that she wants him to stop and take her
somewhere). (Given these two types of intention, perhaps we
should talk of triplet rather than twin cases.) In the latter
case she has a communicative intention to make manifest an
informative intention with a particular content. In code model
views such intentions, as mental states, are generally
considered to be irrelevant. There is no need to metarepresent
what is in the other interlocutor's mind. In Literary Theory,
too, as noted above, texts are signifying entities or sign-
systems that can be analysed and discussed independently of
intentions and mental states.
In the arm rising/raising case, as described above, there is
either no particular intention involved, there is an intention to
reach for something, or there is an intention to communicate
something. Whether there is or is not an intention, and if there
is, what sort of intention, are worked out on the basis of
contextual evidence. The question of how one recognises a
communicative intention and what that intention is was raised
by Grice (1957;1989). The analysis of what is entailed by a
communicative intention has undergone a number of revisions,
88
including one by Sperber and Wilson (1986a: Chapter 1). They
define an informative intention as an intention 'to make
manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of
assumptions (I)' (Sperber and Wilson 1986a:58). This,
according to Fodor (1993) is the crucial, or primary, intention
in the case of advertising, or persuasive rhetoric more
generally. A communicative intention is defined as the
intention 'to make it mutually manifest to audience and
communicator that the communicator has this informative
intention' (Sperber and Wilson 1986a:61). I may have an
informative intention that involves making manifest to you the
belief that John Major has resigned. I can do this by leaving the
newspaper, with its "Major Throws in the Towel" headline, on
your desk. Alternatively, I could communicate the belief to you
by uttering a form of words that make it mutually manifest
that I had the intention to make it manifest to you that John
Major had resigned. In recognising my communicative intention
you do not necessarily come to believe that John Major has
resigned: you may not trust me. The recognition of a
communicative intention does not entail the fulfilment of an
informative intention. There are many informative intentions
that can only be conveyed indirectly via a communicative
intention. In fact, it is often the easiest way of conveying an
informative intention. Making it mutually manifest that the
communicator has a particular informative intention also has
the advantage of facilitating further communication.
The issue of intention has played a significant role in literary
criticism and theory. The notion of intentional fallacy in New
Criticism was critical of appeals to an author's explicitly
stated intentions in order to clarify the meanings expressed in
her works. (See Wimsatt and Beardsley (1954).) Wimsatt
questions the critic's need to obtain evidence of the author's
intentions from sources external to the poem. If the poem is
successful then it provides its own evidence for the poet's
intention and there is no need to appeal to the poet. If the poem
fails to do this, it might seem reasonable to turn to the poet
for elucidation. But in this case, the poem itself must be
considered a failure.
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Wimsatt is right to stress that intentions are not to be seen as
separate from the thoughts that the poet tries to express and
communicate through the language of his poems. The point of
this discussion of intention is partly to highlight a(nother)
division between pragmatics and Literary Theory. Literary
Theorists often express the idea that any talk of intentions is
misleading and a waste of time. Some make the point that
language conveys meanings quite independently of the author's
intentions. For Eagleton, for example, meaning is a function of
language and a social situation rather than some mental
process. He writes:
'To ask in such a situation 'What do you mean?' is
really to ask what effects my language is trying to
bring about: it is a way of understanding the
situation itself, not an attempt to tune in to
ghostly impulses within my skull. Understanding
my intention is grasping my speech and behaviour
in relation to a significant context..' (Eagleton
1983:114).
He also writes: 'In a certain practical situation, the words just
do seem to mean what they mean whatever I might whimsically
want them to mean.' (Eagleton 1983:113).
For Eagleton, it is 'the situation itself' rather than the
communicator that exercises control over which context is to
be used in utterance interpretation. As has been argued above,
it is not at alt clear how a 'situation' can do this, If it can, this
would seem to destroy the point of communication. The
communicator is aware of what context (in the form of
assumptions that the addressee may represent and bring to
bear on the interpretation process) is available, or manifest,
to her addressee; if she is uncertain that the addressee will be
able to construct a necessary contextual assumption she will
herself make such contextual information explicitly available.
In other words, she will construct her own utterance according
to what contextual information she understands the addressee
to have available to him. To give one simple example at this
stage, consider the utterance 'She's gone'. The speaker may
intend the proposition in (10).
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(10) Jane Brown has resigned as Head of the Critical
Theory department.
She may express this proposition in any of the following ways,
depending on her assessment of the ready availability of the
appropriate contextual information to the hearer.
(ha) Jane has gone.
(lib) Jane Brown has gone.
(11 c) Jane Brown has resigned.
(lid) She's resigned.
(lie) She's resigned as Head of the Critical Theory
department.
Eagleton sees the idea that intention plays a role in
communication as whimsical, narrow-minded and dogmatic. He
argues:
'What had been narrow-minded about previous
theories of meaning was their dogmatic insistence
that the intention of the speaker or writer was
always	 paramount	 for	 interpretation......In
countering this dogmatism, there was no need to
pretend that intentions did not exist at all; it was
simply necessary to point out the arbitrariness of
claiming that they were always the ruling
structure of discourse'. (Eagleton 1983:116).
The problem is that Eagleton gives no detailed analysis to
illustrate how discourse communicates in the absence of
intentions (or where it is not necessary to take intentions into
account). The autonomous linguistic meaning provided by the
utterance 'She's gone' is not completed on the basis of
discourse rules or situational context. The communicator
intends some particular thought and the addressee is
interested in what that thought is. The interpretive processes
that the addressee employs are designed to establish the
speaker's intentions.
Nothing has been said yet about how the addressee selects or
constructs the contextual assumptions that he needs for
utterance interpretation. How the addressee achieves this is
the subject of the next section.
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3.4.	 Utterance Interpretation and the Principle of
Releva nce.
In the relevance theory account of verbal communication
utterance interpretation, viewed as a psychological process,
involves two distinct phases. The first phase is a decoding
phase that pairs phonetic or graphemic representations with
semantic representations or incomplete logical forms. The
second phase is an inferential phase that completes the
various gaps in the logical form to derive a fully propositional
form, and then derives implicatures, propositional attitudes
and illocutionary force. Phonet ic and graphemic
representations do not decode directly to thoughts or full
propositional forms, therefore, as is the case with code-model
theories.
Such a view of verbal communication can be seen as consistent
with Fodor's modularity thesis (Fodor 1983). For Fodor the
mind consists of distinct input modules dealing with domain
specific, informationally encapsulated processes and central
systems dealing with open global processes. The former
include the perceptual processes and language; the latter
include conscious reasoning and problem-solving. The task of
the input modules is to convert domain-specific sensory or
linguistic representations into a common language of thought.
The representation of the thought 'There is a glass of
champagne on the table' might be derived from visual
representations,	 gustatory	 representations,	 tactile
representations, olfactory representations, aural
representations, or from linguistic representations. The
language module takes as input phonetic (or graphemic)
representations and converts these into semantic
representations via a complex code involving phonetic,
phonological, morphological, syntactic and semantic levels of
representation. Linguistic semantics is concerned with
accounting for the semantic output of this decoding process.
The central system processing of language takes semantic
representations as input and completes them through
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disambiguation, reference assignment, conceptual enrichment
and the addition of ellipsed material to derive propositional
forms. This completion of the propositional form is an
inferential process and falls within the domain of pragmatics,
together with the further inferential derivation of
implicatures and the embedding of the propositions expressed
within higher level descriptions that express attitudes
towards the proposition expressed. It is in this sense that
semantic and pragmatic processes are psychologically distinct.
Truth conditional semantics is concerned with the relation of
full, inferentially derived, propositional forms (i.e. forms
derived after pragmatic inferencing) to states of affairs in the
world.
According to Fodor cognitive psychology has been relatively
successful at characterising the operation of the input
modules and relatively unsuccessful at characterising the
ways in which the central processes operate:
'the reason that there is no serious psychology of
central processes is the same reason there is no
serious philosophy of scientific confirmation: both
exemplify the significance of global factors in the
fixation of belief, and nobody begins to understand
how such factors have their effects.' (Fodor
1983:140).
Sperber and Wilson (1986a), however, argue against taking
scientific confirmation as the paradigm case of central
thought processes. They argue that a theoretical account of the
inferential stage of utterance interpretation, dealing with the
output of the language module, is possible and may make a
contribution to the study of central systems. The principles
governing the inferencing phase of utterance interpretation
might, for example, have profound implications for the
psychology of reasoning.
Examples of linguistic decoding have already been given.
Barthes with his postcard and Eagleton with his Underground
notice showed that everyday language is propositionally
incomplete. I will consider a few more examples here.
Consider the following utterance.
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(12) He fell off the bar.
Here reference has to be assigned to 'he', which merely
indicates that some male entity is intended. The other problem
with this utterance is that the word 'bar' is at least two-ways
ambiguous, between, for example, gymnasium-bar and pub-bar.
As a result of this ambiguity, the utterance has at least two
logical forms. The addressee must use contextual information
both to disambiguate and assign reference. Contextual
information facilitates such disambiguations to the extent
that in the flow of conversation one is normally quite unaware
of most of these linguistic ambiguities, whether they be
lexical, as here, or structural. (There are two kinds of
discourse that deliberately exploit ambiguity to achieve
particular stylistic effects. In humour, many jokes depend on a
re-interpretation of an ambiguous lexical or structural
ambiguity, though punning exploits ambiguity openly and
directly. In poetry, ambiguity is exploited to enrich and
communicate multiple meanings or thoughts, as Empson (1930)
illustrates.)
Consider now the utterance in (13a). This would decode to give
something like the semantic representation (13b).
(13a) Her book is too long.
(13b) Some BOOK (in some relation to some female) is
too LONG 1 /LONG2
 for some purpose.
The word 'her' directs the addressee to fill in a gap in the
logical form by using contextual information to look for some
particular female. There is an ambiguity in the word 'long',
which may refer to spatial length or temporal length (in this
case, the length of time it might take to read the book). There
is also a gap at the end of the decoded logical form: the
addressee has to find an answer to the question for what
purpose is the book too long?. It might be too long for one of
the following reasons:
(14) too long to read by next week;
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too long to read on the train journey to Nottingham;
too long to win the Booker Prize;
too long to fit into this suitcase;
etc.
The 'possessive' form of 'her' indicates that there is some
relation between the particular female and a certain book. The
possessive decodes, in other words, to something like: there is
some relation between X and Y. The precise nature of the
relationship has to be worked out in context. In this example
the relation could be one of the following:
(15) the book she has bought;
the book she is reading;
the book she has to prepare for next week's
seminar;
the book she has borrowed from the library;
the book she has written;
the book she is trying to balance on her head as she
walks across the room;
etc.
The semantics of the possessive, then, leaves a gap which has
to be filled by pragmatic inferencing.
For comparison, it is interesting to note how one literary
stylistician, who views language as a social code rather than
in terms of mental representations, deals with the possessive
or genitive. Fowler (1986) argues that the syntax in English for
phrases like 'my wife', 'my son', 'my assistant' - that of
'Possessive + Noun':
'has the unfortunate effect of encoding a human
relationship as an object, a possession of another
person, so that 'my wife' seems to be as totally
owned by me as my hand or my books or my car.
Obviously this syntactic structure, apparently so
'natural', embodies a theory of personal
relationship as ownership with dominance, with
the dominated partner reduced to the status of an
object. Once recognised, such processes are seen
as ideological and objectionable.' (Fowler
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1986:20).
It is doubtful that this particular grammatical construction
was invented to encode possession for objectionable
ideological ends. To suggest that that is what it encodes now
is to fail to distinguish between the semantics of the
expression and the variety of pragmatic interpretations it
might have in context. What it does encode is, as has been
suggested, a relationship of an unspecified kind, the exact
nature of which has to be inferred. When I talk about 'my
doctor', 'my teacher', or 'my next door neighbour' I do not intend
a relationship of possession, neither is such a relationship
normally implied. There are many such counterexamples where
the interpretation that Fowler claims to be encoded by the
possessive is simply not appropriate. Rather than a decoding,
the meaning he assigns to 'my wife' or 'my son' should be
considered one possible contextually enriched interpretation.
The possessive, or genitive, provides one illustration of the
notion of conceptual enrichment, in this case where a very
general semantically decoded concept is narrowed down by
pragmatic processing to a more specific meaning. The example
of Wordsworth's use of the word 'sense', discussed in Chapter
2, can also be seen as an example of conceptual enrichment. In
a variety of different contexts Wordsworth's use of this one
word communicates a range of associated meanings. There are
as many different conceptual enrichments as there are
meanings communicated. Birch's observation that Wordsworth
did not seem to have the word under control, based on a very
rigid view of the nature of the linguistic sign, demonstrates a
similar failure to distinguish semantic decoding and pragmatic
inferencing. What Birch (and others) see as instability is the
result of the influence of context on the meaning
communicated. It is possible for a word to have a stable
semantic meaning and yet be interpreted differently in
different contexts. Furthermore, these contexts are selected in
accordance with particular cognitive principles.
Another way in which pragmatic processing takes account of
contextual information in order to complete the proposition
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expressed is in cases where certain linguistic material
is1mitted from utterances. If A simply says 'Lecture' to B as
she races past him on the campus, B may interpret the
utterance as expressing the thought that 'A is rushing to a
lecture and does not have time to stop and talk'. Whether or not
it is A's intention should be clear to B from the contextual
information available to him. In such cases the logical form
itself has to be completed before further pragmatic processing
is possible.
The problems discussed so far relate to the completion of the
propositional form expressed by an utterance. Pragmatic
inferencing is also required to derive propositional attitudes
and implicatures. An addressee has to determine what the
communicator is saying (the proposition expressed), what she
is implicating and what her attitude is to what she is saying
and implicating. An example of implicature was provided in
examples (6) and (7). Example (6) is repeated here:
(6) A: Would you like some coffee?
B: Coffee would keep me awake.
In order to interpret B's utterance A has to supply some of the
contextual assumptions in (7), which she can then use as
implicated premises in an inferential process to derive one of
the implications in (16).
(16a) B wants some coffee.
(1 6b) B does not want any coffee.
Grice's approach to the problem of implicature was to argue
that implicatures are calculated in order to maintain
consistency with a set of tacit norms - the maxims of
truthfulness, informativeness, relevance and clarity. These
conversational maxims, he argued, form part of a tacit social
contract between interlocutors. They are not, however,
arbitrary social conventions, but form a rational basis for the
conduct of conversational interchange. Relevance theory
develops Gricean pragmatics in a number of ways. Many of the
developments derive from the desire to provide a
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psychologically plausible account of utterance interpretation.
According to relevance theory, there are no maxims in the
sense of independently stored principles. Utterance
interpretation, it is claimed, can be explained in terms of one
principle - the principle of relevance - which is grounded in a
generalisation about how minds function when they pay
attention to and represent states of affairs, and process
information.
Our minds are designed to process information. The general aim
of building up a reliable picture of the world we live in is
restricted, however, by the limited time and mental resources
at our disposal. We cannot interpret and attend to an infinitely
large number of phenomena. This invites the following
questions. Why do we pay attention to some phenomena and not
others? Why do we represent the phenomena that we do attend
to in the way we do?
The relevance theory answer to these questions is as follows.
The mind is guided, on the one hand, by the desire to improve
the accuracy of its memory by maximising cognitive effects.
These may take the form of the strengthening of already
existing beliefs, the weakening or contradiction of already
existing beliefs, leading to their rejection, and the calculation
of new beliefs from the combination of new and old
information. The improvements attained in these ways lead to
a more reliable representation of the world and enable the
mind to become more efficient and reliable in its processing of
further information. The mind, then, attends to and processes
information that leads to the derivation of as great a range of
cognitive effects as possible and represents information in
such a way as to promote the derivation of as great a range of
cognitive effects as possible.
Such processing requires time and mental effort. The mind
cannot maximise cognitive effects in a completely
unconstrained way. On the other hand, therefore, the mind is
guided by considerations of processing effort. Because time
and energy are limited, other things being equal, the mind will
process those phenomena that are less costly to process and
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represent them in the most readily available way. Although it
is beneficial to maximise cognitive effects, it is also
necessary and beneficial, in another sense, to minimise
processing effort.
The definition of relevance is built upon these two notions of
cognitive effect and processing effort. To say that information
processing is relevance-driven is to say that an optimal
balance is sought between maximising cognitive effects and
minimising processing effort. A stimulus is more relevant the
more cognitive effects it yields, and is less relevant the more
cognitive effort is required to process it. Interpreting a
stimulus involves assigning it that conceptual representation
which gives rise to the greatest number or range of cognitive
effects for the effort involved. The concepts used will be
relatively accessible and the retrieval of contextual
assumptions from memory will likewise be constrained by the
need to achieve this optimal balance between effects and
effort.
Precise calculations of the number of effects required for
relevance to be achieved is impossible. This will partly depend
on the time and energy available at any given time, which are
likely to vary. It may also be that some people generally have
more mental energy than others just as some have more
physical energy. For these reasons it is not possible to discuss
the relevance of information independently of individual
mental states.
A more specific claim about communication follows from the
general claim about cognitive processing. Communicators are
able to exploit the tact that the minds of their addressees are
relevance-driven. An ostensive signal provided by a
communicator conveys the implicit presumption that it is
worth the addressee's while to pay attention to it, that it is,
in fact, relevant. The addressee is encouraged to assume that
by interpreting the signal in a minimally effortful manner he
will, in the communicator's opinion, achieve a satisfying range
of cognitive effects - at least as satisfying as anything else
he could be paying attention to at that moment.
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A communicator intends an addressee to entertain a thought in
the form of an assumption or set of assumptions and she
intends her addressee to recognise that she has this intention.
She must provide an ostensive stimulus that makes these
assumptions manifest to him. The addressee will assume that
the communicator's act of ostension, whether it be gesture or
utterance, by claiming his attention, implicitly carries the
presumption that there are a sufficient or satisfactory range
of cognitive effects to make it worth his while to process and
interpret the given signal. This signal is relevant to the extent
that a conceptual representation assigned to it interacts with
contextual assumptions that are readily available to the
addressee to yield a range of cognitive effects. It is also
relevant in that it provides what the communicator assumes to
be the easiest means of achieving those effects. Given the
relevance-driven nature of cognitive processing, the best
strategy available to the communicator is to choose a stimulus
(perhaps construct an utterance) which will give rise to the
intended effects with the least possible effort on the part of
the addressee. The addressee will assume that the speaker is
fashioning her utterance in just such a way. The controlling
aspect of utterance interpretation, then, is processing effort:
whatever the effects intended by the speaker, the costs in
terms of processing effort must be minimised.
All ostensive-inferential communication, it is claimed, is
governed by a single principle of relevance, which states:
Every act of ostensive-inferential communication
communicates the presumption of its own
optimal relevance.
In the case of verbal communication, an utterance is said to be
optimally relevant if and only if it provides an adequate range
of cognitive effects for minimal possible processing effort.
Verbal communication, like all ostensive communication,
differs from information one might simply pick up from the
environment in that it carries this presumption of optimal
relevance. An utterance on a given interpretation is
consistent with the principle of relevance if and only if the
communicator could rationally have expected it to be optimally
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relevant to the addressee on that interpretation. This is the
criterion that guides utterance interpretation.
How does relevance theory account for how a hearer would
interpret example (12), repeated below?
(12) He fell off the bar.
First he needs to assign reference to 'he', which, as already
stated, is something he does on-line shortly after the word is
recognised. The word 'he' provides the semantic information
that some male entity is being referred to. The addressee is
instructed by the use of this word to locate an appropriate
'male entity' concept. Which of the thousands present in his
mind does he choose? The relevance theory answer is that he
chooses the one that is easiest to process which, at the same
time, yields an adequate range of contextual effects. A number
of concepts are active in his mind at the time he receives this
instruction. The 'male entity' concept which is most highly
activated is the one that is least costly to use in terms of
processing effort. This is the one he selects, then, and if its
use contributes to providing a satisfactory range of cognitive
effects of the kind the communicator could rationally have
intended, then the addressee assumes that this is, indeed, the
concept that is intended. It is the communicator's
responsibility to judge that one particular male entity concept
would be more highly activated to a significant degree and
hence more easily accessible for the addressee than any other.
Of course, the communicator could always make a mistake
here, but usually 'he' is used of a male entity mentioned in the
immediately preceding discourse or of some male entity upon
whom attention is fixed, or may easily be fixed, in the
immediate physical environment. In face-to-face conversation
such breakdowns in communication as do occur are readily
repaired. If the communicator is in any doubt, thinking perhaps
that several male entity concepts may be highly activated and
equally easily accessible to the mind of the addressee, then
she makes the verbal signal more explicit: instead of 'he', she
says 'John' or 'John Smith'.
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Another problem here concerns the disambiguation of 'bar'. The
one word is linked to several different concepts. One such
concept would be that of the kind of bar found in pubs; another
such concept would be that of the kind of bar found in
gymnasiums. Both these, and other, 'bar' concepts would be
activated in the mind of the hearer, irrespective of the context
(as argued in Swinney (1979)). Prior discussion of gymnastic
competitions, for example, would then bias the interpretation
in favour of the kind of bar found in gymnasiums: that concept
would be more highly activated and would be the one that was
easier to access and process. Prior discussion of a wild end of
term celebratory pub crawl would similarly encourage the
alternative 'pub bar' concept. In each case the more strongly
activated concept would be easier to process and use in an on-
line interpretation of the utterance.
I have been assuming here that concepts are addresses,
activated by items in the mental lexicon, where assumptions
that can be used as context are collected and stored. Sperber
and Wilson (1986a: 84-93) argue that different kinds of
information are stored at conceptual addresses, including
lexical, logical and encyclopaedic information. While the
lexical and logical entries attached to a conceptual address
(containing phonological, morphological, syntactic and
semantic information) are shared by everyone who knows the
word/concept in the language, the encyclopaedic entry is open-
ended and varies from person to person. It contains everything
we believe about the extension of that concept. As has been
argued, the communicator has to make an adequate assessment
of what beliefs an addressee has stored in his memory, and of
their varying levels of accessibility, as part of her general
assessment of what contextual assumptions are manifest to
him on a given occasion.
It should be noted that in poetry, reference assignment and
disambiguation are often deliberately made problematic,
requiring greater processing effort on the part of the reader. it
will be argued later that these are ways of encouraging
readers to explore memory more thoroughly, to combine
memories stored at different conceptual addresses in order to
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increase the range of cognitive effects.
Consider now the following standard cases of implicature:
(17) A: Drink?
B: I'm driving.
(18) A: Drink?
B: I'm teaching in half an hour.
(19) A: Drink?
B: I'm a Mormon.
In example (17) the contextual assumption that A uses to
interpret B's reply to her question is taken from the
encyclopaedic entry attached to the concepts ALCOHOLIC DRINK
and DRIVE. Following A's question, a set of contextual
assumptions about (alcoholic) drink(ing) will be activated in
the minds of both A and B. (The concept DRINK will be enriched
in appropriate contexts, as here, to ALCOHOLIC DRINK).
Following B's answer, a set of contextual assumptions about
driving will also be activated. The encyclopaedic entries
attached to the concepts DRINK (or ALCOHOLIC DRINK) and
DRIVE will share several assumptions: 'It is forbidden/illegal
to drink alcohol before driving'; 'It is dangerous to drink
alcohol before driving'; 'If anyone is about to drive, they do not
want to drink alcohol'. These assumptions, already activated by
the concept ALCOHOLIC DRINK (along with many others),
receive further activation from DRIVE and hence, because of
this increased double activation, become the most accessible
contextual assumptions for use in the interpretation of B's
reply. A uses these assumptions first (rather than any of the
many other assumptions about 'drinking' and about 'driving'
that she has stored in the encyclopaedic entries attached to
the concepts DRINK and DRIVE) because they are the most
accessible. A uses the contextual assumption if anyone is
about to drive, they do not want to drink as an implicated
premise together with the proposition expressed by B's
utterance (B is about to drive) in a standard logical deduction
which yields first, after universal elimination, the assumption
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if B is about to drive, B does not want a drink, and then, after
modus ponens, the implicated conclusion: B does not want a
drink. If the immediately accessible assumptions interact
with the proposition expressed to yield sufficient contextual
effects, as they do in this case, then these effects, here in the
form of new assumptions, are understood to have been
communicated. If they do not interact with the proposition
expressed to yield contextual effects, then further less
immediately accessible assumptions are tried or
communication fails.
Whereas in (17) the relevant contextual assumption is taken
from memory (for most people in what might roughly be termed
'our society'), the situation is different for (18). Here the
contextual assumption 'If anyone is about to teach, they do not
want an alcoholic drink' is used as a premise together with the
proposition expressed by B's utterance in a similar series of
logical deductions which lead to the implicated conclusion that
'B does not want an alcoholic drink'. (In some circumstances,
of course, the opposite could be intended and communicated.)
The contextual assumption here is not so accessible as the one
used in (17) because it does not exist in (most people's)
memory. There are, as yet, no government publicity campaigns
concerning the dangers of drinking and teaching and it is not an
assumption that needs to be used regularly. It has to be
constructed on the basis of what is stored at the encyclopaedic
entries attached to the conceptual addresses for TEACH and
DRINK. It may be constructed (very roughly) along the following
lines. Teaching requires great powers of concentration.
Drinking alcohol is bad for concentration. Therefore, if
someone is about to teach, they do not want to drink alcohol.
This is a relevant assumption to construct because it combines
with the proposition expressed in a logical deduction to give a
conclusion which answers A's question, and it is consistent
with, and can itself be deduced from, assumptions stored at
the encyclopaedic entries attached to the activated concepts
TEACH and DRINK.
Whether or not the details are correct (and they may differ
from individual to individual: some people may go around with
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the assumption 'If anyone is about to teach, they do not want to
drink alcohol' stored in memory) it can be seen that there are
cases where the contextual assumptions needed for the logical
deduction which yields the relevant implicated conclusion are
not immediately retrievable from memory but are available
from memory at one remove (or even at several removes). The
greater effort involved in accessing the intended contextual
assumption is repaid by an increase in contextual effects: a
wider range of implicatures being communicated. The
assumptions used to construct the contextual assumption or
implicated premise which enters directly into a deduction with
the proposition expressed by the utterance are also activated.
Assumptions to do with B's great sense of responsibility
(perhaps in contrast to A) may be communicated. These
assumptions may be less strongly communicated than the
assumptions that B is about to teach and that B does not want
an alcoholic drink. The question of responsibility would
presumably be made more salient if the assumption that B is
about to teach is a reminder to A, rather than a new piece of
information.
In (19) the range of implicatures is potentially wider still as
more effort has to be put into constructing relevant contextual
assumptions. The implicatures in (20) are strongly implicated,
in the sense that they are clearly communicated. (This example
and the following discussion is taken from Pilkington (1992)).
(20) (a) Mormons do not drink alcohol.
(b) B does not drink alcohol.
(c) B does not want an alcoholic drink.
A necessarily supplies the contextual assumption (20a) and
derives the assumptions (20b) and (20c) in the search for an
interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. The
assumption in (20a) belongs to the encyclopaedic entries
attached to both the concept DRINK and the concept MORMON,
which should make it more readily accessible than, say, other
assumptions about Mormons. Here, however, the indirectness of
B's response causes A to access a greater range of
implicatures, some of the possibilities (implicated premises
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and implicated conclusions) being listed in (21):
(21) Grappa is an alcoholic drink.
B would not drink grappa.
Fernet Branca is an alcoholic drink.
B would not drink Fernet Branca.
Centerba is an alcoholic drink.
B would not drink Centerba.
Mormons do not drink coffee.
B would not drink coffee.
Mormons do not smoke.
B would not smoke.
Mormons practise polygamy.
B practises polygamy.
Mormons go around in pairs carrying briefcases.
B goes around in a pair carrying a briefcase.
etc.
By answering indirectly B intended to make a number of
assumptions to do with his being a Mormon mutually manifest.
He makes a context available to A which A can select from.
Other assumptions are made manifest by B's utterance, and
possibly entertained by A, such as those in (22):
(22) A will not have much in common with B.
B would be offended by A's hedonistic outlook on
life.
If, as is likely, B did not intend to communicate these, they are
simply inferred by A on her own responsibility. They are made
manifest but B does not make mutually manifest his intention
to make them manifest. A learns a lot about B, that she would
not have known if B had just answered 'no' or 'I don't drink'. The
assumptions in (20) are strongly implicated, clearly intended
by B and necessarily entertained by A, if she is to make any
sense of B's utterance. A further indeterminate range of
implicatures, perhaps partly selected from (21), are also
communicated, as A searches for an interpretation that is
consistent with the principle of relevance an interpretation,
that is, which supplies sufficient effects to justify the effort
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expended. These weaker implicatures are less certainly
intended by B, and A consequently takes more responsibility
for accessing them. Gradually these merge with assumptions
that B did not intend, such as those in (22). It is worth
emphasising that B may well have intended to communicate
assumptions such as those in (22), and A may well have
understood him to have done so. Whatever the actual intention,
in those cases where a range of weak implicatures is
communicated there will be some indeterminacy about what
the communicator intended to communicate and what is worked
out on the addressee's own responsibility: there will be an
indeterminacy, in other words, between implicatures and mere
I m p1 I cat ions.
Where contextual exploration takes place the vast majority of
assumptions stored at a particular address will not be used or
entertained. What B communicates are the impticatures in (20)
and then anything else about Mormons which A might find
useful in pursuing the conversation. Consider what happens in
the following exchange:
(23) A: What do you do?
B: I'm an Egyptologist.
Again a number of things become manifest to A, assumptions in
the encyclopaedic entry attached to the concept 'Egyptologist',
for example:
(24) B knows about the curse of Tutankhamun.
B is familiar with Egypt.
B can interpret heiroglyphs, etc.
All this is potentially useful background, as are the
assumptions in (21) in the earlier exchange. B 'supplies' A with
a set of contextual assumptions which she may select from in
so far as they are relevant to her. If A is interested in
mummies or pyramids the conversation can take off from
there. Maybe A draws a blank, not having many assumptions
stored at the conceptual address for 'Egyptology', and tries a
different conversational tack - or a different conversational
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partner.
Implicatures, then, can be more or less strong, more or less
determinate. Some pragmatic accounts tend to concentrate on
the determinate end of the scale and ignore the more
problematic indeterminate cases. Code models, in particular,
are ill-equipped to handle indeterminacy. A signal either
conveys a certain message or it does not. While, on the one
hand, indeterminacy may be ignored as a theoretically
embarrassing phenomenon, on the other hand it may be taken as
evidence for the hopelessness of any attempt to provide a
theory of communication. More particularly the indeterminacy
of literary communication may be taken as evidence for the
hopelessness of attempting any theory of literariness. The
relevance theory notion of weak implicature, as I have started
to try to show, provides a theoretical account of such
indeterminacy. It will be the aim of subsequent chapters to
develop this theoretical account.
Before moving on to a discussion of poetic effects it is worth
making one more point here about literary communication in
general. It has been suggested that relevance theory applies
primarily to the interpretation of spontaneous speech and is
less adequately equipped to deal with literary texts. Kiparsky,
for example, argues that:
while the interpretation of dialogue is
constrained by the principle that the speaker
formulates his sentences in such a way that the
first interpretation consistent with the principle
of relevance that occurs to the addressee is the
intended one, the reading of literary works is not,
and they are consequently open to constant
reinterpretation.' (Kiparsky 1987:187).
Clearly there is a difference, not between spoken and written
language, but between language directed at known addressees
and language directed at addressees most, if not all, of whom
will be unknown, which is the typical case with literature.
Only in the former case can communicators make ready
assessments concerning which contextual assumptions are
easily accessible to their addressees.
108
There is a sense, however, in which a potential reader has to
decide whether he is a suitable addressee. As becoming an
addressee is an act of choice (I'll read Ulysses. but I'm not
going to read Finnegan's Wake), the presumption of relevance
does not hold in the same way. James Joyce's novels could not
be accompanied by a presumption of relevance for readers he
did not know. He did write them, however, with the intention
that they be relevant to someone. As readers we simply have to
accept that we may miss a lot of what was intended,
especially during a first reading. We may even decide that we
are ill-equipped to tackle certain books or certain authors on
the grounds that we do not have sufficient contextual
information or the right kind of contextual information
sufficiently accessible.
The point of Seamus Heaney's distinction between 'accuracy'
and 'decency' was to suggest that the poet was more focussed
on his or her own thoughts than on communicating them to
others, more on expression than on communication. There is
also the point, as Fodor (1993) noted, that there are writers,
such as Kafka, who claimed to be writing primarily for
themselves. Although the writer does not adapt her message to
the reader, as in face-to-face communication, she does use a
form of words that will evoke certain thoughts in an imagined,
or implied, reader. It is a form of communication that allows
potential readers to make their own choice as to whether to
take on the role of actual reader. Once this role is assumed,
however, the reader is concerned to work out what the writer
may have intended by the words she used in the order she used
them, as would be the case in other forms of communication.
This is true not only for literature. Just as Heaney claimed a
tension in writing poetry between accuracy (expressing poetic
thoughts precisely) and decency (being accessible to an
audience), so academic writing may be more or less geared to
accuracy or decency. An article in a specialist journal is likely
to be more concerned with accuracy. A textbook is likely to be
more concerned with decency. Ideally, of course, any example
of such writing will strike a balance: it will be as accurate and
decent as it needs to be.
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Literature and academic writing are alike in that (except in the
case of students who are obliged to read certain books) the
potential reader must make the decision as to whether he
belongs to the set of people for whom examples of such
writing can be relevant. Insofar as, and when, they are relevant
to a reader, literary and academic writing are relevant in
entirely different ways. What these ways are should become
decently and accurately apparent in forthcoming chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METAPHOR.
'....metaphor is essential to the precision of language.....
try to be precise and you are bound to be metaphorical'.
John Middleton Murray, The Problem of Style.
4.1.	 Metaphor and Pragmatic Theory.
How does an addressee interpret an utterance like (1)? What
processes are involved in its interpretation?
(1) You are the cream in my coffee.
Grice assumes that the addressee first computes a literal
meaning which corresponds to the proposition expressed by the
utterance or what the utterance 'says'. He then finds that it
involves a 'categorial falsity', that it is not consistent with
one of the tacit standards, norms, or 'maxims', as Grice calls
them, that underlie all rational and co-operative verbal
exchanges. As long as he assumes that the speaker is intending
to communicate in a rational and co-operative manner, that
there is no reason to believe that the speaker is not
conforming to the Co-operative Principle, he judges this to be
what Grice terms a deliberate and overt flouting of a maxim.
In this case (1) flouts the first maxim of Quality which states:
'Do not say that which you believe to be false.' When a maxim
is flouted, the interpretation of the utterance on the level of
what is said is rejected in favour of an interpretation that is
consistent with the maxims on the level of what is implicated.
An implicature is calculated, in other words, which is
consistent with the truth maxim, or maxim of Quality. In the
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case of (1), according to Grice (1975; 1989:34), 'the most
likely supposition is that the speaker is attributing to his
audience some feature or features in respect of which the
audience resembles (more or less fancifully) the mentioned
substance.' Perhaps what is communicated, Grice suggests, is
something along the lines of 'You are my pride and joy.'
This kind of approach is consistent with many discussions of
metaphor in semantics and in the major philosophical and
literary traditions, which treat metaphorical use as deviating
from a literal norm. Grice's account of metaphor may be seen
as attempting to offer a more satisfactory explanation of the
intuitions developed by this tradition within a pragmatic
framework. The assumption behind such views is that ordinary
literal language communicates its meanings directly.
Metaphorical utterances are disruptive of this direct
communicaton and, therefore, require some special
explanation. Looking at the problem in cognitive terms, the
underlying assumption is that extra cognitive machinery is
required for the interpretation of metaphors.
One of the main problems of this approach to metaphor is
raised by Searle (1979:92) when he asks the following
question: 'Why do we use expressions metaphorically instead of
saying exactly and literally what we mean?' How, in other
words, do we explain the motivation of metaphor. There are a
number of other well-known problems with this account.
Utterances, such as (2), for example, as Levinson (1983:157)
pointed out, can be read both literally and metaphorically in
the same context:
(2) Freud lived here.
This is a problem because there is no 'categorial falsity' to
prompt or activate the process which calculates impticatures.
Other metaphorical utterances that do not flout the maxim of
Quality are those containing negation, as in (3):
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(3) No man is an island.
As it is the flouting of the first maxim of Quality that is
supposed to trigger the calculation of implicatures, there is
clearly a problem with these examples. More is intended by (3)
than the trivially true assertion that no person is a member of
the set of islands. The addressee is encouraged to think of
particular properties of islands that people do not share.
In those cases such as (1), where it is possible to maintain
that a maxim has been flouted, Grice does not provide a fully
explicit account of the processes by which an interpretation is
achieved. Some kind of calculation is involved which must
meet the demands of on-line real time efficiency: implicatures
have to be calculated in milliseconds. It has to be shown how
the mind, as it processes a metaphorical utterance, arrives at
the intended interpretation, following certain principles or
rules; it is not sufficient to show how, given our understanding
of the metaphorical utterance, the intended interpretation
could have been achieved. What Grice offers are only ex post
facto rationalisations for certain interpretations. A developed
Gricean account first needs to show how we recognise the
utterance to be an instance of metaphorical use, rather than,
say, an instance of metonymy, litotes, hyperbole or irony,
which, it is claimed, also flout the first maxim of Quality.
Then it requires an explicit account of the metaphor-specific
principles and inferential rules that enable the hearer to
proceed from the metaphorical utterance to the intended
interpretation.
Searle (1979) tries to fill in some of the gaps in Grice's
account by suggesting some eight principles that deal with
different metaphor types and that take addressees from
sentences that are manifestly 'defective' to paraphrase
interpretations that make literal sense (specifically, he
attempts to show how metaphors of the form 'S is P' can be
taken to mean 'S is R', where R is literally true of S). Searle
rejects the standard comparison and interaction semantic
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theories of metaphor, arguing that metaphor must be explained
within the framework of a pragmatic theory. His pragmatic
account centres on the special principles needed for metaphor
interpretation: 'for communication to be possible, speaker and
hearer must share a common set of principles' (Searle
1979:114). He outlines three interpretive steps: (i) have some
strategy to determine whether the hearer needs to interpret
the utterance ('S is P') using the special purpose principles
appropriate to metaphor interpretation (and clearly here
Searle's statement that 'where the utterance is defective if
taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from
sentence meaning' (Searle 1979:114) does not go far enough -
the hearer does not want to invoke irony or metonymy
interpreting principles); (ii) use the set of special purpose
principles to compute possible values of A; (iii) use the set of
principles to restrict the range of Rs, using strategies like: 'go
back to the S term and see which of the many candidates for
the values of R are likely or even possible properties of S'
(Searle 1979:115).
I will give four of Searle's principles here with his examples,
some of which I shall refer to in later discussion. (i) Things
which are P are by definition R (for example, 'Sam is a giant',
intending 'Sam is very big', giants being by definition very big).
(ii) Things which are P are contingently R (for example, 'Sam is
a pig' intending 'Sam is messy and/or greedy', it being a
contingent - though not defining - property of pigs that they
are messy and greedy). (iii) Things which are P are often said
or believed to be A, even though both speaker and hearer may
know that R is false of P (for example, 'Richard is a gorilla',
intending 'Richard is fierce, nasty and prone to violence', it
being a cultural stereotype that gorillas have these properties,
although they are not necessarily assumed to be actual
properties of gorillas). (iv) Things which are P are not R, nor
are they like A things, nor are they believed to be R,
nonetheless it is a fact about our sensibility, whether
culturally or naturally determined, that we just do perceive a
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connection, so that utterance of P is associated in our minds
with R properties (for example, 'Sally is a block of ice',
intending 'Sally is unemotional, lacking in feeling or the
ability to express feeling', it just being the case that we
associate coldness with lack of feeling).
As Searle himself acknowledges, this is by no means a
complete and fully satisfactory account of metaphor
interpretation. The principles, as given, are incomplete. They
deal only with nominal metaphorical utterances of the form 'S
is P'. They also only deal with dead or conventional metaphors
which have relatively fixed, context-independent
interpretations. But there is the further problem of how the
hearer selects on-line in real time between the different
principles. The principles again turn out to be ways of
explaining ex post facto how certain interpretations are
arrived at; they do not offer rules that are descriptive of, or
that can be used in the actual process of, interpretation. The
account Searle offers would seem to be psychologically
implausible: it lacks explicitness and it depends on too much
extra machinery to be workable on-line. Searle criticises and
rejects Miller's version of the comparison theory of metaphor
(as in Miller 1979) on the grounds that its reconstruction of
the comprehension of metaphorical utterances 'assigns an
impossible computing task to the speaker and hearer' (Searle
1979:111). Searle's own account, sensitive to its own
shortcomings in other respects, might stand accused of the
same fault.
Levinson argues that Grice's account 'offers little insight into
the nature of metaphor' (Levinson 1983:157) and that Searle's
development of this approach still 'leaves obscure the
motivation for, and the expressive power of, metaphors'
(Levinson 1983:158). If metaphors require so much extra
interpretive machinery it is worth asking why they are such a
common feature of language use. Why do speakers not save
their hearers some effort and use acceptable literal
paraphrases? The problem is, as Searle recognised, that even
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in the case of conventional metaphors such as (4a) there
probably is no fully satisfactory literal paraphrase. Intuitively
(4b) does not express the same as (4a). Metaphorical
utterances are not simply alternative ways of expressing what
could equally well be expressed literally. They are not merely
'decorative' in some superficial sense. They differ in terms of
what they communicate, as well as how they communicate.
So what does (4a) express that (4b) does not? What is its
motivation? How can one account for its greater expressive
power?
(4a) He was burning with anger.
(4b) He was extremely angry.
Levinson concludes that a pragmatic theory of metaphor will
probably always remain incomplete. He suggests that some
general psychological theory of how we think analogically is
required to supplement the pragmatic account offered by
Gricean pragmatics. Before dismissing the claims of pragmatic
theory to offer a full account of metaphor interpretation,
however, one should consider alternative theories to those
offered by Grice and Searle. Relevance theory, I shall argue,
offers a richer account of metaphor that is able to respond to
many of the criticisms Levinson and others have levelled
against Grice's account. While holding that metaphorical
utterances form a natural part of language use that do not
deviate from any norm, relevance theory does not hold to the
view, familiar in Literary Theory circles, that as language is
irretrievably metaphorical it can only be discussed in a loose,
metaphorical way.
Before I turn to the relevance theory account of metaphor,
however, I would like to refer to one further criticism of both
Grice and Searle that Levinson does not mention, but which
arises out of recent psycholinguistic research into metaphor.
Some psycholinguists have criticised what they refer to as 'the
Standard Pragmatic Model of Comprehension' (Gerrig 1989) or
the 'literal meaning hypothesis' (Gibbs 1984; 1989). This model
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or hypothesis, they argue, predicts that non-literal utterances
take longer to process than literal utterances. This prediction
is not borne out by research, which suggests that utterances
used metaphorically do not necessarily take longer to process
than the same utterances used literally.
Gerrig (1989) used sentences such as (5a) which could be read
literally or metaphorically, depending on the context supplied
by the preceding text. In (5b), for example, it can be read as a
literal utterance; in (5c) it can be read as a metaphorical
utterance.
(5a) The winter wind gently tossed the lacy blanket.
(5b) Joan didn't want to put her silk blanket in her
automatic dryer. Although it was January, she risked
putting it on the clothesline. The winter wind gently
tossed the lacy blanket.
(5c) Joan looked out into her yard with great excitement.
Over night, a layer of snow had covered the ground.
The winter wind gently tossed the lacy blanket.
Gerrig found that subjects took no longer to read and
understand the final sentence in (5c) (which is used
metaphorically) than they took to read and understand the same
sentence (used literally) in (5b). These results falsify the
prediction made by the standard Gricean pragmatic model of
comprehension. He concluded that we do not pass through a
literal meaning stage when we interpret metaphors. Gerrig
included Sperber and Wilson (1986a) in his list of advocates of
the Standard Pragmatic Model of Comprehension, but in fact
the relevance theory account of metaphor interpretation is
quite consistent with the kind of psycholinguistic research
results that he and others have produced.
According to relevance theory there is no need for an
independent truth maxim, or maxim of Quality. There is no
automatic assumption, in other words, that when a
communicator produces an utterance which has a propositional
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form P, she is committed to the truth of P. It follows that
there is no need for an account which requires the
interpretation of metaphorical utterances to pass through a
literal meaning stage, only for such an interpretation to be
rejected. It is generally the case that an addressee is only
entitled to assume that the proposition expressed resembles
the thought of the speaker to some degree. The propositional
form of an utterance resembles the propositional form of the
communicator's thought to the extent that it shares logical and
contextual implications with it in a certain context. An
utterance is used literally when all such implications are
shared, when the propositional forms of utterance and thought
are identical.
The account of metaphorical utterance interpretation
developed in Sperber and Wilson (1986a; 1986b) argues that
metaphors communicate a range of implicatures. When a
proposition interacts inferentially with contextual
assumptions to yield a further range of assumptions as
implications, a number of these will be communicated as
implicatures. It may or may not be the case, however, that the
proposition expressed by the utterance is itself communicated.
It may simply be the case that uttering that particular
utterance is the most economical way of communicating a
particular set of further assumptions/implicatures. (I do not
really think that you are the cream in my coffee; I do believe
you are special in a variety of ways and that that specialness
in that variety of ways can best be communicated via the
propositional form expressed by the utterance in (1).) In this
view there is no need for a maxim of Quality and no need for
any special metaphor-specific machinery of the kind suggested
by Searle.
Metaphorical utterances communicate sets of assumptions
which describe states of affairs in the world. If it is possible
to talk about 'metaphorical thoughts', then such thoughts
would themselves, presumably, be interpretations of further
non-metaphorical thoughts. Generally speaking a metaphorical
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utterance communicates sets of non-metaphorical
assumptions. 'Sam is a pig' is a metaphorical utterance, but
'Sam is messy', 'Sam is greedy' and other implicatures that the
metaphorical utterance may be said to communicate are not
themselves metaphorical. As already mentioned, it is a widely
held assumption among Literary Theorists, taken from ideas
developed within poststructuralism, that the widespread use
of metaphor destabilises language in its relations with a
purported real world. Poststructuralist theories of language
assume that the idea that language use is full of metaphorical
utterances demonstrates that language must inevitably fail to
refer, that it cannot possibly relate directly to states of
affairs in the world. But a cognitive pragmatic account, such
as that provided by relevance theory, would hold the view that
it is sentences in the language of thought, rather than natural
language sentences, that refer directly to states of affairs in
the world. As explained in Chapter 3, the semantic
representations of natural language sentences underdetermine
the thoughts communicated by those sentences in context. Only
pragmatically enriched propositional forms can have truth
conditions. There is no necessary identity between the
propositional forms of sentences and thoughts. Once this point
is recognised a fundamental argument in the poststructuralist
philosophy of language is undermined.
Sperber and Wilson (1986a:231-235; 1986b) discuss metaphors
in relation to more general examples of 'loose talk'. There are
many ways in which the proposition expressed by an utterance
may be used 'loosely', i.e. to resemble the thought of the
communicator, by sharing a range of logical and contextual
implications with it. Understatement and overstatement are
common loose uses of language, for example. Speakers also
commonly use a variety of approximations with regard to
colours, sizes, shapes, positions and the time of day. Again, as
with certain metaphorical utterances, there is not necessarily
any apparent categorical falsity. An example of approximation
as loose talk might be B's response in example (6):
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(6) A: How many students are there in the first year?
B: One hundred.
One hundred is a nice round figure that is easy to process. A
range of implications to do with the time it is likely to take to
mark the papers, the time it is necessary to start marking
them, the amount of effort likely to be involved, whether it
would still be possible to spend the weekend watching cricket,
etc., may still be derived from B's reply, even though what B
said was strictly false. A would not automatically assume that
B believed that there were exactly one hundred students in the
first year or take him to task on discovering that there were in
fact only ninety-eight. Clearly there are cases where 'loose
talk' would be inappropriate. It is easy to imagine a context in
which the same question could be asked of B, say, for some
administrative purpose, when it would be appropriate for B to
give the exact number. If he gave the answer 'one hundred' in
such a context, then the questioner would be entitled to access
(7):
(7) B believes that there are one hundred students in the
first year.
Consider now the example in (8).
(8) This steak is raw.
When used by a customer in a restaurant, this utterance is
unlikely to be intended literally. What the communicator here
is likely to be wanting to communicate is something like the
following set of assumptions: that the steak is difficult to
chew, that she would find the steak difficult to digest, that it
is not cooked to the required degree, etc. The utterance in (8)
can be seen as an economical means of encouraging the
addressee, in this case the waiter, to access these
assumptions. The waiter would not be expected to go on and
access the assumption that the steak had not been cooked at
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all and any other assumption that might follow from that.
The general point is that the search for an interpretation
consistent with the principle of relevance leads the addressee
to that subset of the contextual and logical implications of the
propositional form of the utterance that might have been
intended by the addresser. In example (6) it was easier for A to
process 'one hundred' and calculate from that figure how long
it would take him to mark his share of the papers than if B had
said 'ninety-eight'. The contextual effects in this context
would remain the same. Similarly, in example (8), the waiter is
able to distinguish the subset of assumptions that are intended
from the broader set of assumptions that are logically implied
by the propositional form of the utterance in context.
Consider now the interpretation of (9):
(9) This place is a dump.
An addressee has to assign reference to 'this place' (which
could be 'where I am standing', 'this room', 'this building', 'this
place of work', 'this town', for example), which may not be
possible until information stored at the conceptual address of
'dump' is activated. Assuming the hearer understands the
speaker to be talking about her office, and activates
assumptions stored at the encyclopaedic entry for 'dump' such
as 'a dump is untidy', 'a dump smells', 'a dump is strewn with
rubbish', and so on, then the hearer will derive implicatures
such as 'the speaker's office is untidy', 'the speaker's office
smells', 'the speaker's office is strewn with rubbish'. His
attention is also likely to be drawn to salient properties of the
room that make it dump-like, for example, books and papers
scattered across chairs and floor, half-empty plastic coffee
cups perched on the word processor and along the window-sill.
Example (10) was used by Searle (1979) to illustrate his third
principle:
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(10) Richard is a gorilla.
According to Searle we derive the following implicatures:
'Richard is fierce', 'Richard is nasty', 'Richard is prone to
violence'. Attention is also drawn, perhaps, to aspects of
Richard's appearance or the way he moves. The hearer derives
these, or a similar set of implicatures, having accessed
contextual assumptions from the encyclopaedic entry attached
to the conceptual address for 'gorilla'.
There are a number of important points to make here. First, a
point noted with regard to implicatures in general in the last
chapter: there is usually a certain degree of indeterminacy
regarding which particular range of implicatures is intended,
even in the case of conventional metaphors. Example (10), for
example, may or may not communicate assumptions to do with
Richard's appearance. Particular aspects of untidiness in (9)
and nastiness in (10) will be brought to the hearer's attention,
aspects that depend on what is directly perceptible to the
hearer.
Second, we do not access all the assumptions available from
the encyclopaedic entry. Consider example (11):
(11) Juliet is the sun.
Whatever the assumptions communicated as implicatures, we
never consider the possibilities, as Searle points out, that
Juliet is gaseous or that she is 90 million miles from the
earth. (It is perhaps necessary to stress that assumptions from
the encyclopaedic entry for 'sun', such as 'the sun is gaseous'
may be activated to some degree, though not to such a degree
that we become aware of them. In the same way Gibbs has
shown that idioms activate information stored under individual
constituent concepts, e.g. information to do with spilling and
beans is activated when an utterance containing the idiom
'spilling the beans' is interpreted (see, for example, Gibbs and
Nayak (1989).) The fact that we focus upon particular
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properties of 'sun' may be because we are constrained to look
for properties of human beings and this narrows down and
makes salient a narrow range of possibilities in the case of
both (10) and (11).
From the relevance theory point of view one would expect it to
be the case that there is no fixed hierarchy within the
assumptions stored in the encyclopaedic entry attached to a
concept. Certain assumptions will become more highly salient
in some contexts; other assumptions will become more highly
salient in other contexts. These assumptions become salient
during the interpretation process. As Vicente points out: 'The
salience of a bit of information that the hearer brings to bear
on the interpretation of a certain utterance is a result of the
comprehension process, rather than a precondition for it.'
(Vicente 1993a). In examples (10) and (11) a certain range of
assumptions from the encyclopaedic entries for the concepts
GORILLA, or SUN, become more salient than the others, and, as
a consequence, are considered first. If this is the case, once a
sufficient or satisfactory range of implicatures is accessed,
enough to repay the effort expended, then the hearer need go no
further. This would be much more efficient (quicker and less
wasteful) than considering all the possible assumptions stored
at the encyclopaedic entry of a concept and then rejecting the
majority of them. One would not need to consider, for example,
the assumptions that 'Richard is hairy' and 'Richard comes from
Africa'. If the more salient, more highly activated,
assumptions produce a reasonable range of implicatures,
however, that range would suffice as the interpretation of the
metaphorical utterance.
This is the same process that occurs for the interpretation of
literal utterances. A person queueing to buy a ticket for an
exhibition at the Royal Academy asks the price of a ticket and
adds 'I'm a student'. Under 'ticket price for the exhibition' and
'student' we have the same contextual assumption: 'Students
pay half price for an entrance ticket'. This will become a highly
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accessible contextual assumption for the person selling
tickets. Other assumptions stored at the encyclopaedic entry
attached to the address for the concept STUDENT - for
example, 'Students attend lectures', 'Students can withdraw
books for three weeks', 'Students are dedicated to the pursuit
of knowledge' - will not become salient in the same way. The
person queueing is not primarily interested in communicating
that she is a student, i.e. the proposition expressed by her
utterance (though this is part of what she does communicate).
What she is especially interested in communicating is the
assumption that she is entitled to a reduced price ticket to the
exhibition. Again, the intended contextual assumptions become
salient and yield contextual effects; the other potential
contextual assumptions stored at the encyclopaedic entry for
STUDENT are simply not accessed.
An alternative account of metaphorical utterance
interpretation to that outlined so far may argue that the
metaphor provides a new ad hoc concept for the proposition
expressed by the utterance. Encyclopaedic entries would be
explored in the same way, leading to an increase in the
salience of a number of assumptions, these providing an
encyclopaedic entry for the new concept. It is difficult to see
how this view, where the proposition expressed by the
utterance becomes an explicature, can be empirically
distinguished from the view that argues that metaphorical
utterances communicate a wide range of implicatures. The
assumptions communicated as implicatures in the one account
are also activated and used to form the new concept in the
second account.
There may, however, be a number of theory-internal reasons
for supporting the explicature account. One could argue, for
example, for a symmetry between cases of 'loose use'
metaphorical utterance interpretation, on the one hand, and
cases of pragmatic enrichment, on the other. Both concept
broadening and concept narrowing could be said to contribute a
new ad hoc concept to the proposition expressed by the
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utterance, which becomes an explicature. Standard cases of
implicature, such as the following example, discussed in
Chapter 3 and repeated here as (12), communicate the
proposition expressed by the utterance (the proposition
expressed by B's response in (12)), as well as the implicature
(either of the possibilities here in (13) depending on context).
Metaphorical utterances, on the other hand, according to the
implicature account, do not communicate the proposition
expressed by the utterance.
(12) A: Would you like some coffee?
B: Coffee would keep me awake.
(13) (a) B wants some coffee.
(b) B does not want some coffee.
A better grasp of the problem of forming new ad hoc concepts
can only follow a better understanding of the identity
conditions on concepts and the relations between
encyclopaedic entries and the concepts that feed into on-line
utterance interpretation.
Before continuing the discussion of metaphor I would like to
look a little more closely at the process of ad hoc concept
construction. As was argued in the previous chapter, apart
from the disambiguation of ambiguous lexical items and
ambiguous structure, the assignment of reference, and the
completion of propositional forms in the case of unarticulated
constituents, the proposition expressed by an utterance
requires that its constituent concepts be pragmatically
enriched. It has already been suggested that utterances
containing a possessive such as 'Her book is interesting', or
the pr-i, such as 'I've already eaten' or the word 'some'
as in 'It takes some time to get to Nottingham', generally
require these particular concepts to be enriched. The
semantics of the possessive or the petf.c-t marks a broad
range of possibilities which it is the business of pragmatic
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inferencing to narrow down to something more specific. It is
probably the case, however, that all concepts with
encyclopaedic entries are flexible and context-sensitive, and
that many of them are narrowed in the process of utterance
interpretation.
This is a position adopted, for example, by Barsalou. He argues:
'Rather than being retrieved as static units from
memory to represent categories, concepts
originate in a highly flexible process that
retrieves generic and episodic information from
long-term memory to construct temporary
concepts in working memory.' (Barsalou
1987:101).
He goes on to claim that the idea that concepts are invariant
structures, though widespread, is an analytic fiction. As a
psychologist concerned with real cognitive states, mental
representations and processes, Barsalou does, however, argue
that lexicalised concepts possess a context-independent
stability. Also, the actual instantiations that result from on-
line interpretation are obviously not arbitrary. Different
information is incorporated into a concept on different
occasions. Concepts that fit into the highest level
representation constructed on-line are themselves constructed
during that comprehension process. Barsalou does not have
much to say about how the particular information incorporated
into individual concepts is selected, but relevance theory
would have a clear contribution to make here. The information
used would include the most readily accessible assumptions in
the context that yield contextual effects.
The phenomenon of pragmatic enrichment, the narrowing of a
general to a more specific meaning, has been studied and
discussed in psychology, where it is more commonly referred
to as 'instantiation'. One example discussed in the
psychological literature (Halif, Ortony and Anderson 1976) is
given here as (14):
(14) A fish attacked a swimmer.
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The word 'shark' has been found to be a better recall cue than
'fish', even though the latter actually occurs in the utterance
and the former does not. Vicente (1993a) discusses this
example at some length. She argues that the VP provides a
context which encourages an instantiation of the 'fish'
category to 'something like 'a shark-like creature' or 'a fish of
the kind that attacks people'.' The narrowed-down concept, she
argues, 'would be sufficient to prompt recall of a more
specific term.' (Vicente 1993a:3). Here we have a case of a
general concept being enriched or instantiated to something
more specific, with some psychological evidence that that is
in fact the case. The only point of debate here is whether the
instantiated concept is intended by the speaker and hence
communicated. This example, which depends on a particular
context, would differ from the kind of enrichment that takes
place in (15):
(15) I don't drink.
Here 'drink' is enriched to 'drink alcohol'. The enriched concept
is clearly intended by the speaker and communicated to the
hearer. If Grice had been an advocate of the pragmatic
enrichment of concepts as a contribution to 'what is said', he
would have termed this 'generalised enrichment', in contrast
to the 'particularised enrichment' that occurs in the case of
(14).
Parallel to pragmatic enrichment are those cases where
concepts are extended or loosened. Example (16) provides an
example of loosening in a context where a doctor is about to
stick a needle in a patient's arm.
(16) This will be quite painless.
While the amount of pain may be minimal, presumably it is not
strictly true that there is a complete absence of pain. What is
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communicated is that, given what the patient might expect or
fear, the amount of pain will be very slight.
Metaphors, as we have already seen, have been defined in terms
of such loosenings, where the thought communicated
resembles, or shares logical and contextual implications with,
the proposition expressed by the utterance. According to this
definition, metaphorical utterances communicate a range of
implicatures. The alternative account, as already mentioned,
sees metaphors as contributing to the proposition expressed. In
the case of (17) what is communicated is a concept close to,
but not identical with, 'giant'. In (18) what is communicated is
a concept close to, but not identical with, 'pig'.
(17) Sam is a giant.
(18) Sam is a pig.
The concepts that we use to think with, that are combined to
form sentences in our 'language of thought', are much more
flexible than natural language lexicalised concepts or
categories, as Barsalou (1987), for example, argues. If we wish
to communicate a thought which contains a non-lexicalised
concept then we have to use a lexicalised concept which shares
some of its properties with the concept we 'have in mind' and
also take advantage of other features of context to encourage
the communication of the thought we intend.
Example (18) may be used literally, when Sam is the name of a
pig. If it is clear from the context that Sam is a human being
then that piece of contextual information will indicate that a
concept is intended that can be constructed from information
that the lexicalised concept 'pig' makes available, but which is
not identical to that concept. Indeed, in the case of
conventional metaphors such as (18) it may be that one can
speak of two lexicalised concepts, both lexicalised by 'pig'. It
always remains possible, however, to exploit the connection
with the 'original' concept and use the metaphor more
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creatively to make salient other properties of pigs. This can be
illustrated more clearly perhaps in the case of 'Richard is a
gorilla', where aspects of Richard's appearance or the way he
moves can also be made highly salient.
One further argument in favour of the view that metaphors
contribute concepts to the proposition expressed might be that
the range of implicatures communicated is, in the case of
conventional metaphors, generally quite stable across
contexts. Unlike standard cases of what Grice terms
'particularised conversational implicatures', the implicatures
communicated by examples such as (18) remain much the same.
In the case of more creative metaphors, as we shall see in the
next section, the range of implicatures, though not standard in
the same way, are very similar in meaning. It may also be the
case that the intuition that metaphors are used to
communicate thoughts more precisely (as expressed in
Middleton Murry's observation quoted at the beginning of this
chapter) is captured better by the view that new ad hoc
concepts are formed. It is possible to have a precise thought
involving non-lexicalised concepts that it is otherwise
difficult to express: in fact, one would expect it to be difficult
to express precisely because there are no equivalent
lexicalised concepts. The implicature account tends to
encourage the view that the complex thought communicated by
a metaphorical utterance is vague and indeterminate. But one
would also need to consider the question of what it would
mean to have a thought consisting of a set of weakly activated
assumptions.
The relevance theory view of metaphorical utterance
interpretation, whether the implicature account or the account
that metaphors contribute non-lexicalised concepts to the
proposition expressed by an utterance, requires no special
principles, processes or metaphor interpretation mechanism.
So it is not subject to the criticisms that Gibbs and Gerrig
level at the 'literal meaning hypothesis' or the 'Standard
Pragmatic Model' account of metaphor interpretation. It is
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more explicit about the process of interpretation and it
answers Levinson's points about the motivation and expressive
power of metaphor: metaphors are convenient and economical
ways of communicating complex thoughts. This point will
receive fuller treatment in the following section which
introduces a discussion of more creative uses of metaphor.
4.2.	 Creative Metaphor.
One further advantage that relevance theory has over other
pragmatic accounts of metaphor is that it is able to provide a
characterisation of creative or poetic metaphor. It can also
account for relative creativity and the relative success of
metaphors intended to be creative. In this sense the relevance
theory account of metaphor is able to show greater sensitivity
to the range of stylistic effects that metaphors can achieve, in
contrast to those semantic, pragmatic and even literary theory
approaches to metaphor that treat metaphors as though they
were cut to a standard pattern and expressed a standard kind
of stylistic effect.
Metaphors that are relatively conventional and metaphors that
are relatively creative vary in terms of the range and strength
of the assumptions that they make more salient. According to
the view that treats these assumptions as implicatures, the
richer and more creative the metaphor, the wider the range of
weak implicatures. By contrast, the narrower and stronger the
range of impticatures the more conventional the metaphor. The
alternative account sees these assumptions as contributing to
the creation of a new ad hoc concept. The new concept is more
creative the less it is derived directly from any one
established lexicalised concept. In (18) the new concept is
derived from a subset of the properties of pigs. In (9) the new
concept is derived from a subset of the properties of dumps. In
the case of creative metaphors, as will be demonstrated in
this section, the new concept is not derived from a subset of
the properties of an existing concept, but is constructed on the
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basis of an interaction between assumptions derived from two
or more encyclopaedic entries.
In the case of creative metaphors two concepts are brought
together, the connection between which is neither well-
established nor easy to achieve. The addressee (in this case,
more likely, a reader) has to work harder to find assumptions
that the concepts might share. A greater amount of processing
effort is required: but the rewards in terms of contextual
effects are correspondingly higher. Easy access, as in the case
of dead or conventional metaphors, leads to relatively strong
communication: a small range of assumptions are standardly
made highly salient. Less easy access leads to a more diffuse
range of assumptions being made weakly salient. In literary
communication it may happen that the effort required is
beyond the capability of the reader and he becomes confused or
frustrated. (One is reminded of Ezra Pound's comment on James
Joyce's Finnegan's Wake: 'Nothing so far as I can make out,
nothing short of divine vision or a new cure for the clap can
possibly be worth all the circumambient peripherisation.')
The example of poetic metaphor used by Sperber and Wilson
(1986a:237) is the following remark made by Flaubert of the
poet Leconte de Lisle:
(19) Son encre est pale. (His ink is pale.)
Here there are no strong assumptions to the truth of which
Flaubert can be said to have committed himself. The
considerable processing effort involved in the search for
relevant contextual assumptions is offset by the subsequent
large range of implicatures weakly communicated. The
contextual assumptions are obtained in the usual way through
exploring the encyclopaedic entries attached to the concepts
INK and PALE. This example includes an instance of metonymy,
as well as metaphor, with 'ink' standing for 'writing', in the
sense of 'work' rather than 'handwriting'. The metonymy itself
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might be considered poetic, but if one were to make the simple
substitution, for the purpose of concentrating on the metaphor,
one would start with the assumption in (20):
(20) Leconte de Lisle's writing is 'pale'.
After searching through the encyclopaedic entry attached to
the concept PALE one might derive implicatures such as:
(21) Leconte de Lisle's writing is weak.
By searching out and constructing contextual assumptions in
this manner a wide range of implicatures can be derived. Other
possible implicatures are:
(22) (a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Leconte de Lisle's writing lacks contrast.
Leconte de Lisle's writing may fade.
Leconte de Lisle's writing is sickly.
Leconte de Lisle's writing will not last.
Leconte de Lisle does not put his whole heart
into his work.
There are an indefinite number of further implicatures one
could add to (21) and the list in (22), all of which will be weak
in the sense described, and there is no cut-off point that
allows us to say that so many implicatures are communicated
and no more. It is the range and the indeterminacy of the
implicatures which gives the metaphor its poetic force. These
factors explain why it is that metaphors, especially poetic
metaphors, can never be adequately translated or paraphrased.
They also explain why their interpretation may differ across
individuals and be subject to debate amongst literary critics.
I would now like to consider a poetic metaphor from a poem.
The example I wish to discuss is the metaphor used by Seamus
Heaney at the end of his poem Digging. The concluding lines of
the poem are as follows:
132
The cold smell of potato mould, the squelch and slap
Of soggy peat, the curt cuts of an edge
Through living roots awaken in my head
But I've no spade to follow men like them.
Between my finger and my thumb
The squat pen rests. I'll dig with it.
If the metaphor had been presented on its own, as in (23), its
intended meaning would not be so clear.
(23) The poet digs with his pen.
The pen is a spade.
Such a metaphor, as it stands, is too vague in its intended
effects. It offers insufficient encouragement to the reader to
access particular contextual assumptions. The reader might
establish links between 'pen' and 'spade' or 'writing' and
'digging', but insofar as he is left to do practically all the
work, the metaphor is excessively vague with regard to what it
is supposed to communicate. The reader has no evidence that
the writer had anything particular in mind. He might even
consider it to be pretentious, in the sense that it pretends to
the status of a creative poetic metaphor, but fails to
communicate a range of implicatures sufficient to compensate
the effort the reader expends in seeking an interpretation. It
might be the case here, as it no doubt often is, that the writer
herself is vague about what she wants to say.
The working out of implications, it should be noted, is
considerably more effortful and time-consuming than is the
case for implicatures. The expressive power and aesthetic
force of metaphors, it will be argued later, depend on the
spontaneous, rapid way in which implicatures are processed.
In Heaney's poem the interpretation of this central metaphor
has been prepared by the rest of the poem. Contextual
assumptions made accessible prior to the metaphorical
utterance itself help direct the search for relevant contextual
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assumptions from the encyclopaedic entries of the concepts
brought together in the metaphorical phrase or utterance. In
this way, a good poem, by activating a wide network of
contextual assumptions prior to the interpretation of the
metaphorical utterance itself, may give greater direction to
the interpretation of metaphors, enabling them to be read in a
richer, more creative way than would otherwise be possible.
Successful literary works are successful not simply by virtue
of containing original metaphors (and original uses of other
tropes and figures), but by allowing the contextual search
encouraged by such metaphors to resonate more widely in a
broader context.
Some of the contexts set up earlier in this poem include the
information that digging is how the poet's forefathers earned
their living, that it is an activity and occupation with a long
tradition in the community, that it is hard and honest and
necessary work, that it requires intense concentration, that it
inspires awe, etc. Many more such contextual assumptions
might be accessed and the properties of 'digging' in these
assumptions transferred, by inference, to the activity of
writing poetry. A danger of starting to make a list such as the
one above, apart from it being incomplete, is that it
mistakenly suggests that all these assumptions are strongly
communicated and equally strongly communicated. Meanings
flicker as assumptions are made marginally more manifest.
Heaney writes at some length on his intentions in an essay in
his book Preoccupations, suggesting some of the further
contexts he had in mind. (Heaney 1980:41-43.) He talks about
the metaphor recalling the oft-quoted proverb 'the pen is
lighter than the spade' and suggests that 'the poem does no
more than allow that bud of wisdom to exfoliate'. The contrast
between spade work and pen work introduces a note of guilt or
unease into this metaphor as well as a note of assertion and
what might almost be termed defiance. He emphasises the idea
of digging as a sexual metaphor, 'an emblem of initiation, like
putting your hand into the bush or robbing the nest, one of the
134
\
various analogies for uncovering and touching the hidden
thing....' It is a metaphor, he writes, that suggests a view of
poetry: 'poetry as a dig, a dig for finds that end up being
plants.' It was certainly a rich metaphor as Heaney intended it.
The reader is encouraged to derive a very large number of
implicatures from exploring the encyclopaedic entries for the
concepts DIG and POETRY or WRITING. If these implicatures are
accessible in an on-line reading, then the metaphor is both rich
and successful.
Consider now an earlier metaphor in this poem. Heaney wrote
in Preoccupations: 'there are a couple of lines that have more
of the theatricality of the gunslinger than the self-absorption
of the digger.' He is referring here to the opening two lines of
the poem:
Between my finger and my thumb
The squat pen rests; snug as a gun.
The somewhat sinister contexts prepared by this image - 'pen
as gun' - suggesting that the pen is a powerful and dangerous
instrument, that the poet is a gunslinger, are not exploited in
the rest of the poem: in fact they might even be said to be
contradicted by the rest of the poem.
'The surprise or beauty of a successful creative metaphor',
Sperber and Wilson (1986a:237) write, 'lies in this
condensation, in the fact that a single expression........will
determine a very wide range of acceptable weak implicatures'.
This, according to Heaney himself, is what happens for the
first of the metaphors discussed here, but not what happens
for the second. The idea that creativity can be described in
terms of the communication of a wide array of implicatures
suggests a theory of value. What happens is that the
organisation of the language in the poem together with the
metaphor itself leads to many more assumptions being
simultaneously activated, and brought together at one
conceptual address, 'poetry' for example, or 'Juliet'. It becomes
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a way of exploring a particular concept more extensively. A
creative metaphor combines insight with depth. The reader
must be able to construct the links between concepts where
links are not well-established. If the context is too readily
accessible, on the one hand, or if the search through context
leads nowhere, on the other hand, then the metaphor fails as a
creative metaphor.
One thought that is bound to occur is that the greater effort
demanded by poetic metaphors will surely mean that they will
take longer to process. In the light of this question it is worth
re-examining the psycholinguistic evidence referred to earlier
that suggests that metaphorical utterances take no longer to
process than literal utterances. How are we to explain the fact
that many rich creative metaphors occur, for example, in plays
that we have to interpret on-line in the theatre? Although
Gerrig (1989), among others, argues that metaphorical
interpretation requires no special procedures or principles to
guide it, he is clearly worried by these kinds of questions and
raises one or two interesting points regarding creative and
literary metaphors. He points out that in the case of examples
such as (5) (the 'lacy blanket' example), it is possible to record
satisfactorily the time taken to understand the metaphorical
utterances. But what about cases such as 'Juliet is the sun'?
Like most examples of literary metaphor, if you spend more
time and effort on it there is the chance of achieving greater
appreciation and understanding. The point of practical
criticism is to do just this. A reader cannot reasonably be said
to reach a point at which he understands such a metaphor. The
reader recognises that he has 'understood' the metaphor to a
satisfactory degree (or not) before passing on, but that it
would be possible to give more attention to it and achieve a
fuller understanding.
Gerrig suggests that, while there may not be two different
processes for literal and non-literal utterance interpretation,
there may be two different processes for conventional or
standard metaphor understanding and literary or creative
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metaphor understanding:
'The first type of understanding can be called
time-limited comprehension and is governed by
the total time constraint; the second type can be
called leisurely comprehension and may well
involve types of processing that are largely
'specified for metaphor". (Gerrig 1989:238.)
Within a relevance theory framework, however, such a
distinction is not necessary. Leisurely study, analysis and re-
reading - not just in relation to metaphor - may help the
reader to deliberately and consciously build an extended
network of contextual assumptions; when a further on-line
reading or theatre attendance then takes place the appropriate
contextual search is facilitated and the interpretive
experience consequently enriched. Leisurely comprehension
may take a great deal of time, deliberately exploring context,
looking for connections between encyclopaedic entries or
adding to encyclopaedic entries. The later on-line reading,
however, follows the usual interpretation process - the search
for an interpretation consistent with the principle of
relevance. It is at this stage that poetic effects are
communicated. This is more or less the point that Nabokov
made about readers in the introduction to his Lectures on
Literature:
'Curiously enough, one cannot read a book: one can
only reread it. A good reader, a major reader, an
active and creative reader is a rereader. And I
shall tell you why. When we read a book for the
first time the very process of laboriously moving
our eyes from left to right, line after line, page
after page, this complicated physical work upon
the book, the very process of learning in terms of
space and time what the book is about, this stands
between us and artistic appreciation. In reading a
book we must have time to acquaint ourselves
with it..... ' (Nabokov 1983:3).
Nabokov's argument (translated into relevance theory terms) is
that the initial reading acquaints us with the contexts we need
to explore, making the actual exploration easier next time
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round. The pleasure derives from the continuous on-line
reading process that is guided by the search for
interpretations consistent with the principle of relevance. In
short, literary aesthetic experience is an on-line experience.
I have characterised poetic metaphor here in terms of complex
thoughts communicated as a wide range of weak implicatures. I
would now like to consider the possibility that, as in the case
of more standard metaphors, creative or poetic metaphors
communicate new ad hoc concepts that make a contribution to
the proposition expressed.
In (20) this would mean that Leconte de Lisle's writing
(perhaps instantiated to 'poetry') has a particular property X,
whereX refers to some non-lexicalised concept. The concept
that represents X in Flaubert's thought can be arrived at in
communication (if the metaphor is successful) via the
lexicalised concept PALE, using assumptions stored at the
encyclopaedic entry for this concept. It might be argued that
the implicature account faces a number of problems. The fact
that the implicatures suggested in this instance, and in other
cases of poetic metaphor, are difficult to articulate and,
singly or in a set, are relatively feeble attempts to paraphrase
what is intuitively felt or understood to be communicated, may
lend support to the idea that it is in fact a new non-lexicalised
concept that is communicated, which is, by its very nature,
difficult to articulate. Another problem is that in most cases
of poetic metaphor the 'implicatures' that are suggested tend
to be very close in meaning. This, too, may be because they
characterise the encyclopaedic entry of a single concept. It is
also hard to avoid including further metaphors among the
implicatures (for example, using the concepts 'sickly' and
'fade' in the list of suggested implicatures in (22) above).
Although it might be argued that it is possible to entertain
metaphorical thoughts, it is not clear that such thoughts can
be anything other than interpretations of other non-
metaphorical thoughts. Again, it seems more reasonable to
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assume that we are dealing here with thoughts containing non-
lexicalised concepts.
Such non-lexicalised concepts would be constructed by the
hearer using the information stored at the encyclopaedic entry
attached to the concept for the lexical item used as
metaphoric focus in conjunction with other contextual
information derived from the encyclopaedic entries attached to
related concepts. In the case of example (19) the hearer would
need to use information stored at the encyclopaedic entry
attached to the concept PALE, in conjunction with information
stored at the entries for INK, POETRY, and the concept for
'Leconte de Lisle'. In the case of creative metaphors, such as
this, the concept constructed would be dependent to a much
greater extent on a particular context than in the case of more
standard metaphors. This is clearly seen in the case of
Heaney's metaphor that 'writing poetry is digging'. The
assumptions used to create the concept in such poetic
examples would also be less readily accessible.
Barsalou (1987) has suggested that the creation of new
concepts is the normal state of affairs in utterance
interpretation. What is being suggested here for metaphor is a
more creative and active version of the process Barsalou sees
as happening in the case of almost every concept. This
alternative account of creative metaphor has implications for
the theory of the relative value of metaphors, mentioned
earlier. In the more creative, and hence valuable, cases, a
wider range of assumptions from a variety of encyclopaedic
entries contributes to the construction of these ad hoc
concepts.
Again, it is difficult to adjudicate between the implicature
account and the ad hoc concept account. If one is going to adopt
the latter account for conventional metaphors, however, there
seems to be no obvious reason why it should not also be
adopted in the case of creative poetic metaphors. A consistent
account is needed because metaphors do not fall into neat
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'conventional' and 'creative' categories, but vary on a scale
from dead through to highly original and poetic, passing
through the relatively conventional and relatively creative.
Both accounts involve the same use of relatively weakly
salient information from long-term memory, either to use in
inferential processes to construct implicatures, or to
construct a new concept. It is only possible to refer to theory-
internal arguments, of the kind mentioned earlier, in support of
one alternative over the other.
Having to invent labels for new concepts and then explain the
properties belonging to those concepts is a familiar (and hard)
task in any academic discipline. (Examples from pragmatics
include the concepts RELEVANCE, EXPLICATURE and
INTERPRETIVE USE.) In the case of poetic thoughts, the
concepts generally relate to personal experience, but are still
relatively difficult thoughts to think and to understand. That is
why there is the tension that Seamus Heaney refers to between
being accurate and being decent: accurate thoughts, properly
expressed, are not usually decent thoughts.
There is much more to the characterisation of poetic metaphor
and poetic thought than has so far been suggested in this
section. Some account is needed of how poetic metaphors (and
poetic thoughts) communicate affect, a point that is
recognised in Sperber and Wilson (1986a:224) where it is
suggested that there is a link between 'the marginal increase
in the manifestness of a great many weakly manifest
assumptions' and the communication of non-propositional
effects. The issue of nonpropositional affective communication
will be one of the central topics considered in Chapters 6 and
7.
4.3. Knowledge Representation and Metarepresentation.
In this section I want to look at various ways in which
assumptions may be stored in memory. The way they are stored
140
will affect ease of access and contextual assumption
construction and thus have a bearing on the issue of poetic
effects as defined here. It will also play an important role in
the discussion of sentimentality in Chapter 6.
In example (10), repeated here, it may be the case, as Searle
notes, that an ethologist has a different set of beliefs about
gorillas from the set of stereotypical beliefs held by most
non-ethologists.
(10) Richard is a gorilla.
The ethologist may believe, for example, that gorillas are 'shy,
sensitive creatures, given to bouts of sentimentality', yet still
understand the utterance in (10) in the same way as everyone
else, using, according to Searle's suggestion, the assumptions
that gorillas are 'fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth'.
(Searle 1979:102.) She may in fact believe that the average
gorilla is far less fierce, nasty and prone to violence than the
average human being. Even so, uttering 'Richard is a gorilla',
rather than 'Richard is a human being' is a better way of
communicating that Richard is fierce and nasty. Despite her
actual beliefs, in other words, she interprets the utterance in
(10) in the same way as everyone else (though it may be the
case that, as she interprets the utterance, thoughts about the
ways in which gorillas are grossly misunderstood also occur to
her.) The question is: how can this be, given that this implies
that what she has stored in the encyclopaedic entry attached
to the concept GORILLA are apparently contradictory
assumptions?
The apparent contradiction is avoided if we assume that, for
the ethologist, assumptions of the kind 'Gorillas are sensitive',
'Gorillas are shy', as well as assumptions like 'Gorillas are
found in the mountains of Africa', are stored as factual
assumptions. Factual assumptions can be seen as directly
stored in a subject's encyclopaedic memory (see Sperber
1985:54 for discussion of this point); assumptions such as
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'Gorillas are aggressive' and 'Gorillas are prone to violence', on
the other hand, are not directly stored in encyclopaedic
memory, but are indirectly stored as metarepresentations. In
the latter case the metarepresented assumptions are only
stored directly under some higher level descriptive comment,
for example, 'it is believed in this culture/society that......p',
where the boundaries of this culture/society receive
appropriate definition. In this way assumptions that appear to
contradict each other can be stored in the same encyclopaedic
entry. Sperber (1975;1985) uses this idea to explain why the
apparent irrationality of cultural beliefs is only apparent.
Cultural/symbolic beliefs, unlike factual beliefs, are stored
indirectly and are used differently in thinking. A Dorze can
consistently hold the cultural belief that 'The leopard is a
Christian animal who observes the fasts of the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church' and the factual belief that 'Leopards are not
to be trusted on any day of the week'. (See Sperber 1975:93.)
An individual may store the assumptions 'Gorillas are
aggressive' and 'Gorillas are nasty' directly in memory as
factual assumptions. Relevant experience may later reclassify
these as non-factual assumptions and metarepresent them by
placing them under an appropriate descriptive comment. I
would like to suggest here that whereas factual assumptions
are stored individually and come together in different ways
depending on context, metarepresented chunks of information
are accessed en bloc. I do not wish to suggest, however, that
there is any kind of hierarchical organisation or structure
within the metarepresented set of beliefs. Such
metarepresented chunks (equivalent to stereotypical sets of
beliefs) appear to be highly salient when it is mutually
manifest to interlocutors that they both have access to the
metarepresented set of beliefs.
There is still a large measure of disagreement and uncertainty
about how assumptions are stored in memory. As I will be
making a number of suggestions which assume a particular
kind of organisation it is important that I discuss some of the
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issues here, albeit briefly.
A theory that has received a lot of attention over recent years,
popularised through Al as much as cognitive psychology, is
schema theory. Schema theory holds that assumptions are
grouped together in encyclopaedic memory as cognitive units in
their own right. Schemata as structured chunks of information
in the form of co-occining descriptions relating to object
concepts are known as 'frames'; schemata as structured
chunks of information about stereotypical event patterns (e.g.
going to a restaurant, visiting a doctor) are known as scripts.
(There are, in fact, a variety of technical terms used in the Al
literature, but this is a widely accepted distinction and I shall
use these widely accepted terms to refer to it.)
Schank and Abelson (1977) were interested in developing a
model of knowledge representation that could account for
coherence between sentences such as those in (24):
(24) Jimmy sat down in the restaurant. The waiter took
his order.
They argued that for these sentences to be coherent it is
necessary to assume that the word 'restaurant' gives access to
a frame containing information about restaurants and a script
outlining the stereotypical sequence of events involved in a
visit to a restaurant. This schema would include the
information that restaurants are staffed by waiters and that
after customers sit down at a table they are approached by
these waiters who take their order for food and drink. Access
to this frame and script mean that there is no problem with
the use of the definite article in the second sentence: the
waiter is already there in the schema.
The implication of schema theory is that schemata are stored
as cognitive units. One of the problems with this view is that
we rarely want to use all the information that might be stored
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in a schema and it would be inefficient for it all to be
accessed every time the schema concept is referred to. In the
following example waiters would only get in the way:
(25) A: Come round about eight o'clock.
B: How do I find your place?
A: It's in Via delle Bone Novelle between the garage
and the restaurant.
It is also clear that much information would be duplicated by
different scripts. Schank changed his original view on the
nature of scripts partly as a result of the findings in Bower,
Black & Turner (1979). They found that when subjects read a
story about a visit to a doctor and another about a visit to a
dentist they became confused in their later recognition of
which events belonged to which story. As a result Schank
hypothesised that instead of complete scripts, smaller scale
general scenes were stored in memory which could be shared
out, e.g. a 'pay scene' shared by 'restaurant' and 'shopping', or a
'waiting room scene' shared by visits to the doctor and the
dentist. Schank (1982) referred to these general scenes as
Memory Organisation Packages (or MOPs). Scripts could be
constructed, in other words, from smaller MOP components.
Anderson (1980) asks whether schemata are cognitive units in
the same way that concepts and propositions are assumed to be
cognitive units. Concepts, propositions and schemata are all
packages of information. Few, outside the wilder excesses of
Literary Theory, would question that concepts are basic
cognitive units. The existence of propositions as assumptions
in memory is crucial, as we have seen, for any psychologically
plausible pragmatic account of verbal communication.
Anderson argues that if schemata are also cognitive units, then
they must possess two properties. A structure is a cognitive
unit if: (I) when any elements of the units are interassociated
then all are; (ii) when some of the elements are retrieved into
working memory then all are.
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As seen above, it would appear to be grossly inefficient and
cumbersome for all the information stored as frames and
scripts to be retrieved into working memory every time a unit
is accessed, especiaily considering the vast amount of
information stored under familiar and frequently used concepts
such as 'restaurant'. On any given occasion one small part of
such information may be used; the rest would simply occupy
and waste valuable space in working memory.
Another problem is the invocation problem. We may wish to
have access to a frame and/or script even in the absence of the
word that would normally trigger it. It may be that talk of
going to the Odeon or buying popcorn is intended to indicate
that the 'cinema' script should be activated and retrieved into
working memory, because information to do with going to see a
film at the cinema is required to interpret subsequent
utterances. But would it be efficient for this script to be
accessed every time the word 'popcorn' is mentioned?
Anderson asks specifically whether it would always be
appropriate or efficient for the utterance in (26) to access the
'movie' script:
(26) John bought popcorn and a drink.
It may be that in this example 'popcorn' does invoke 'cinema',
but one does not want the cinema schema invoked every time
the word 'popcorn' is used. It is clearly important to control
schema activation to avoid overloading short-term memory,
but how is this to be done? 'Popcorn' might activate the
schema for 'cinema', 'cinema' might activate the 'Kenneth
Branagh' schema, 'Kenneth Branagh' might activate the schema
for 'Shakespeare', 'Shakespeare' might activate the schema for
'Julius Caesar', 'Julius Caesar' might activate the schema for
'Jerry Fodor' and 'Jerry Fodor' might activate the schema for
'the language of thought'. it is not just that you get from
'popcorn' to 'the language of thought' in six stages, you could
get from any concept to 'the language of thought' schema in six
stages (or less). It becomes important to consider this
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question: how are general activation and the accessing of
specific material into working memory controlled?
Another problem is the correspondence problem. How do the
schemata stored in memory relate to new information? There
is a suggestion, following work done by Bartlett (1932), that
our memories distort the way in which we perceive events and
states of affairs in the world. This is a well-documented
observation about memory (see, for example, Neisser 1982).
The implication here is that stored schemata strongly
influence the way we interpret and represent new information.
It is clear, on the other hand, that schemata do not determine
what we perceive and remember. We do not perceive and
remember the same patterns all the time. The problem
becomes: how do we develop a notion of schema that is not too
rigid in the way it affects perception and memory?
What account of knowledge representation is consistent with
relevance theory? In relevance theory assumptions having full
propositional form exist in memory stored in the encyclopaedic
entries attached to concepts. Logical forms, as incomplete
propositional forms, also have a role to play in memory and in
interpretation, as a stage on the way to the pragmatic
completion of full propositional form. For example, these
incomplete propositional forms may have elements that need
enriching, disambiguating, or having reference assigned to
them, or they can be in the form of argument structure that has
to be completed in on-line interpretation (the word 'put', for
example, makes available the structure THING
	 THING
PLACE or thematic core Agent Patient Goal, which
requires these three argument slots to be completed.)
Alternatively they can be in the form of what Sperber
(1985:5Off.) refers to as semi-propo5k .%S which contain
elements 'the conceptual content of which is not fully
specified'. (Sperber 1985:51.) These can be useful in a variety
of ways. For example, they can be useful to children acquiring a
language and they can be useful to students of any academic
discipline as stepping stones on the path to full understanding
146
of technical concepts. Say, for example, that a student is
convinced of some particular relevance theoretic analysis of
an aspect of verbal communication and, as a result, comes to
look favourably upon the theory as a whole. She grasps the
notion of contextual effects and the idea of processing effort
(she thinks) and she has learned that 'every act of ostensive
communication communicates the presumption of its own
optimal relevance.' She remains unclear, however, about the
exact notion of 'optimal relevance'. It is clearly important, but
what exactly does it mean? Something to do with balancing
processing effort against contextual effects? For the time
being (perhaps until the next pragmatics back-up class) she is
prepared to accept the incomplete version of this concept.
The encyclopaedic entries attached to concepts contain sets of
these incomplete propositional forms alongside sets of
assumptions having full propositional form. There is no
requirement, however, in the account of verbal communication
presented here for there to be any organisation of assumptions
into schemata. Assumptions need to be selected or constructed
for inferencing as part of the process of utterance
interpretation. Rather than a complete encyclopaedic entry (or
a stereotypical version of an encyclopaedic entry) being
accessed, a smaller range of highly activated assumptions will
be accessed and enter into inferential processes.
The notion of activation is important here and should come to
play as significant a role in pragmatic processing as it now
plays in theories of lexical processing. In the earlier version of
Marslen-Wilson's cohort model, for example, (Marslen-Wilson
and Welsh (1978); Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1980)) candidate
lexical items either enter or fail to enter the cohort, on the
basis of initial bottom-up sensory stimulus information. In the
later cohort model (e.g. Marslen-Wilson 1987) the system
becomes a lot more flexible and items that share phonetic
features with the incoming sensory stimulus are activated to
greater or lesser degrees, depending on their 'relative
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goodness of fit'. It may be the case that the assumptions
selected or constructed during the process of utterance
interpretation are individually activated to greater or lesser
degrees. Hierarchies of assumptions within an encyclopaedic
entry do not need to be fixed, but may be entirely context-
dependent.
As Vicente points out (Vicente 1993a; 1993b) much of the
research into metaphor that explores concepts such as
'salience imbalance' (e.g. Ortony et al (1985)) is based on
static notions of context. One of the central points in
relevance theory is, as already discussed, that context is not
pre-given, but constructed on-line in accordance with the
requirement of locating an interpretation that is consistent
with the principle of relevance. Some contextual assumptions
become more salient than others, and they are the ones that
potentially come to play a significant role in the
interpretation process. Which assumptions are accessed from
encyclopaedic entries as the most salient will depend on the
presence of other concepts and the contextual assumptions in
their encyclopaedic entries. This highly flexible and dynamic
account of context construction is consistent with the
argument in Barsatou (1987) which views 'concepts as
temporary constructs in working memory that are tailored to
current situations' (Barsalou 1987:119).
It should be emphasised again here that, while all concepts, as
they occur in utterances, are highly context-sensitive (in the
sense of sensitive to contextual assumptions other than those
provided by their own encyclopaedic entries), there is a marked
difference in the extent to which they depend on context in
this sense. Non-poetic instances of tropes and schemes are
less dependent on a wider context for their interpretation than
poetic instances. They consistently communicate the same, or
very similar, meanings. The only exception to this is when they
pick up contextual information from the physical environment,
as may be the case in examples (9) and (10). The more poetic or
creative the metaphor, the more it depends on contextual
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assumptions available from the encyclopaedic entries attached
to other concepts to achieve its effects. This is clear when one
compares examples of conventional metaphors such as 'Sam is
a pig' with more creative metaphors such as 'Son encre est
pale'. The central metaphor in Heaney's poem, DiQging, is also
clearly more creative in the context of the poem, than it is
when taken on its own. The richest poetic thoughts, then, are
those in which a wide network of contextual assumptions are
activated.
The notion of poetic effects depends on a highly flexible
account of how context is constructed on-line. This suggests
that the assumptions stored at encyclopaedic entries are not
organised in any fixed pre-given structure, hierarchical or
otherwise. A number of independent reasons as to why it is
unlikely that structured schemata have the status of cognitive
units have been given in this section. The only way in which
encyclopaedic information may be structured, I have suggested,
is that certain kinds of information may be metarepresented
and brought together under some higher level descriptive
comment. A typical case of the latter is culturally endorsed
information (as in the 'gorilla' example) which may run counter
to one's factual beliefs or assumptions. In such cases, the set
of metarepresented beliefs forms a relatively highly salient
"package" to be used in utterance interpretation, irrespective
of the factual assumptions that one has stored at the same
address. Poetic effects, I wdutd suggest, do not usually make
use of such readily available metarepresented contextual
assumptions. This is a point that will be developed in the next
chapter.
4.4	 Poetic Imagery and Aesthetic Value.
Several references have already been made to the issue of
value. It has been suggested that the relevance theory account
of poetic effects may offer a theoretical perspective on the
traditional literary critical concern with the evaluation of
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literary works and smaller scale poetic effects. Certainly
intuitions about relative value are central to our reading of
literary works and any serious concern with literary style
must address this issue.
In this section I propose to look briefly at three images (using
simile and metaphor) that are used, in a book on literary
criticism, to illustrate the effective and ineffective use of
imagery from the poetic point of view. Coombes (1963)
contrasts (i) images that are 'stale' and conventional with (ii)
images that are original and ineffective and (iii) images that
are original and successful. His first example, (27), contains a
simile, but what he has to say about it applies equally well to
conventional metaphors.
(27) X was 'as white as a sheet'.
Here, he argues that:
'the staleness of the comparison is apt to cause
the statement to pass with very little attention
paid to it; in most cases it would be more
effectiveto say 'he was very pale'..............................A
state and ready-made image is almost invariably
evidence of an absence of original first-hand
experience in the user, as far as any significance
in the phrase itself is intended; it is expression of
a loose and general kind, not precise and
individual; it doesn't carry in itself any sign of
fresh perceptiveness or imagination' .(Coombes
1963:43)
Before commenting on these remarks I would like to consider
Coombes' other examples. His second example, this time of an
original but ineffective image, is also a simile:
(28) '..btack as the inside of a wolf's throat'
This example, Coombes writes,
'is personal in the bad sense; it is rather showy
and individualistic, rather 'clever' and affected;
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images like this, whose validity can't be verified
by us because their content is outside our
experience - does a wolf's throat suggest
blackness particularly even when we try to
imagine it? and why a wolf particularly? - tend to
take attention away from the objects they are
supposed to illuminate and make more vivid to our
mind and senses' (Coombes 1963:43).
A successful image, Coombes writes, 'helps to make us feel
the writer's grasp of the object or situation he is dealing with,
gives his grasp of it with precision, vividness, force, economy'
(Coombes 1963:43). His first example of such an image is the
metaphor in the following lines, spoken by Angus, in
Shakespeare's Macbeth (Act 5,scene 2, lines 16-17).
Now does he feel
His secret murders sticking on his hands
This is (part of) what Coombes has to say about this image:
'The feelings of the tyrant are not referred to with
abstract words like 'conscience' or 'guilt' or
'fear', but are given a concrete presentation which
powerfully suggests the inescapability of fears
and of fate and the resultant terror. The line draws
much of its force from the paradox contained in
the juxtaposition of the murders' concealment -
'secret' - with the plain and persisting visibility
and feeling of the blood on the hands - 'sticking':
we are brought very close to a Macbeth who is
suffering the terrors of a kind of nightmare; the
hands cannot be washed clean, they must betray,
and the intended secrecy has turned into its
opposite, an overt and palpable presence. The
image thus presents an idea or thought in terms of
physical sensation, a sensation, moreover,
belonging to the hands, the delicate and sensitive
agents of brutal murder: 'now does he feel'.
Further, it has association with many other lines
of the play.........' (Coombes 1963:44).
With regard to the first example, it is probably the case that
the phrase 'white as a sheet' is stored as one unit, in which
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case it is simply a slightly more costly way of saying 'very
pale'. It standardly communicates the same meaning,
irrespective of wider context. This meaning is obtained easily,
but inefficiently in that information about sheets will be
fruitlessly activated (see, for example, Gibbs and Nayak
(1989)). There is only one property of sheets that is relevant.
There is no possibility, therefore, of exploring context further
to achieve poetic effects. This combination of ease,
inefficiency, and an encouragement to explore without the
means (a rich encyclopaedic entry) to do so, contributes to the
sense of looseness and staleness that Coombes describes.
The second example here, (28), fails as an original poetic
image. The concepts WOLF and THROAT are rich concepts that
trigger a contextual search through their respective
encyclopaedic entries. The search which is triggered, however,
proves fruitless. Links are sought between the concept BLACK
and the concepts WOLF and THROAT. No immediate link is found;
there are no assumptions that take the reader any further than
the expression 'very black', an expression which would have
been significantly easier and more efficient to process. Part of
the oddity of this image is that we can see nothing special
about the blackness of wolves' throats ( a property of wolves'
throats that we assume but probably do not have any direct
personal experience of). This image fails because expectations
that are set up are frustrated: processing effort is wasted as
many assumptions are activated without yielding contextual
effects.
The metaphor in the passage taken from Shakespeare's Macbeth
is original, creative and poetic. Part of its richness derives
from connections to other contexts set up in the rest of the
play, as Coombes notes. It is an example which it is difficult,
though not impossible, to analyse in terms of weak
implicature: Macbeth cannot forget his murders; Macbeth is
obsessed by his murders; Macbeth is desperate about his
murders. It is also possible to argue that it encourages a new
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concept to be constructed (if not several new concepts). It may
be that a new verbal concept is constructed that expresses the
way in which the murders affect Macbeth. This new concept
would express the nature of Macbeth's attitude to the murders,
giving a more precise idea of his sense of guilt. But here, and
in the other examples of poetic effects already discussed, this
analysis, inadequate for reasons already given, still seems to
be missing a vital ingredient. This ingredient is, I suggest,
hinted at in Coombes' comment about the 'concrete
presentation' of the feelings expressed. This hint will be
developed into an argument about affect and affective
communication in Chapters 6 and 7.
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CHAPTER FIVE.
SCHEMES AND VERSE EFFECTS.
5.1.	 Introduction.
In this chapter I will consider the pragmatics of schemes (in
the sense of 'foregrounded repetitions of expression', as in
Leech 1969:74). I will concentrate on one particular scheme:
epizeuxis. I will then also make some brief comments about
verse features. Traditionally, in the study of rhetoric and style
the effects of epizeuxis and other figures involving repetition,
as well as verse features such as metrical variation,
alliteration and rhyme, have been characterised in terms of
'intensity' or 'emphasis', and - particularly in the case of
repetition - in terms of their emotional or affective qualities.
The aim of this chapter will be to provide an analysis of
epizeuxis and verse effects within the context of relevance
theory in order to provide a cognitive explanation for these
frequently expressed intuitions. The discussion and
characterisation of poetic effects will also be continued.
5.2.	 Epizeuxis.
Epizeuxis is the term used to describe the immediate
repetition of a word or phrase. Stylistic intuitions with regard
to the emphasis and emotional tone produced by epizeuxis are
usually sharpened when examples of this scheme, as in (la)
(discussed in Sperber and Wilson 1986a: 219-222) and (2a)
(taken from the Bible, 2 Samuel, Chapter 18, verse 33 and
Chapter 19, verse 4) are contrasted with truth-conditionally
equivalent examples lacking the repetition, as in (ib) and (2b):
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(la) My childhood days are gone, gone.
(ib) My childhood days are gone.
(2a) Oh, Absalom, my son, my son.
(2b) Absalom, my son.
The following passage, taken from an essay entitled 'The
Philosophy of Poetry', written in 1835 by Alexander Smith in
the Edinburgh journal 'Blackwoods', describes the intuitions
that such a contrast gives rise to:
"My son Absalom' is an expression of precisely
similar import to 'my brother Dick', or 'my uncle
Toby', not a whit more poetical than either of
these, in which there is assuredly no poetry. It
would be difficult to say that 'oh! Absalom, my
son, my son', is not poetry; yet the grammatical
and verbal import of the words is exactly the same
in both cases. The interjection 'oh' and the
repetition of the words 'my son', add nothing
whatever to the meaning; but they have the effect
of making words which are otherwise but the
intimation of a fact, the expression of an emotion
of exceeding depth and interest, and thus render
them eminently poetical.'
This passage makes a number of important points about
epizeuxis. Although having, in Smith's words, the same
'grammatical and verbal import', (2a) is clearly more emphatic,
more emotional, and, as a consequence, Smith goes on to say,
more poetic than (2b). We can translate what he says here into
contemporary idiom and say that they both make the same
contribution to truth conditions, that the same analytic
implications can be drawn from them. Why then is there a
clearly noted stylistic difference? One possible answer is in
terms of the notion of implicature. Although (2a) and (2b) give
rise to the same analytic implications - 'the verbal import of
the words is exactly the same in both cases' - it could be
argued that the different processing demands they make on the
addressee affects the range of implicatures they communicate.
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In relevance theory terms (2a) and (la) require greater
processing effort, but offer more contextual effects in return.
In (la) a proposition is followed by the single word 'gone'. This
verb takes an obligatory argument in subject position. This
subject is not provided linguistically, so it has to be inferred.
In this case the obvious candidate is the concept encoded by
the phrase 'childhood days'. The previous propositional form is
repeated, using the same concepts. The effort involved in
reconstructing the same propositional form leads to greater
activation of assumptions stored in the encyclopaedic entries
attached to the constituent concepts, in particular here to the
concept CHILDHOOD, and in the case of example (2) the
concepts for FATHER/SON.
Given this line of argument, an account of rhetoric and style
only makes sense in the context of a pragmatic theory
concerned with cognitive processing effects. Stylistic effects
cannot be explained as a direct function of linguistic form. The
mere linguistic fact of repetition does not always lead to the
kinds of effects that we experience in the case of (la) and
(2a). Metaphors offer a range of stylistic effects: they may be
more or less creative; they may or may not be the source of
poetic effects; they may communicate a relatively wide range
of weak impticatures or a relatively narrow range of strong
implicatures. The same range of stylistic effects may be
offered by instances of verbal repetition such as epizeuxis.
Examples (3) to (6) (from Sperber and Wilson 1986a: 219)
illustrate the point that the kinds of contextual effects
offered by different instances of repetition are not uniform.
(3) We went for a long, long walk.
(4) There were houses, houses everywhere.
(5) I shall never, never smoke again.
(6) There's a fox, a lox in the garden.
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The extra contextual effects are worked out in different ways.
In (3) and (4) they take the form of modified explicatures, the
effects being reflected in the propositional content. Example
(3) communicates that a particular group of people went for a
very long walk, and example (4) communicates that there are
more houses than the hearer would have thought. In (5) the
speaker's degree of commitment to the propositional content
of the utterance is strengthened. In the case of (6) and (la),
however, it is not so easy to provide propositional paraphrases
that would capture what they communicate. They seem, as
Sperber and Wilson suggest, to 'exhibit rather than merely
describe the speaker's mental or emotional state: they give
rise to non-propositional effects which would be lost under
paraphrase' (Sperber and Wilson 1986a:220).
In the case of (6) it is easy to imagine contexts in which one or
two implicatures are strongly communicated, for example: 'The
chickens are in danger'. We explore the entry for 'fox', at the
same time linking it to whatever other contextual assumptions
are available. What is so significant about foxes being in
gardens? Apart from danger to animals, it may simply be
surprise and rarity value: foxes are not often seen in this
neighbourhood. One further possibility is that the speaker is
communicating a higher level explicature, expressing an
attitude of surprise to the belief that there is a fox in the
garden. All of these different types of interpretation, in
examples (3) to (6), fall out from the search for an
interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance.
In the case of (la) the extra contextual effects are to be
sought neither in terms of one or two strongly communicated
implicatures, nor in terms of a clearly expressed attitude. As
has already been suggested, what occurs is an increase in the
salience of a wide range of assumptions. CHILDHOOD is a rich
concept, with a wealth of assumptions stored in its
encyclopaedic entry. This information consists, to a large
extent, of beliefs about childhood that belong to a particular
cultural viewpoint. This can be seen by contrasting (la) with
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the utterance in (7):
(7) My teenage days are gone, gone.
In Sperber and Wilson (1986a) it is argued that (la), unlike
examples (3) to (6), communicates poetic effects. As in the
case of poetic metaphor, a wide range of assumptions are
activated, and here probably communicated as weak
implicatures. In deriving these implicatures the hearer is given
less guidance by the speaker and has to take a great deal of the
responsibility in selecting and constructing the appropriate
contextual assumptions. The hearer accesses assumptions such
as those in (8) and uses them as implicated premises in an
argument to derive the assumptions in (9) as implicated
conclusions:
(8a) Childhood days are innocent.
(8b) Childhood days are ingenuous.
(8c) Childhood days are carefree.
(9a) The speaker's days of innocence are gone.
(9b) The speaker's days of ingenuousness are gone.
(9c) The speaker's carefree days are gone.
For such effects to be achieved, the concept involved must
have a rich and complex encyclopaedic entry. As indicated,
neither 'teenage' nor 'fox' possess such a rich encyclopaedic
entry. That is why the activation of contextual assumptions
within the entry of 'childhood' can be much more extensive
than that within the entry of 'fox'.
I would like to make a further point here concerning the nature
of the encyclopaedic entry for 'childhood'. Although the entry
for 'childhood' is rich and the stylistic effects achieved by
(la) are different from most of the other examples discussed, I
would question the suggestion that (la) is a good example of
poetic effects. I would suggest that this example leads to a
stock response and is sentimental in tone. (I will return to the
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issue of sentimentality in the next chapter.) A genuine attempt
to access and construct new assumptions is blocked by the
presence of a metarepresented set of assumptions, equivalent
to a cultural stereotype, about childhood. As addressees, we
are not interested here in what childhood is really like, but
only in a certain sentimental picture of childhood. What I am
suggesting is that a readily accessible social stereotype
short-circuits any wide search through context and yields a
comparatively narrow range of relatively strong implicatures.
It may well be the case that we hold several cultural
stereotype views of childhood, the view that childhood is
innocent, cosy, rosy and sweet, on the one hand, and the view
that childhood (and children) is/(are) fierce, nasty, and prone
to violence, on the other hand. The cosy-rosy stereotype would
be the one accessed here, in example (la). Perhaps this is
because it is the dominant stereotype for our culture and
society now. (It would be different in other societies; it would
have been different in our society a few hundred years ago.)
The important point is that not enough information is given in
(la) for a genuine search. The encyclopaedic entry for the
concept CHILDHOOD potentially contains a great deal of
information. A serious genuine search, distinguishing between
factual assumptions and metarepresented assumptions, would
require a great deal of time and energy. Unless further context
serves to direct the search, the time and energy available
would not be sufficient to pass beyond the readily accessible
metarepresented set of beliefs. (One might compare the case of
the central metaphor in Seamus Heaney's poem, Digging, which
only becomes rich and poetic in the context provided by the
entire poem.) The metarepresented set of beliefs would be
easier to access, and hence accessed first, because it would be
assumed to be shared between communicator and addressee. In
this example the culturally endorsed stereotype will be the one
that sees childhood as cosy and innocent. In the 'gorilla'
example, discussed in Chapter 4, the culturally endorsed
stereotype was the one that saw gorillas as fierce, nasty and
prone to violence. Some metarepresentations are richer than
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others (metarepresented 'childhood' is richer than
metarepresented 'gorilla'). The repetition in (la) leads to a
stronger activation of the metarepresented set of beliefs,
making the assumptions it contains more salient and more
widely salient. But there is no genuine exploration of the
concept 'childhood', this being short-circuited by the
metarepresentation. This example is, as a result, sentimental
rather than genuinely poetic. The issue of sentimentality will
be taken up in Chapter 6.
Example (2a), I would suggest, works differently and is a
genuine example of poetic epizeuxis. What I suggest happens in
the processing of (2a) is very roughly as follows. The
addressee locates the word 'Absalom' in his mental lexicon.
This makes accessible a set of contextual assumptions
concerning 'Absalom'. Assumptions activated may include:
'Absalom is the son of David', which would give access to and
weakly activate assumptions to do with 'son' and 'David', etc.
For the next stage of interpretation - 'my son' - the
assumptions attached to 'son' receive further activation,
together with assumptions concerning the relationship
between the speaker, David, and his son. The repetition of the
phrase 'my son' encourages still further exploration of context
that is already activated, the making more salient of already
weakly activated assumptions. 'Absalom', 'Absalom, my son',
and 'Absalom, my son, my son' all give access to the same
information. In the latter case, however, many more
assumptions to do with David's relationship to and feelings for
his son are implicated as a result of this repetition.
Encyclopaedic entries are explored much more thoroughly than
is the case in the simpler versions. Contextual assumptions
already activated are further activated and more of the
assumptions are actually entertained and brought to bear in
arriving at the intended interpretation.
But the wider context of the story in the Bible plays an
important role in giving direction to the retrieval and
construction of contextual assumptions. The richness of
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effects follow from, among other things, awareness of the
prior struggles between David and Absatom, other expressions
of David's love for Absalom and the conditions in which
Absalom was killed in battle. This information, available as
contextual assumptions, makes more salient a range of
implicatures to do with David's love for Absalom, his sense of
guilt and his regret that he didn't do more to ensure Absalom's
safety. They multiply the reasons for David's acute sense of
loss and create the conditions for the communication of the
emotional state of grief. This example will be discussed
further, in the context of an account of emotion in
communication, in the next chapter.
The accessing of a concept involves the activation of
assumptions stored at the encyclopaedic entry attached to that
concept. In the time available on-line only those assumptions
receiving further activation from the accessing of other
concepts will become salient, unless, of course, this is pre-
empted by the accessing of a metarepresented cultural
stereotype. (The point of such metarepresentations is that they
are easily accessible to members of a social group and hence
facilitate processing). In the case of epizeuxis, an
encyclopaedic entry is activated by the first occurrence of the
word or phrase and the repetition and reactivation takes place
before the initially activated assumptions have fully
deactivated. This allows the assumptions stored in the
encyclopaedic entry to become more salient in the processing
time available. From another point of view, given the
preparedness to expend a certain amount of processing effort,
the repetition allows the extra effort to achieve more
contextual effects. This view is consistent with relevance
theory considerations of the importance of processing
constraints in determining initial contexts for interpretation.
It should be noted that repetition can only be poetic if there is
sufficient context to explore - if, in other words, there is a
rich enough encyclopaedic entry to activate. Consider the
following examples:
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(10) Oh, Fred, my colleague, my colleague!
(11) The pubs have closed, closed.
These appear ridiculous because a search is encouraged which
has nowhere to go. The utterance in (2a) can support such a
search because of the richness or potential richness of
father/son relationships. There is more to explore in this case
than in the case of relationships between colleagues, which
can be any kind of relationship, intense or distant, but which
are, stereotypically at least, not rich in a particular kind of
experience. The speaker's relationship with Fred can be deep
and meaningful, but not by virtue of them being colleagues.
Similarly, one cannot invest with feeling and complex thought
the closing of a pub, which will always be open again
tomorrow.
Finally I would like, as I did in the case of metaphor, to look at
an instance of repetition as it occurs in a poem. In this case a
whole verse line is repeated. It is an interesting example in
that the repetition leads to a concept being interpreted
metaphorically: there is a 'loosening' of the concept. The
example I will discuss is one I have discussed elsewhere
(Pilkington 1991), Robert Frost's Stopping by Woods on a
Snowy Evening. The complete poem follows below:
Whose woods these are I think I know.
His house is in the village, though;
He will not see me stopping here
To watch his woods fill up with snow.
My little horse must think it queer
To stop without a farmhouse near
Between the woods and frozen lake
The darkest evening of the year.
He gives his harness bells a shake
To ask if there is some mistake.
The only other sound's the sweep
Of easy wind and downy flake.
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The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.
(from New Hampshire (1923))
In Pilkington (1991) I discuss this poem in the light of a
debate about the pedagogic value of stylistic analysis (from
Widdowson (1975)). One of the views presented in this debate
held that the repetition of the final line encourages the reader
to interpret the word 'steep' metaphorically, so that it comes
to mean 'die', or to mean 'die' in addition to 'sleep'. The
repetition encourages greater activation of the assumptions
stored in the encyclopaedic entries of the concepts in the
sentence repeated. In this case the only concept that can be
fruitfully explored is the concept attached to 'sleep'. Although
there is no 'categorial falsity', no clear flouting of the maxim
of Quality, in Grice's sense, those assumptions about sleep
which also apply to death are the ones made most salient. This
is partly due to the long and familiar link between 'death' and
'sleep' in our cultural and literary tradition. But other
contextual assumptions supplied by the rest of the poem also
encourage such a link. The complete line - 'And miles to go
before I sleep' - makes use of the familiar metaphorical idea
that life is a journey: at the end of this journey is death. Other
possible interpretations (discussed in Widdowson 1975:
Chapter 7) include the idea that the mysterious woods in the
first line are 'the Forest of Death', and that the house in the
village is the graveyard. According to this reading the real
theme of the poem is the strong attraction of death which the
poem's narrator finally resists. This reading may be too rigid;
it may fall into the common trap of treating poems as puzzles
to solve. In this case, the 'sleep = death' equation might be
seen as providing the key that unlocks the poem's meaning. I
would argue, though, that the further activation of
assumptions stored in the encyclopaedic entry of 'sleep'
caused by the repetition includes the activation of
assumptions that 'sleep' shares with 'death', because of the
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cultural link and because of contexts made accessible by the
rest of the poem ('the darkest evening of the year', etc.).
5.3. Verse effects.
The questions I would like to consider in this section are: how
do verse phenomena affect readers/hearers? and why do they
have the effects that they do? A wide range of verse features
(metre, metrical variation, alliteration, rhyme, line-length,
stichic and strophic organisation, etc.) are typically used in
poetry and can be used to create poetic effects. Verse features
do not always lead to such effects being achieved, however
(despite the linking of verse features with the 'poetic function'
by Jakobson and others); they can also be found in non-poetic
rhetorically marked discourse of various kinds (e.g. political
speeches, advertisements, football chants).
Verse has variously been seen as mere embellishment, as
contributing to the music rather than the meaning of poetry, or
as contributing to the affective rather than cognitive
dimension of what is communicated. Many critics engaged in
close analysis of verse effects, however, have stressed the
ways in which verse contributes to both cognitive and
affective dimensions of what is communicated. If we translate
the language of literary criticism into the language of
pragmatics, verse features, exploited poetically, might be said
to encourage the accessing of a wide range of assumptions in
the same way as poetic metaphor or epizeuxis. But if this is
indeed what they do, how do they do it? In trying to answer
this question I will limit my attention to the topics of
metrical variation, rhyme and alliteration.
5.3.1. Metrical Variation.
'Rhythm must have a meaning'.
Ezra Pound.
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The notion that there is any virtue in regularity or
variety, or in any other formal features, apart from its
effects upon us, must be discarded before any metrical
problem can be understood.'	 LA.Richards.
Consider the following passage from Shakespeare's King Lear
(Act One, scene two, lines 11-14). 'Bastards', Edmund claims:
in the lusty stealth of nature, take
More composition and fierce quality
Than doth, within a dull, stale, tired bed,
Go to th' creating a whole tribe of fops.
The word 'stale' receives unexpected stress: the regular iambic
pentameter, with its alternating weak-strong stress pattern,
would normally require a weak stress on this word. The
concept to which this word is attached seems to receive extra
emphasis. This emphasis is further enhanced by the fact that
there are three stressed syllables in a row, the first two being
monosyllabic words: '...dull, stale, tired...' The combined effect
of these factors is to slow down the verse and thereby create
stylistic effects which have often been noted but never
properly explained. An explanation may, perhaps, be sought in
terms of the way in which processing is affected. More time is
allowed to access and activate the assumptions stored at the
encyclopaedic entries of the words 'dull', 'stale' and 'tired'. If
the concepts are rich enough, as they are here, then the result,
as in the case of epizeuxis, is the communication of a
relatively wide range of implicatures and the achievement of
poetic effects. (I would like to suggest that phenomenal
memories are also activated for these concepts. The question
of phenomenal memory will be addressed in Chapters 6 and 7.)
There is some evidence to suggest that utterance prosody plays
an important role in the process of lexical access. (See, for
example Cutler 1992; forthcoming). Cutler has explored the
165
possibility that in English, where for most words (especially
for most commonly used words) stress falls on the first
syllable, hearers use stress to mark word boundaries and to
initiate the process of word-recognition and lexical access.
Stress falls on content words as opposed to function words,
which usually contain reduced vowels in normal speech.
Content words are those which link to conceptual addresses
that have encyclopaedic entries, whereas function words,
which have a procedural role to play in utterance
interpretation, do not. One of the properties of stress is that it
lengthens the time taken to process the word on which it falls.
This may well be because for such words there is more
information to activate and access at their corresponding
conceptual addresses.
Metre encourages expectations to be set up as to when strong
(and weak) stress will occur. Of course, metrical patterns have
their own characteristic effects. It is generally recognised
that triple metres with two weak syllables, which speed up
the verse, are effective in enhancing comic effects, as in the
following example which uses anapaestic feet:
To make out the dinner full certain I am
That Ridge is anchovy, and Reynolds is lamb;
That Hickey's a capon, and by the same rule,
Magnanimous Goldsmith a gooseberry fool.
(from Goldsmith's 'Retaliation').
Such metres are not so successful in the case of would-be
serious verse, as in this example:
My fugitive years are all hasting away,
And I must ere long lie as lowly as they,
With a turf on my breast, and a stone at my head,
Ere another such grove shall arrive in its stead.
(from Cowper's 'The Poplar-Field').
Metrical patterns can also be exploited to achieve local
effects, as in the example from King Lear, where, in the lines
quoted, the metrical pattern is in conflict with the normal
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rhythm of speech. A strong stress is found where the metrical
pattern leads us to expect a weak stress. My suggestion is that
the regular strong stress on content words (to allow time to
access their encyclopaedic entries) is enhanced by metre and
enhanced further in the case of verse where metrical variation
and extra or unexpected strong stress occurs. The extra time
this enhanced stress gives to the lexical access process,
together, perhaps, with the earlier accessing of information
that it allows, causes the encyclopaedic entry to be more
thoroughly explored and assumptions within it to be made more
highly salient. These assumptions become available for
inferencing and as a result a wide range of implicatures is
communicated. The tendency metrical patterns may have to
slow verse down, especially where variation is used, can be
enhanced, as is the case in this example, where several
stressed monosyllables follow one another. There are no
intervening weak stresses along the way to speed things up.
The extra or unexpected strong stress requires extra
processing effort to be put into accessing information stored
at the conceptual address linked to a lexical item. This extra
effort facilitates the exploration of encyclopaedic entries by
allowing more time for such exploration. In a similar way the
extra effort required in cases of epizeuxis facilitates the
exploration of encyclopaedic entries by allowing more time for
such exploration.
The following examples illustrate the stylistic intuitions
prompted by metrical variation that I am trying to account for.
The second example is from Wilfred Owen's poem, Anthem for
Doomed Youth; the first example is from an earlier version of
the poem which Owen decided to reject:
(i) The shrill demented choirs of wailing shells,
And bugles calling sad across the shires
(ii) The shrill demented choirs of wailing shells,
And bugles calling for them from sad shires.
Why is the second version superior to the first? There is a
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change in the meaning expressed by the final line: in the second
version 'the shires' are 'sad', whereas in the first version the
sadness is in the sound of the bugles; in the second version the
bugles explicitly call 'for them', i.e. for the fallen youth. These
changes are clearly important. Another important difference,
however, is created by the spondaic substitution in the final
foot - 'sad shires' - which places unexpected stress on 'sad'
and slows down the delivery of the line. The iambic pattern of
the earlier version does, of course, require metrical stress to
fall on 'sad', but in the improved version the unexpectedness of
the stress is significant as well as the fact that two stressed
monosyllables follow each other. The stylistic intuition is
clear: the question is how to explain it. The suggestion I made
above is that the clash between the actual use of stress and
the stress pattern expected from the iambic metre affects the
point at which the encyclopaedic entry is explored, and the
time available to explore it. The assumptions stored in the
encyclopaedic entry, in other words, are activated earlier and
for longer.
As a final example, I would like to consider the final two lines
of Keats' On First Looking into Chapman's Homer. The complete
poem is quoted below:
Much have I travell'd in the realms of gold,
And many goodly states and kingdoms seen;
Round many western islands have I been
Which bards in fealty to Apollo hold.
Oft of one wide expanse had I been told
That deep-brow'd Homer ruled as his demesne;
Yet did I never breathe its pure serene
Till I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold:
Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken;
Or like the stout Cortez when with eagle eyes
He stared at the Pacific - and all his men
Look'd at each other with a wild surmise -
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.
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The first foot in each of the final two lines of this sonnet is
subject to metrical variation. In each case an expected iambic
foot is replaced by a trochaic foot. These trochaic
substitutions have contrasting effects. In the penultimate line
the substitution seems to emphasise the sudden active nature
of the looking; in the final line the substitution emphasises the
stillness and silence as Cortez stared out over the newly
discovered Pacific Ocean. In both cases the unexpected stress
right at the beginning of the line slows down the verse, allows
more processing time, and possibly initiates the activation of
assumptions in the encyclopaedic entries earlier than would
otherwise be the case. The stylistic effects achieved by these
substitutions are highlighted if Keats' version is compared
with the following - definitely inferior - alternative version,
which maintains the iambic foot.
Each looked at other with a wild surmise -
All silent on a peak in Darien.
The sense of stopping and staring at something wondrous
which Keats' version communicates (and which my version
doesn't) is also the metaphorical heart of the poem: this is the
same experience the poet has on first looking into Chapman's
Homer. I have said little about the nature of the implicatures
communicated by any of the examples in this section. It is
difficult to suggest any suitable candidate implicatures for
the last two examples, for instance. Yet the stylistic effects
are clear and of the kind that one would want to call poetic.
Why should this be so? Suggested reasons for the difficulty in
explaining the stylistic effects here will be offered in the next
chapter.
It would be interesting at this point to engage in some general
speculation about the popularity of iambic metres in English
poetry. The iambic pentameter is by far the most natural and
productive metre in the literary tradition. There has been much
discussion of this point in literary criticism and in books on
verse, but, apart from some insightful intuitive comments
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regarding, for example, the greater flexibility, seriousness and
variability that may be achieved by such verse, this discussion
has been able to offer little in the way of an explanation as to
why this should be the case. Many have sought to explain the
effects of different metres in terms of conventions. Fussell,
for example, partially explains the effects of metre in this
way:
'....metres can mean by association and
convention......In the limerick, for example, the very
pattern of short anapestic lines is so firmly
associated with light impudence or indecency that
a poet can hardly write in anything resembling this
measure without evoking smiles'. (Fussell
1979:12).
Limericks are probably the best example of a verse metre
where this kind of association might hold. I would suggest,
however, that pragmatic and processing considerations
generally underlie the effects achieved by different verse
metres. Where conventions exist, there will probably be a good
psychological reason for their existence. In the case of the
iambic metre the even match of strong and weak stresses is
used to slow the verse down. It encourages the greater use of
monosyllabic words and it allows metrical variation to be
introduced more easily. In the case of metres that use dactyls
and anapaests such variation is rare because it tends to be too
disruptive. Dactyls and anapaests create a strong metre
which, with its extra weak stresses hurries the verse along
(as in the case of the Goldsmith and Cowper examples above).
What then of trochaic verse, which also evenly matches strong
and weak stress? Part of the reason, again, would seem to be
that the trochaic metre is faster than the iambic metre. Stress
falling on the first syllable of disyllabic words leads us to
perceive that syllable as shorter than, or about the same
length as, its unstressed partner, for example in the cases of
words such as 'limpid', 'doctrine', 'scooter'. The same holds for
stressed monosyllables with a closely connected nonstressed
word, as in 'stop it', 'got him'. If the stress is on the second
syllable this syllable will appear longer, for example in the
170
cases of words and phrases such as 'deceive', 'ignite', 'the
seive', 'the night'. (See Cutler 1989 for further examples and
discussion of this point.) My suggestion is that this perceived
difference in duration carries over to verse, so that where
strong stresses fall in iambic metre they often tend to be
perceived as longer than strong stresses in trochaic metre.
Other factors are no doubt involved, for example, the fact that
a iambic verse line typically ends with a strong stress, making
the line ending into a significant extra punctuation device,
which can be accompanied by rhyme.
To sum up this section, I am offering the suggestion that
metrical variation, enhanced perhaps by its occurrence at the
beginning of the line, as in the examples taken from the Keats
poem, or by occurring in a row of stressed monosyllables as in
the Shakespeare example, in slowing down the verse, allows
for the speedier and lengthier activation of the assumptions
stored at the encyclopaedic entries of the concepts involved.
These claims are based on ideas in relevance theory concerning
processing effort and contextual effects and on ideas in
psycholinguistic theory concerning lexical access. These
claims should, in principle, be testable. There seems as yet to
be little, if any, directly relevant work in psycholinguistics
bearing on these issues. The most promising findings which
have some indirect bearing are those suggesting that mis-
stressing has an effect on processes of lexical access. Taft
(1984) has found that 'mis-stressing a strong-strong word like
'canteen' if anything tended to facilitate lexical access'
(Cutler: personal communication). It does not necessarily
follow from this, of course, that unexpected stress in metrical
variation also facilitates lexical access. But the
psycholinguistic evidence that it can happen is certainly
encouraging - and certainly worth a research programme.
If lexical access is facilitated it becomes easier to activate a
greater range of information from encyclopaedic entries.
Assuming that these encyclopaedic entries are rich enough and,
perhaps, that other context helps to direct the search through
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these entries, then they can give rise to poetic effects. As in
the case of metaphor and epizeuxis, whether poetic effects are
achieved will depend on these other contextual factors.
5.3.2. Rhyme and Alliteration.
'Mouth, south. Is the mouth south someway? Or the
south mouth ?.....South, pout, out, shout, drouth...'
(James Joyce, Ulysses).
Fussell echoes a point made by Wimsatt (1954) about the
effects of rhyme in verse that has often been made in practical
criticism. He argues that: 'every rhyme invites the reader's
consideration of semantic as well as of sound similarities.'
(Fussell 1979:110). Fussell illustrates this point with
reference to the following stanza from Pound's Mauberley:
The 'age demanded' chiefly a mould in plaster,
Made with no loss of time.
A prose kinema, not, not assuredly, alabaster
Or the 'sculpture' of rhyme.
The use of 'alabaster' to rhyme with 'plaster' has, according to
Fussell, an ironic effect. He argues:
'By rhyming the words which represent these two
rich symbols of technical, aesthetic opposition,
the stanza appears to compare them, while
ironically it actually contrasts them.' (FusseD
1979:111).
The use of rhyme here encourages a comparison and contrast of
the semantic and encyclopaedic information attached to their
respective conceptual addresses. The presence of the sound
similarity encourages the encyclopaedic entries attached to
these concepts to be explored more thoroughly and for items
within them to be made considerably more salient. A similar
kind of irony results from the rhyming of 'time' with 'rhyme'.
In the context of this poem the timeless qualities of 'rhyme'
and true art are contrasted with the speedy manufacture of
mass-produced material goods. (See Fussell 1979:110-111 for
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further discussion of these examples).
One possible (and, by now, familiar) explanation for these
stylistic effects is that the presence of rhyme, which
generally combines phonetically identical material with strong
stress, facilitates exploration of encyclopaedic entries. But
how is it possible for the mere repetition of phonetically
identical material to affect semantic or pragmatic
processing? Could it be that where there is a pair of rhyming
words the process of lexically accessing the second word is
facilitated by the prior accessing of the first, and that the
second word, in its turn, reactivates the conceptual address of
the first word? The stylistic effects experienced could follow
from the resulting increased salience of assumptions within
the encyclopaedic entries attached to these conceptual
addresses, or they could follow from the increased salience of
assumptions shared by the two encyclopaedic entries or the
construction of assumptions common to both entries.
These speculations are encouraged by recent theories of
lexical access. The current version of the cohort model (as
outlined, for example in Marslen-Wilson (1987);(1989)) argues
that the processes of word recognition and lexical access are
essentially bottom-up, stimulus-driven processes that
activate a wide range of items in the mental lexicon. Those
items that provide the best 'fit' will receive the greatest
activation. (The notion of 'relative goodness of fit' refers to
the relation between the sensory stimulus provided by the
phonetic signal in speech and the representation of lexical
items in the mental lexicon.) The preferred candidate-item
must then be able to fit into the on-going construction of
higher-level representations. The model is designed to make
the construction of on-line meaning representations as fast
and efficient as possible (and, of course, to make clear
falsifiable predictions that can be tested in psycholinguistic
experiments).
The important point here is that, as the sensory stimulus is
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being processed, multiple lexical access to conceptual
information occurs. The closer the items in the mental lexicon
to the target item in their phonetic representation, the greater
their activation, including the activation of semantic and other
information stored at the corresponding conceptual addresses.
What I am suggesting, then, is that at the same time as the
first word of the rhyming pair is contacted in the lexicon by
the incoming sensory stimulus, the second word is also
contacted. There would also be activation of the concept
attached to this second rhyming word and possibly access to
its encyclopaedic entry. These activations would fade as the
first word was found to offer the best fit. It might be the case,
however, that they are still active enough by the time the
concept attached to the second rhyming word is being accessed
in its own right to make that accessing easier and quicker,
allowing more time with less effort to explore the
encyclopaedia more extensively. At the same time that the
second word is being processed the encyclopaedic entry
attached to the concept of the first word is reactivated and
the assumptions become more salient because of their recent
activation. I have also suggested that the activation of the
second word is facilitated by its prior high activation as a
strong candidate item. Again, it is easier to access and there
is more time to explore its encyclopaedic entry more
extensively.
The phenomenon of alliteration might work in a similar way to
that suggested for rhyme. There are, in fact, two basic reasons
why one would expect it to work more effectively than rhyme.
If alliteration occurs within a line then the relative state of
activation of the first word should be higher given the shorter
time lapse between the alliterating words. The other reason is
that the beginnings of words play a more important role in
activating and locating the intended lexical item in the
lexicon, in the determination of relative goodness of fit.
It should be noted that these speculations adapt rather than
adopt ideas currently held in psycholinguistics. The actual
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psycholinguistic evidence for these ideas is lacking or even
contradictory. Rhyme prime tests have been found to facilitate
real-word priming only by a very small margin. Experiments
carried out by Marsien-Wilson and Zwitserlood (1989) found
the facilitation time to be a mere 11 msec. As Marsien-Wilson
noted:
'In contrast to the onset primes, rhyme primes
were notably ineffective in priming their
targets.......Rhyme primes failed to facilitate their
targets even for very large amounts of overlap.
Sequences up to three syllables long, where only
the first consonant was mismatching, still showed
no significant priming effect.' (Marslen-Wilson
1992:14).
The results obtained are more likely to support the idea that
alliteration facilitates the kind of semantic links to which
Fussell refers.
Both alliteration and rhyme have clear stylistic effects, which
have often been noted, but never properly explained (unless in
terms of literary reading conventions). Contemporary ideas in
psycholinguistics, in conjunction with ideas in relevance
theory, allow suggestive speculation. The experimental
evidence from psycholinguistics may be, for the moment at
least, sparse or not encouraging. But the speculative remarks I
have offered here do not have to be totally rejected yet. Such
experiments as have been carried out have used individual
words, essentially as a way of testing directionality in lexical
access. It is possible that the minimal priming which Marslen-
Wilson and Zwitzerlood detect for such cases might be
increased in the case of rhyming words occurring in metrical
patterns where enhanced stress and the pause that occurs at
the end of the line may also have an effect, Ideally one would
want to compare rhyme priming where the rhyming pair occur
in a variety of contexts.
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CHAPTER SIX
EMOTION, ATTITUDE AND SENTIMENTALITY.
'The right occasions are when emotions come flooding in and
bring the multiplication of metaphors with them as a
necessary accompaniment.'
Longinus, On the Sublime. p.173.
6.1.	 Introduction: Emotion and Poetry.
In Chapters 4 and 5 the poetic effects communicated by tropes
(such as poetic metaphor), schemes (such as poetic epizeuxis)
and verse effects (such as metrical variation) were
characterised in terms of a process that involved a wide range
of assumptions being simultaneously made marginally more
salient. These could either be communicated as a range of weak
implicatures or they could contribute to the communication of
a new concept forming part of the proposition expressed by the
utterance. In either case they would be activated in the search
for an interpretation consistent with the principle of
relevance. The route of least effort would not lead
immediately to the selection or construction of a narrow range
of easily accessible contextual assumptions; it would lead to
the selection and construction of a wider range of assumptions
after a lengthier and more extensive search. This account of
poetic effects deals with what is communicated
propositionally: the type of mental representation that
characterises poetic effects, according to this account,
consists of assumptions or propositional forms. If it is
assumed that pragmatic theory can only account for
propositional effects, then this will be as far as pragmatics
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can go in providing an account of poetic metaphor and poetic
epizeuxis, or in providing a more general account of
lit e ra ri ness.
In literary criticism it is generally assumed that the
communication of what is loosely referred to as 'emotion' or
'feeling' plays a central role in poetic effects. In the study of
rhetoric, too, it is claimed that rhetorical devices provide
emphasis for a thought, or produce intensity of feeling or
emotion. Alexander Smith, in the extract from his essay quoted
above in Chapter 5, wrote that 'the interjection 'oh', and the
repetition of 'my son' have the effect of making words which
are otherwise but the intimation of a fact, the expression of an
emotion of exceeding depth and interest, and thus render them
eminently poetical.' The same kind of heightening of emotion
can be seen in the example of epizeuxis (taken from Sperber
and Wilson (1986a)), which was discussed in Chapter 5, and is
repeated here as (1).
(la) My childhood days are gone, gone.
(1 b) My childhood days are gone.
The intuition that (la) is more emotional (or sentimental) in
tone than (ib) is one of the main stylistic differences between
the two utterances.
Rhetoricians have observed this to be the case for most types
of verbal repetition. Consider the following examples, taken
from Joyce's Eveline and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young
Man (and discussed in Wales (1992)):
(2) 'Everything changes. Now she was going to go away
like the others, to leave her home. Home!'
(3) 'She stood up in a sudden impulse of terror. Escape!
She must escape!'
(4) 'Her bosom was as a birds' soft and slight, slight and
soft as the breast of some darkplummaged dove. But
her long fair hair was girlish: and girlish, and
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touched with the wonder of mortal beauty, her face.'
(2) is an example of anadiplosis, where a word at the end of
one sentence is repeated at the beginning of the next; (3) is an
example of epiphora, where the same word is repeated finally
in successive sentences; (4) is an example of epanados, the
repetition of words in reverse order. Each of these rhetorical
schemes are deliberately used to heighten a strong emotional
effect. (See Wales (1992) for more detailed discussion of
these and similar examples.)
The idea that poetry is primarily an expression of emotion (or
feeling) was an important part of the Romantic theory of the
period in which Smith was writing. All the leading Romantic
poets and critics from Wordsworth to Byron expressed their
own version of this idea. Wordsworth wrote in his Preface to
the Lyrical Ballads that 'all good poetry is the spontaneous
overflow of powerful feelings'. Byron, in a letter to Tom Moore,
wrote that 'poetry is the expression of excited passion.' The
idea that poetry is best fitted to express emotion is at least
as old as Longinus' On the Sublime, where Longinus wrote of
the importance of the 'stimulus of powerful and inspired
emotion' as a source of the sublime. It is an idea that has found
its echo in the writings of many twentieth century poets.
Larkin, for example, makes the following observation about the
writing of a poem in his essay, The Pleasure Principle:
'It consists of three stages: the first is when a
man becomes obsessed with an emotional concept
to such a degree that he is compelled to do
something about it. What he does is the second
stage, namely, construct a verbal device that will
reproduce his emotional concept in anyone who
cares to read it, anywhere, any time. The third
stage is the recurrent situation of people in
different times and places setting off the device
and re-creating in themselves what the poet felt
when he wrote it.' (Larkin 1983: 80).
Given this strong connection between emotion and poetry in
general, and, more particularly, between emotion and the use
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of rhetorical devices in poetry (and other discourses such as
political oratory), it becomes important to ask the questions:
what is an emotion? and how might an account of emotion be
introduced into a pragmatic account of poetic effects, if at
all? In this chapter I will consider some recent accounts of
emotion in philosophy and cognitive science. Then I will return
to the questions raised above. In Chapter 7 I will discuss the
question of how nonpropositional effects in general might be
included in a theory of pragmatics.
6.2.	 Properties of emotional states.
Rey (1980) characterises emotions as complex states
possessing cognitive, physiological, behavioural and
qualitative properties. Other types of properties have been
attributed to emotional states, some of which are mentioned
by Rey, but essentially they reduce to these four.
The cognitive properties of emotions may be characterised in
terms of particular types of sets of beliefs and desires. They
may be characterised, therefore, in terms of their
intentionality: emotions are about something, they refer to
states of affairs and events in the world. These properties are
the ones that have particularly interested cognitive science
and will be discussed in section 6.4.
The physiological properties of emotions seem the most
clearly theorisable, falling within the domain of the natural
sciences (biology and chemistry). The standard view is that the
evolutionary function of such physiological effects was to
prepare the body for appropriate action (for example to fight or
for flight) in response to external phenomena, events or states
of affairs in the world.
The behavioural properties of emotions include bodily
movement and gesture. Emotional behaviour responds to the
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physiology of emotions but can be controlled and is subject to
cultural variation. It is caused by a complex interaction of
physiological factors and culturally determined belief/desire
sets. Cultural constraints may influence the degree of freedom
or restraint shown in the expression of behaviour either
generally or with respect to certain emotions. They may also
influence the manner in which such behaviour is expressed.
Social groups recognise behavioural norms with regard to the
expression of emotional behaviour, but there is room for
variation and the norms are sometimes contravened. Such
behaviour has to be measured in terms of broad generalisations
and statistical correlations rather than in terms of causality.
It is possible to develop separate and combined theoretical
accounts of the physiological and cognitive properties of
emotions. Rey offers the following example of how the two
might interact:
'.... a specific cognition or constellation of
cognitions, might be linked nomologically to
specific qualitative and physiological states, and
so forth; a given emotion might be regarded as
some commonly occuring segment of just such a
sequence. A crude but not impossible instance
might be, say, depression over the collapse of
one's career: this might be identified as the
sequence beginning with the belief that one's
career has indeed collapsed, the quite strong
preference that it hadn't, a consequent depletion
of norepinephrine, the effects of that depletion
upon the nervous system, consequent further
changes in cognition (e.g., the belief that nothing
any longer is worthwhile, decreased preferences
for doing anything at all), followed by still further
depletions of norepinephrine, and further effects
of this still greater depletion, various portions of
this sequence being accompanied, perhaps, by that
unmistakable qualitative feel.......' Rey (1980:188).
Qualitative properties (those unmistakable qualitative feels),
however, are more problematic because they are subjective and
elusive. Only I know what my anger and despair are like, and
even then only approximately. These properties may relate
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causally to the cognitive and physiological components of
emotional states, but it is difficult to see how the nature of
the causal relationships may be determined or characterised. It
may be that the qualitative properties of emotions are really
properties of physiological states, that when we talk of
qualitative properties we are really talking about conscious
awareness in relation to such physiological states, just as we
talk about the sensation of an itch or a headache. At some level
it may be that all emotions are complex physiological states
triggering different types of conscious awareness, Some
physiological states trigger conscious awareness in the form
of 'thoughts', and some in the form of 'feelings'. I will return
to these issues in Chapter 7.
If we assume that emotional states typically involve all these
properties, it is also important to point out that it is possible
to have states that combine some but not all of them. As Rey
puts it:
'a typical emotional state is not analyzable as
merely the cognitive component of the state, since
one may have the beliefs and preferences without
the emotions, and the emotions sometimes without
the beliefs and preferences.' (Rey 1980:176).
Examples of the latter case (of what might be termed
'incomplete emotions'), where the cognitive component is
absent, would be free-floating anxiety or elation.
Emotional states, then,
'are, typically, complex states involving
nomological interactions between cognitions,
qualitative states, and physiological processes
(should qualitative states be eliminated in favour
of physiological processes, the interaction would
of course be only between the cognitive and the
physiological).' (Rey 1980:188).
It is this complexity of emotional states that leads Rey to
question the claim that machines can possess emotions.
Emotions depend upon interactions between the cognitive and
the physiological. (Certain cognitive states cause physiological
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states, which, in turn, cause cognitive states, etc.). As
machines do not have human physiology these interactions
clearly cannot take place. Another consequence of not
possessing human physiology is that machines cannot have the
characteristic human qualitative experience of emotions.
6.3. The evolution and relevance of emotion.
Complex emotional states of the kind described could evolve
only with a relatively advanced and flexible degree of
intelligence. The circuits of the brain dealing with emotion
were set up to motivate appropriate behaviour in major life-
challenging circumstances. There are four systems located in
the limbic system involving distinct neural pathways,
parallelling four types of behaviour: (i) exploratory and
appetitive; (ii) attack; (iii) flight; (iv) loss or grief. For
primitive life forms specific reactions to specific stimuli
were sufficient for survival. The appearance of a predator, for
instance, would activate the appropriate autonomic/hormonal
circuit which would send out the appropriate messages and
prepare the body for flight. A simple representation of some
state of affairs (maybe a visual image) would directly trigger
a bodily reaction, a set of physiological responses.
For more complex systems, responses need to be adapted to
important non-specific life-situations where flexibility is
required. The flight response is no longer triggered by a fixed
number of stimuli, but results from a more complex set of
circumstances. It has developed into the emotion of fear.
Emotions, then, have evolved as a way of interrupting the
behaviour of the organism when a goal is frustrated by a novel
or unexpected situation, causing it to rethink its plans. (See
Oatley (1992) for one of the most recent accounts of this
view.) As the ability to represent the external world has
become more sophisticated, with the development of a rich
array of concepts and a language of thought, emotions
themselves have become more complex and sophisticated.
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Whereas the fear response was activated by a narrow range of
stimuli in some animals (e.g. the shape of a predator), for
humans the emotion is now triggered by a complex pattern of
beliefs and desires. (I leave aside the question of whether or to
what extent animals are conscious of the emotions they
undergo: whether, that is, their emotions have a qualitative
component in the sense discussed. This issue is still hotly
debated; but see Dawkins (1993) for arguments in support of
animal consciousness.) The desires which are thwarted or
violated become more complex as immediate desires are
supplemented by time-indexed desires. (An immediate desire
might be the desire to quench one's thirst; a time-indexed
desire might be the desire to visit Paris next summer.)
Emotion provides a means of focussing attention. Certain
environmental stimuli become super-relevant in the sense that
survival depends on paying absolute attention to them. As de
Souza argues:
'The role of emotion is to supply the insufficiency
of reason by imitating the encapsulation of
perceptual modes. For a variable but always
limited time, an emotion limits the range of
information that the organism will take into
account, the inferences actually drawn from a
potential infinity, and the set of live options
among which it will choose.' (de Souza 1987:195).
This analysis of emotion is seen by deSouza (1987:195) as 'one
of Nature's ways of dealing with the frame problem.' What the
specialised circuits of the brain are designed to do is
facilitate the process of fixing on one piece of information -
the representation of an environmental stimulus or state of
affairs - to the exclusion of all others. In relevance theory
terms, these systems make sure that the crucial piece of
information is less costly to process.
6.4.	 Analysing emotions as belief/desire sets.
It is clear that emotions play a crucial role in motivating
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human behaviour and that they are extremely complex: that is
what makes them so interesting. One way of characterising the
complexity of human emotions is in terms of what Rey (1980)
termed its cognitive properties. For Sloman (1986; 1987) these
cognitive properties can be analysed in terms of belief/desire
sets. The sophistication of our awareness of emotional states
depends on the sophistication of the ways in which the
cognitive properties of emotions can be represented.
Sloman (1987) illustrates the view that emotions may be
partially characterised in such a way with an analysis of
anger. The following is a simplified and abbreviated version of
Sloman's analysis. (For a fuller analysis of 'anger' see Sloman
1987:224-226).
For it to be possible to make the claim in (5), Sloman argues,
something like the conditions in (6) must hold:
(5) X is angry with Y
(6a) X believes that V did (or failed to do) something.
(6b) In doing (or failing to do) this something, one of
X's desires was violated.
I will flesh this out with a simple example. When Gorbachev
was released from his dacha in the Crimea in August 1991,
after the abortive coup in what was then the Soviet Union, he
was angry. One of the people he was particularly angry with
was his former friend, Lukyanov. Why was Gorbachev angry? He
believed that Lukyanov had helped to organise the coup (6a) and
that this violated his desire to go on running the country, more
immediately getting the 'All Union Treaty' signed, with lots of
important etceteras (6b). But are this belief and frustrated
desire enough to make Gorbachev angry? Sloman argues that
the conditions in (6) are not sufficient for anger; a further
condition expressed here in (7), the creation of a new motive
(as Sloman calls it) or desire, is essential before one can
justifiably make the claim in (5).
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(7) X desires to hurt/harm Y.
For X to be angry with Y, then, a new desire must be created. As
Sloman phrases it: 'Anger involves an insistent and intense
non-derivative desire to do something to make V suffer.'
(Sloman 86:9). This is a characteristic of all emotional states,
according to Sloman: a belief about some state of affairs or
event in the world causes one desire to be frustrated, or
violated, and a new desire to be created. In terms of the
present example, for Gorbachev to be angry with Lukyanov, if
Sloman's analysis is correct, he must also desire to hurt or
harm Lukyanov. This is not to say that he (or any X) has to
actually hurt or harm Lukyanov (or any Y); other desires or
beliefs might interfere - fear of the consequences of such
action, for example. The general rule, however, is that, if one
desire is thwarted by some action of Y and a new desire to hurt
or harm V is created, then X may be said to be angry with V.
Sloman's method, then, involves the conceptual analysis of key
emotion terms (such as 'anger') and a formulation of the
results of such analysis in terms of belief/desire sets that
characterise the cognitive state of a mind experiencing the
emotion. The analysis of 'anger' above is very schematic.
Sloman's analysis, in fact, allows for much variety and
sophistication, as he argues in the following passage:
'Emotions like anger can vary along different
quantitative and qualitative dimensions, such as:
how certain X is about what V has done, how much
X cares about it (i.e. how important and intense the
violated motive is); how much harm X wishes to do
to Y; how important this new desire is, how
intense it is, how insistent it is, how long lasting
it is; how much mental disturbance is produced in
X; how much physiological disturbance there is;
which aspects of the state X is aware of; how
many secondary motives and actions are
generated..... ' (Sloman 86:9-10).
Anger without the desire to harm V may be interpreted as
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exasperation, dismay or annoyance. Emotions may be coloured
by secondary emotions, by socially sanctioned emotions that
respond to primary emotions. The emotion strengthens and
holds the new desire in the mind. The strength of the anger and
desire to harm can vary, depending on the strength of belief in
(6a) and the strength of the thwarted desire in (6b). This great
range of possibilities is what can make particular emotions
and feelings so individual. The variations in belief/desire sets
are reflected in the way the emotion is experienced, in the
qualitative character of the emotion. The emotion becomes
much more complex in a wider context, a complexity which has
a corresponding qualitative feel. This is a crucial point in the
consideration of poetic effects, where pragmatic processing
encourages the accessing of a very wide context.
I will now suggest my own brief and sketchy analysis of
'sadness' along the same lines. In order to make the claim in
(8), I would suggest that something like the conditions in (9)
must hold.
(8) X is sad about not V.
(9a) X believes the state of affairs Y to be good or
valuable.
(9b) X desires to (continue to) experience the state of
affairs Y.
(9c) The state of affairs Y is no longer accessible or
available to X for t amount of time.
(9d) X's desire in (9b) is strengthened.
This example may be fleshed out in the following way.
Gorbachev believes that being President is a good and valuable
thing (for him) (9a). Gorbachev desires to go on being President
(9b). Gorbachev believes he is unlikely ever to be President
again (9c). As he entertains these beliefs and desires, his
desire to be President is strengthened (9d). And so Gorbachev
is sad about not being President any more.
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Whereas in Sloman's analysis of 'anger' a new desire was
created, focussed on the violator of an earlier desire, here
there is no new desire, but a strengthening of an earlier
violated desire (9b). It may be the case that this strengthening
involves raising a hitherto unconscious desire to the level of
conscious awareness.
This kind of analysis allows one to make many detailed
distinctions between kinds and degrees of sadness. Different
intensities of sadness are possible depending on the relative
strength of the belief in (9a) and the relative strength of the
desire in (9b). The state of affairs that one values and desires
may be (and perhaps typically is) one in which a person, place,
object or experience is considered valuable (in some sense),
and in which one desires to be in contact (in some sense) with
that person, place, object or experience. The extent to which
one believes the person, place, object or experience to be
valuable will affect the quality of the sadness. The quality of
sadness will depend, as well, on whether it is a person who is
gone, a place one is absent from, an object that is lost or an
experience that is no longer available. Again, different
intensities of sadness are possible depending on the length of
time one is to be separated from the person/place/object/
experience (on how the I slot is completed in (9c)). If a loved
person departs for a weekend that is mildly sad, if for a
summer very sad, if forever extremely sad. Grief is the most
extreme form of sadness: there is absolutely no hope of being
with that person again. The belief in (9a) can be about a state
of affairs believed to be good or valuable by X for some other
person: one can feel sad on behalf of other people. Grief can, in
this sense, be a mixture of personal loss and the sense of
another's loss. There are many other dimensions to sadness,
and many ways in which sadness can mix with or give way to
other emotions.
It was suggested above that example (1), repeated here, evokes
the emotion of sadness and that the verbal repetition in (la)
results in the expression or communication of a greater degree
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of emotion than (ib).
(la) My childhood days are gone, gone.
(1 b) My childhood days are gone.
'My childhood days', like everyone else's childhood days, were
good days because they were carefree and innocent. Those days
have definitely gone, and gone for good, except for the
memories I will always treasure. I am sick of my present
careworn, and far from innocent, existence. I yearn to
experience life as it used to be when it was less complex,
when others did the worrying. I don't always feel like this, of
course, but when I do remember my childhood the desire to
experience those days of carefree innocence is strengthened
and I feel sad. What this example does is set up the
(belief/desire set) conditions for 'sadness'. Childhood is
believed to be valuable. X's desire for the experience that
'childhood' offers - innocence, lack of worry, security, etc. -
can no longer be fulfilled. Concentrating on these beliefs and
desires strengthens the impossible desire to experience that
kind of carefree innocence again.
Compare two other examples discussed in chapter 5 and
repeated here as (10) and (11):
(10) The pubs are closed, closed.
(11) My teenage days are gone, gone.
In (10), pubs are not precious enough, for most people, to evoke
the emotion of sadness. Also the time factor is important: the
pubs will be open again tomorrow morning. Because a
contextual search is initiated which has nowhere to go, the
hearer has no other recourse than to distance himself from the
proposition expressed, which is understood as ridiculous and
possibly as having been ironically intended. In (11) 'teenage
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days' do not have the same stereotypical set of positive
attitudes associated with them as 'childhood'. It is sad that
they have gone, but not as overwhelmingly sad as the fact that
'my childhood days' have gone.
Examples such as (ib) vaguely evoke the emotion and feeling of
sadness because the right conditions apply: the desire for what
childhood represents - security, innocence, lack of worry, and
other good things - is strengthened, as it is recognised that
the experience of childhood can never be attained again. The
emotion and feeling are much stronger in (la) because the
concept CHILDHOOD is much more extensively explored in the
search for an interpretation consistent with the principle of
relevance. Many more assumptions about childhood are
activated and a greater variety of things that are good about
childhood are made more highly salient: there are simply more
reasons and stronger reasons for feeling sad.
6.5.	 Emotions and Attitudes.
Clarifying the different properties of emotional states and the
role they play should help to avoid a certain amount of
confusion in discussing the role of emotion in poetic effects.
An analysis of the cognitive properties of emotions can be used
to show how poetic effects create a wider range of, and
stronger conditions for, evoking the feeling or qualitative
properties of an emotion. But there must be more to say than
this. When poets and literary critics claim that emotion is
central to poetry and poetic effects, what exactly do they
mean? Frustrated British Rail passengers often resort to the
expression of 'emotional concepts', but they do not necessarily
achieve poetic effects when they do so. In section 6.2 I
discussed Rey's notion of emotion as a complex state involving
four distinct properties. Often the term 'emotion' is used
loosely to refer to just one, or several, of these properties.
When Larkin refers to 'emotional concepts', then, perhaps he is
using the term loosely in this way. I will go on to suggest that
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he is, in fact, really interested in the qualitative properties of
emotions.
Before considering this question further, there are a number of
other frequent terminological confusions that need to be
clarified. Sloman (1986) illustrates the inconsistency in the
ordinary usage of such terms as 'emotion'. He suggests that X
might hold at one and the same time that:
(a) X loves her children deeply.
(b) Love is an emotion.
(c) X is not in an emotional state.
The apparent contradiction here can be resolved, Sloman
argues, if we draw a distinction between emotions and
attitudes. An emotion, such as fear or anger, is a temporary
state, a response to some perceived event or state of affairs in
the world. This causes a physiological response and, typically,
also a behavioural and qualitative response. An attitude, such
as love or hate, involves the storage of a belief and/or
phenomenal state in long-term memory, attached to a
conceptual address. In the example above, therefore, the
statement in (b) is the weak link in the argument because love
is an attitude, not an emotion. It is quite possible for the
statements in (a) and (c) to be consistent.
This distinction between emotions and attitudes is useful for
resolving many apparent confusions. It may happen, for
example, that Jane does something that makes John very angry
with her. His emotion, anger, has Jane (or whatever it was that
Jane did) as its object. There may be no contradiction,
however, in arguing that, at that moment, 'John was angry with
Jane' and 'John loved Jane'. Part of the force of King David's
feeling in the quotation from the Bible discussed by Alexander
Smith, is the conflict between his emotion (of anger), directed
at Absalom in the circumstances described in the Bible story,
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and his underlying attitude (of love) towards Absalom that the
emotion had helped to obscure. The force of poetic effects
generally is to provide the wider context which may serve to
clarify and disentangle what may be relatively complex
attitudes.
Whereas an emotion is a temporary response to a situation
involving the creation of a new desire or the strengthening of
an existing desire, an attitude is focussed upon a particular
object. Attitudes may be seen primarily in cognitive terms, as
sets of beliefs. As Sloman argues: 'An attitude, such as love or
admiration, is a collection of beliefs etc. focussed on some
individual, object or idea.' (Sloman 1986:13). These beliefs
would be stored as assumptions in encyclopaedic entries
attached to conceptual addresses, for example, as 'John loves
Jane', 'John hates Jean', or 'John admires Joan'.
It may be that attitudes also have qualitative properties, or
that there is some distinct non-propositional phenomenal
memory store for 'qualitative property memories', just as
there are non-propositional memory stores for iconic or echoic
memories, attached to conceptual addresses. It may be that
both of these possibilities are true: that there are attitude-
beliefs which loosely describe attitude-phenomenal states. If
this is the case what is needed is either an extension of the
notion of encyclopaedic entry, as so far explained, to include
phenomenal memories, or a separate 'phenomenal' entry to
include iconic and echoic (perceptual) memories as well as
phenomenal state attitudes.
There is some support for this idea in Damasio (1989). In
discussing what is activated at a conceptual address, Damasio
includes what Sloman refers to as attitudes. He argues as
follows:
'The presentation of a line drawing of a violin, or
presentation of the word 'violin' (aurally or
orthographically) generates a set of time-locked
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activations of sensory and motor representations.
The activations are generally pertinent to
manipulable man-made objects, more specifically
pertinent to musical instruments of the string
variety, and even more narrowly so to the class of
violins. In the visual realm the perceiver is likely
to evoke representations of shape, motion, color
and texture which will vary from individual to
individual according to the experience of violins
that each has enjoyed. For those who have held
violins in their own hands, or even played a violin,
numerous somatosensory representations will also
be evoked relative to the pressure the instrument
will have exerted in the perceiver's body. But that
is hardly all. Auditory representations of the range
of sounds produced by the instrument may also be
generated; motor programs according to which the
appropriate posture and motions applicable to a
violin can be organised may also be evoked and
readied for appropriate display; finally, a range of
somatic states appropriate to one's experience of
a violin, e.g. like or dislike, pleasurable or painful
sensation, and so on, will also be activated. In
short, a wide array of representations will be
generated that together define the meaning of the
entity momentarily..... ' (Damasio 1989:26).
Damasio is offering an answer to the question what is a
concept? His view is that a concept consists of whatever is
triggered or activated in the mind/brain by some stimulus (a
word, a drawing....). As he describes it in this quotation (and in
further detail in Damasio (1989)), various types of information
are triggered and activated in different parts of the brain.
These types of information include what might be termed a
logical entry, an encyclopaedic entry and 'phenomenal
memories' relating to the senses (the look, the sound, the feel
of a violin) and to what Sloman calls attitude ('like or dislike,
pleasurable or painful sensation').
If a conceptual address does connect to phenomenal memories,
as well as memories in propositional form, what form might
these memories take? Just as Gorbachev's belief/desire set
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for anger (directed at Lukyanov, in the example used to
illustrate Sloman's analysis of anger in the previous section)
had certain qualitative characteristics, so phenomenal
memories may relate in the same way to sets of beliefs and
desires stored in long-term memory. Indeed, attitudes may
derive from remembered emotions. Gorbachev may have
changed his previous attitude of trust to one of hate for
Lukyanov, that hatred being a long-term memory version of the
qualitative feel of his original anger. The attitude would
consist of this belief plus the memory of the qualitative or
phenomenal state that partially constituted his emotional
experience. Such phenomenal memories may be more or less
complex, depending on contextual factors. It may be that for
Gorbachev the mention of Lukyanov's name evokes a
characteristic phenomenal state, which is 'felt as' hatred. In a
wider context - remembering their earlier long friendship -
this phenomenal state may be qualified or become less intense.
It is important to note that these phenomenal memories may be
more or less strong. For some people the phenomenal state
memory attached to the concept 'Stalin' may be stronger than
the phenomenal state memory attached to the concept 'Lenin',
although they may both be the same kind of phenomenal state
memory.
Sloman makes several other basic distinctions, which are
worth mentioning briefly. Mood, like emotion, is temporary,
and can be affected by such things as alcohol, the weather, the
seasons and proximity to the sea. For Sloman mood is
characterised by: 'some kind of global disturbance of, or
disposition to disturb, mental processes.' (Sloman 1986:13). If
someone is in a particular mood they are disposed to actlreact
in certain ways. Moods may be considered as emotions without
objects or without a cognitive cause. Moods may then affect
the beliefs and desires that a person comes to hold. It may be
possible to argue that whereas emotional states are initiated
by cognitive states, moods are initiated by physiological
states.
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Temperament is a more permanent feature of a person's
character. A person may be temperamentally angry, fearful,
sad, joyful (or, as it once was, choleric, phlegmatic,
melancholic or sanguine) etc., in the sense that they have a low
threshold for experiencing such emotions. Temperament may be
seen as a wide-ranging collection of general dispositions to
produce certain goals in specific situations. Some people are
disposed to sadness and others to anger. The former will 'look
for' situations to feel sad in, and this will affect their beliefs.
They will have a tendency to overvalue and possibly
sentimentalise certain situations. The latter will look for
situations to feel angry in and will tend, for example, to judge
the innocent actions of others to be (or to have been)
intentionally designed to frustrate. Emotions as responses to
actual states of affairs are rational and functional;
temperament and mood can make emotions irrational and
dysfunctional. They encourage misrepresentation, as beliefs
are adjusted to conform to and justify pre-existing mood or
temperament.
Returning to the question as to what poets and critics intend
by the use of the term 'emotion', one possible answer is that
they mean 'attitude' as defined here. It may be the case that it
is, in particular, the qualitative or phenomenal memories that
they are keen to evoke, and that it is a phenomenal state that
they are intent on communicating. Larkin's 'emotional concept'
and Heaney's 'feeling' could both be reinterpreted as
phenomenal state attitudes.
As has been noted, language is regularly used to express
standard emotional responses to situations. The expression
'Bloody trains!' communicates that there is some fact about
some trains that the speaker is angry about. Forms of abuse
like 'Fascist!' or 'Bastard!' are not used with the intention that
the hearer should come to access a set of assumptions about
fascists or bastards in order to apply them to the person
referred to (perhaps the hearer himself). They are intended to
evoke some standard or stereotypical phenomenal state
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attitude stored at the conceptual address of FASCIST or
BASTARD. This memory is used directly to convey a current
emotional response. (It is interesting that in word-recognition
tasks subjects typically respond significantly more slowly to
such 'emotionally-charged' words.)
The kind of phenomenal states that poets wish to communicate
are non-standard and non-stereotypical; they are not easily
accessed directly from phenomenal memory, but are
constructed within a context that uses phenomenal memories
from a variety of sources. This point will be developed in
Chapter 7, but I will give one example here. When he wrote his
poem, On First Looking into Chapman's Homer, Keats was
describing an actual (emotional) experience. He attempts to
communicate the qualitative feel of his experience (the
qualitative aspect of his emotion) by evoking analogous
phenomenal memories. The reader has to imagine (create the
phenomenal tone of) what it must have been like for Cortez and
his men to suddenly catch sight of the Pacific Ocean for the
first time. One way in which the reader is helped to do this is
by Keats' use of metrical variation. In Chapter 5 I argued that
the trochaic substitutions at the beginning of the final two
lines allow extra time and effort to be spent on processing the
concepts LOOK and SILENT. What I might now add to that
analysis is the suggestion that the extra contextual
exploration is partially, if not mainly, spent on evoking
phenomenal memories which can be used to evoke the wider
sense of rapture that Cortez must have felt. This feeling, or
phenomenal state, is then transferred to the feeling of what it
was like for Keats to discover Chapman's Homer. No doubt it is
altered in some respects as it is transferred, mainly as a
result of the reader drawing upon his own phenomenal
memories relating to similar discoveries of works of
literature. Rhetorical devices and verse features are used to
encourage a more extensive exploration of context and an
evocation of phenomenal state attitudes, which are then used
to communicate a particular phenomenal state, relating to a
particular experience.
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It is a commonly noted feature of metaphor that it typically
consists of a concrete vehicle and an abstract tenor or focus.
For poetic metaphor it is often the case that a perceptual
memory is used to evoke a phenomenal state attitude. In the
lines from Shakespeare's Macbeth, discussed in Chapter 4, the
unusual experience of Macbeth's sense of obsessive guilt for
the murders he has committed is obtained via the familiar
feeling of something sticking to one's hands. It is as though
such metaphors (extremely common throughout Shakespeare)
appeal to a kind of synaesthesia that connects perceptual
memories to phenomenal state memories. Here there is
something that having things sticking to one's hands feels like
which is similar to what Macbeth's guilt felt like as Birnam
Wood was about to approach.
I will consider one or two simpler, less creative, cases of
metaphor here. Why is (12) (relatively) poetic and (13) not
poetic?
(12) My love is like a red, red rose.
(13) My love is very beautiful.
According to the account developed in Chapter 4, we explore
the encyclopaedic entry attached to the concept ROSE and
derive assumptions of the kind that a rose is beautiful,
delicate and fragrant. We then derive implicatures of the kind
that 'my love' (the poet's love) is beautiful, delicate and
fragrant. This analysis seems inadequate, however: although
this may not be an extremely rich poetic metaphor, it is a lot
richer than this implicature analysis would seem to suggest.
One way of enriching it is to appeal to phenomenal state
attitudes. The experience of a rose (the way it looks and
smells, for instance) feels like something. The feeling evoked
by 'my love' is created by analogy with this feeling.
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Even conventional metaphors can be evocative, in a similar
way, but to a much more modest degree. Consider again an
example discussed earlier, repeated here as (14) and (15).
(14) He was burning with anger.
(1 5) He was extremely angry.
It is difficult to give a fully convincing account of (14) in
terms of the implicatures communicated after activating
contextual assumptions stored at the encyclopaedic entry of
the concept BURN. The marked stylistic difference between
(14) and (15) can perhaps, at least partially, be explained in
terms of the phenomenal quality attaching to anger in (14) that
comes from the concept BURN. The feeling of burning is used to
communicate the feeling of the anger. There is something that
it is like to burn, which is similar to what it is like to be
angry.
Returning to the previous example, there is, similarly,
something that it is like to experience a rose - a red, red, rose
- that is similar to what it is like to experience 'my love'. In
working out what this is, of course, the reader has to use his
experience (memories of the qualitative feel) of being in love:
horticultural expertise would not be sufficient. These kind of
comparisons force one to concentrate on what it is like to
experience a red rose and to focus on how the experience of
someone's love might be a similar kind of experience. The
extension of experience encouraged here involves making more
salient (and enriching) not thoughts (as propositional forms, or
sets of propositional forms), but phenomenal state attitudes.
6.6.	 On Sentimentality.
I suggested in Chapter 5 that there was a problem with
example (1), that because there is a stereotyped notion that
childhood days are cosy, rosy and innocent, this prevents a true
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exploration of the concept CHILDHOOD. In Chapter 4 I argued
(following and adapting an argument in Sperber 1985) that
certain sets of assumptions are stored not as factual
assumptions but as metarepresented beliefs stored under some
descriptive comment. For an ethologist 'gorillas are sensitive'
would be a factual assumption, while 'gorillas are aggressive'
would be stored differently, as a metarepresented assumption.
Apparently contradictory assumptions can be stored in the
same encyclopaedic entry if one is a factual assumption and
the other is a metarepresented assumption. The concept
CHILDHOOD clearly has a rich metarepresented entry,
corresponding to a culturally endorsed view of childhood. (In
fact, this concept probably has several metarepresented
entries for many people.) It is the metarepresented chunk of
assumptions ('childhood is a time of innocence', etc.) that
enables the appropriate belief-desire set for sadness to be
constructed in example (1). Because these assumptions are
based upon a cultural stereotype they may not reflect
individual experience. The emotion evoked by this stereotype
is, therefore, a culturally endorsed emotion: it is the emotion
that everyone is supposed to feel. The warm, cosy, affectionate
feeling is one we may slip into and even enjoy on occasion, but
it is otherwise recognised to be something false and
sentimental. It only works if we accept beliefs about children
and childhood that, personally, we are not wholly committed
to. It is this falseness, I would argue, based on the recognition
that the set of assumptions used is a metarepresented cultural
stereotype, that 'feels like' sentimentality.
Richards (1929) concluded, after his experiment in practical
criticism, that the word 'sentimental' was 'one of the most
overworked words in the whole vocabulary of literary
criticism' (Richards 1929:256), it being 'among the politer
terms of abuse' (op. cit.:255). Richards' discussion of
sentimentality included the idea that 'a person may be said to
be sentimental when his emotions are too easily stirred, too
light on the trigger' (op. cit.:258), and the idea that
sentimentality is false and occurs when a response is too
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great or inappropriate for the occasion.
If the metarepresented set of assumptions is easily accessed,
then the attitude associated with them is also easily accessed.
A sentimental response is 'too easily stirred', therefore,
because it is associated with a metarepresented set of
assumptions. The strength of the belief that childhood is 'good'
and 'valuable' (based on the strength of the 'attitude' or
phenomenal memory stored at the encyclopaedic entry for
'metarepresented' childhood) is greater than that we would
allow it based on our experience of our own and others'
childhoods. It is a much simpler view of childhood based on a
narrowed-down context and, once generally accepted, it is
easier to use in communication. Metarepresentation provides
stability across contexts and ease of access for
metarepresented thoughts and feelings. It may give rise to the
communication of different kinds of stock, false, 'easily
stirred' form of emotion.
The sentimentality can be indulged and enjoyed even if, in
clearer and more honest moments, one recognises the falsity
of the beliefs that give rise to it. Epiphanies can be lonely;
sentimentality, on the other hand, is cosy and intimate. It is
commonly recognised that knowing what one really feels is
just as difficult, if not more so, as knowing what one really
thinks. It is so much easier to think and feel what one is
supposed to think and feel. It is also recognised that one of the
aims of literary communication is precisely to clarify what it
is one does feel, to sort out true from false feeling and seek to
avoid sentimentality and other stock emotions. There is an
alternative kind of pleasure in expressing and communicating a
genuine contextually enriched feeling or attitude accurately.
The 'Absalom' example, like example (1), might appear to be
sentimental out of context. in the context created by the
section of the Bible where it occurs it is both emotional and
poetic, or, as Alexander Smith claimed, poetic because full of
emotion. For it to have its full force, one has to have access to
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this wider context, a point made in the discussion of this
example in Chapter 5. The feeling evoked here is one of grief,
an extreme and intense form of sadness. It is also mixed with
other emotions, such as self-directed anger. It was David
himself, on an earlier occasion, who had violated one of his
own desires. The context enables a particular father/son
relationship to be explored in this instance; the emotion and
feeling, in consequence, are complex and genuine.
6.7.	 Conclusion.
Any account of poetic effects or literariness must include an
account of affective communication. The common claim is that
there is a direct link between poetic effects and emotion, that
poetic effects characteristically express or communicate
emotional states. This claim may result in a great deal of
confusion and imprecision. It is necessary to distinguish
emotion from attitude, mood and temperament (as in Sloman
1986; 1987), and to distinguish the various properties of
emotional states (as in Rey 1980). Having done this it is
possible to engage in detailed analyses of emotional states, by
concentrating on their cognitive properties, analysing them in
terms of belief/desire sets.
Affective states are communicated by setting up the belief/
desire sets that correspond to the cognitive properties for a
particular emotion. These states are heightened in the
communication of poetic effects by contextual exploration
which makes more of the appropriate conditions available and
makes them more highly salient.
I also argued that attitudes as phenomenal state memories are
triggered or evoked by rhetorical figures and verse features.
The more thorough exploration of context that rhetorical
devices and verse may encourage also activates a phenomenal
memory store (containing memories of the qualitative aspects
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of emotional states).
phenomenal states that
effects are not relevan
information, but insofar
aspects of experience.
It is the communication of such
is central to poetic effects. Poetic
insofar as they communicate new
as they communicate phenomenal
Just as it is possible to have metarepresented chunks of
information that do not necessarily correspond to real states
of affairs, and which are stored separately from factual
assumptions, so it is possible to have metarepresented
culturally endorsed stock attitudes. Metarepresented sets of
assumptions and attitudes allow for ease of access
(minimising processing costs) and a degree of stability. They
rely on narrow contexts: if you senhimentalise a situation, you
emphasise its good points and block out its bad points. Any
honest acceptance of the latter might complicate your
attitude. The feelings communicated by, say, sentimental,
horror, gore or adventure films are strong but simple. Such
films - and the same goes for any art-form - simplify things-
as-they-really-are in order to gain quick access to stock
attitudes which allow emotions to be communicated strongly
and clearly. The point of poetic effects, and literariness more
generally, on the other hand, is to broaden context, and make
both thoughts and feelings more precise with regard to actual
situations or states of affairs.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
VARIETIES OF AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE.
'It can be seen that Julien had no experience of life; he had not
even read any novels.'
Stendahi. The Scarlet and the Black.
7.1.	 Introduction: What is communicated?.
The question what is communicated? is one of the first
questions raised in Sperber and Wilson (1986a:1). It is an
important question because there is always the danger in
pragmatic theory of failing to notice, or conveniently ignoring,
the fact that language is used to communicate more than
propositional attitudes. Sperber and Wilson use a variety of
terms, such as 'impressions', 'images' and 'affect', for what it
is that may be communicated nonpropositionally. It may be
difficult to be precise about the nature or different types of
nonpropositional effects that are communicated, but a
comprehensive theory of communication should not simply
ignore them.
The importance of this question to the discussion of literary
communication was emphasised in Chapter 6, where it was
suggested that the communication of 'qualitative feels' or
phenomenal states were central to poetic effects. The problem
is: how can these non-propositional effects be handled by a
theory of verbal communication? Theory-construction can only
take place where discrete objects enter into causal
relationships with other objects on the basis of clearly
definable and distinguishable properties. Propositions are
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suitable objects for pragmatic theory because they have
structural and logical properties that allow them to interact
with other propositions, and other objects with similar
properties (such as logical forms), in predictable ways. An
explanatory cognitive pragmatic theory produces hypotheses
that make predictions about the relationship between semantic
representations, nonhinguistic context and full propositional
forms. These are all objects over which inference can operate.
But, as Sperber and Wilson (1986: 57) argue: 'No one has any
clear idea how inference might operate over non-propositional
objects: say, over images, impressions or emotions.' Affect (or
phenomenal state attitudes, or 'emotional qualia') does not
consist of discrete objects (affective representations?) with
clearly definable and distinguishable properties that enable
them to enter into predictable relationships with other
objects. Affect is vague, subjective, and possibly even
epiphenomenal. The most convenient answer to the question
'what is communicated?' from the point of view of pragmatic
theory is thus: 'propositions and propositional attitudes'.
Nonpropositional effects would seem to be highly embarrassing
phenomena for a pragmatic theory to handle.
This problem cannot be avoided because literary
communication is centrally concerned with affect, with the
communication of phenomenal experience. The poet's central
problem, as Seamus Heaney (1980) phrased it in the title of
one of his essays, is one of putting 'feelings into words'. By
this Heaney clearly is not referring to the communication of
thoughts about feelings. (For example, if I tell you that 'I feel
angst-ridden', I communicate a thought about my feeling,
rather than the feeling itself.) He is referring to the
communication of feelings themselves: the reader experiences
the feeling that the writer intends to communicate. But this is
a problem for anyone who uses language poetically or
rhetorically.
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7.2. Mutual affect.
In chapters 4 and 5 the poetic effects communicated by poetic
metaphor and poetic epizeuxis were characterised in terms of
a wide array of assumptions which are simultaneously made
marginally more salient, and which are communicated as weak
implicatures or as assumptions contributing to the formation
of new ad hoc concepts. The accessing of these assumptions
can be explained in terms of the search for an interpretation
consistent with the principle of relevance. If, as has been
claimed, affective communication is central to poetic effects,
one possible conclusion is that the account of poetic effects
developed in chapters 4 and 5 is incomplete, but necessarily so
because pragmatic theory can only deal with the
communication of propositional forms.
This problem is addressed in Sperber and Wilson (1986a) as
part of their discussion of poetic effects. The proposal is that
nonpropositional effects can be accounted for in terms of a
certain kind of propositional effect:
'How do poetic effects affect the mutual cognitive
environment of speaker and hearer? They do not
add entirely new assumptions which are strongly
manifest in this environment. Instead, they
marginally increase the manifestness of a great
many weakly manifest assumptions. In other
words, poetic effects create common impressions
rather than common knowledge. Utterances with
poetic effects can be used precisely to create this
sense of apparently affective rather than cognitive
mutuality. What we are suggesting is that, if you
look at these affective effects through the
microscope of relevance theory, you see a wide
array of minute cognitive effects.' (Sperber and
Wilson 1 986a:224).
This account of affective mutuality might form the basis of a
more general account of aesthetic experience, as Fabb (1992)
suggests. Using a distinction from Goodman (1968), Fabb
argues that literary critics have either had recourse to clear
and verifiable articulate schemas to describe aspects of
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literary texts, or dense schemas. Articulate schemas would
include rhyme schemes, metrical patterns and stanza
organisation, as well as the patterns of linguistic and
discourse features applied to texts by current work in
stylistics. Critics and stylisticians are always looking for new
articulate schemas that they can apply to texts, new ways of
describing texts in clear and verifiable ways. Dense schemas,
on the other hand, describe the experience of reading literary
texts by means of metaphor and analogy (a poem as an organic
body, for example) rather than direct description. (As a further
illustration of the difference, 'time' might be described either
in terms of articulate or dense schemas: it might be measured
in days, hours, minutes, seconds and milliseconds; it might be
described as 'flowing' like a current of water, or 'hurrying'
like a winged chariot.)
Although articulate schemas can be used to describe aspects of
literary texts, there remains a general sense that what is
centrally, or intrinsically, literary about what these texts
communicate gets left out of account. (To some extent this
may always be a problem of imposing articulate schemas on
'dense' phenomena: guidelines for measuring teaching quality
might serve as an example.) Fabb uses the term Response to
cover phenomena such as emotional responses, evaluative
attitudes, impressions of intensity, profundity, sublimity,
awareness of epiphanies, poetic experience and aesthetic
pleasure. These, he claims, are all 'real cognitive activities
stimulated by a text', which cannot, it seems, be adequately
described in terms of articulate schemas. Critics use
articulate schemas to describe peripheral aspects of literary
texts and dense schemas to allude to Response.
Fabb then argues that the relevance theory account of poetic
effects indicates a way of dealing with Response in cognitive
terms; it also shows why it can never be described in terms of
articulate descriptive schemas. Response is to be explained in
terms of the relevance theory account of poetic effects, i.e. in
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terms of a process whereby a wide array of assumptions are
made marginally more salient. Marginal variations in salience
are a matter of degree rather than something that can be
precisely measured and captured in terms of an articulate
schema.
In this account Response as aesthetic experience is a term that
may be used to describe the monitoring of characteristic
electrochemical activity in the brain: the wide-ranging
contextual exploration that characterises poetic effects
produces a particular kind of brain activity which simply has
'the feel' of aesthetic experience.
I would like to consider one other recent discussion of the
communication of nonpropositional effects here (such
discussions being somewhat rare). Gibbs (1989) is interested
in what he terms 'intimacy effects'. One of his main examples
is the exchange in (1):
(1) Rob: Does Gladys have a good memory?
Denise: Gladys is just like an elephant.
Gibbs comments:
'Why does Denise respond to Rob's question with a
metaphorical assertion, and not a simple, literal
statement? We assume that Denise wants Rob to
use his encyclopaedic knowledge of elephants,
including, let's suppose, the folklore that
elephants are reputed to have excellent memories.
With this information, Rob could infer that 'Gladys
has a very good memory'. Although Denise expects
Rob to recover the implicature that 'Gladys has a
very good memory', and all the implications from
it that Rob might be interested in (i.e. regarding
Gladys's phenomenal memory powers), it would be
unusual if this implicature is all Denise expected
Rob to infer. After all, Denise could have explicitly
stated, Gladys has a very good memory, in response
to Rob's question.' (Gibbs 1989:249-250).
The answer, Gibbs suggests, is that metaphor 'often
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presupposes and reinforces an intimacy between speaker and
listener, the cultivation of which is, perhaps, the primary
function of such language.' Maybe, he suggests, Denise and Rob
share assumptions about Gladys's size, these reinforcing
Denise's intention 'to achieve a mutuality, a sense of intimacy
or complicity.' In conclusion, 'it is the recovery of these
nonpropositional, sometimes poetic effects that makes
metaphor seem so different from so-called literal language.'
(Gibbs 1989:250).
Other kinds of non-literal language, Gibbs claims, seem special
in a similar way - sarcasm, for example, and metonymy. He
argues that the metonymic utterance in (2) 'creates similar
affective import':
(2) The ham sandwich is getting impatient for his check.
Gibbs finds support for this idea in Cohen (1979). It is odd that
Gibbs should appeal to Cohen's article for support given
Cohen's argument that 'an appreciator of a metaphor must do
two things: he must realize that the expression is a metaphor,
and he must figure out the point of the expression.' (Cohen
1979:6). Gibbs has elsewhere argued against the view that the
trope-type must be identified before the trope-token can be
interpreted. This point aside, Cohen's general argument is that
interlocutors can share a sense of intimacy through the use of
figurative language that depends for its interpretation on a
shared range of background assumptions. Cohen adds jokes to
the list of language uses that, like metaphor, can 'acknowledge
a community' and 'establish intimacy'. The creator and
appreciator of a metaphor or a joke, in this view, are drawn
closer together by the recognition that they belong to a group
(maybe only of two) that shares an exclusive set of common
background assumptions.
It is interesting that Gibbs should raise this issue and try to
account for stylistic intuitions about the expressive power of
metaphor which have generally been ignored. The claim that
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intimacy effects are a distinguishing characteristic of
metaphor or other types of non-literal language use, however,
is somewhat dubious, as is the idea that 'various
nonpropositional aesthetic meanings' are typical of non-literal
language use.
It is strange to relate the term 'aesthetic meanings' to non-
literal language use. The point about non-literal language is
that it can be used to communicate a wide range of stylistic
effects. Some metaphors communicate poetic (or 'aesthetic')
effects; many do not.
The argument about intimacy is essentially an argument about
one general aspect of style that marks the relationship
between communicator and addressee. Intimacy as an appeal to
shared background assumptions is an extremely important
contributor to style that affects decisions about what should
be made explicit and what should be left implicit. (For
discussion of this point see Sperber and Wilson, 1986a:
Chapter 4.6; Blakemore, 1989). This aspect of style is,
however, neither peculiar to metaphorical use (or non-literal
use generally), nor is it necessarily typical of it.
Whatever the problems with Gibbs' argument as it applies to
non-literal language use, it does suggest a way in which
nonpropositional effects may be explained in propositional
terms. The feeling of intimacy, which is nonpropositional,
derives from the wider use of mutually manifest contextual
information to construct the proposition expressed and to
extend the effects of that proposition in context. (Gibbs would
not use the term 'mutual manifestness', but his notion of
intimacy is based on contextual assumptions being mutual in
some sense.) Having a wide mutual context makes it easier for
communicator and addressee to communicate and to be
confident that the communication will be successful. The ready
accessibility of contextual assumptions means that the
communicator need not be so explicit (need not encode so
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much) and that the addressee is able to rely more on
inferencing (and not so much on decoding). The reduction in
effort (however minimal) and the reliance on a wide range of
mutually manifest contextual assumptions (for use in
inference to create a potentially wider range of contextual
effects in the time available) will be accompanied by
characteristic brain activity which may be monitored and
'experienced' or 'felt' as intimacy. (I am not arguing that there
is a characteristic brain activity for intimacy effects, which
may be monitored: only that the intuitions that Gibbs is trying
to account for could be explained in this way. In any case,
intimacy effects are distinct from aesthetic effects, so if
there is a characteristic brain activity for intimacy effects it
will be a different kind of brain activity than that for
aesthetic effects.)
A similar point may be made for what happens in the case of
humour. The interpretation of jokes, for example, typically
involves a contextual garden-pathing: jokes encourage the
addressee to access a range of contextual assumptions, only to
finally reject them in favour of a new set of assumptions. The
re-interpretation, involving a sudden burst of processing
activity as new context is accessed, produces a special kind of
brain activity, which may be monitored and 'experienced' or
'felt' as humour. A further more dramatic physical reaction
may sometimes ensue - laughter.
Bringing together the points made in this section, poetic
effects result from a special kind of mental processing - a
wide-ranging activation and accessing of contextual
assumptions, triggered by the search for an interpretation
consistent with the principle of relevance. This pragmatic
processing - which can be at least as dramatic as the
different, but equally special, pragmatic processing that
occurs in the interpretation of jokes - produces a special kind
of brain activity which is experienced as aesthetic response. In
more extreme cases aesthetic response can be accompanied by
a marked physiological reaction such as a shiver down the
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spine, a constriction of the throat or a bristling of the hair.
This account of poetic effects, in terms of pragmatic
processing leaves a number of important questions
unanswered. What is the nature of the 'feeling' that
accompanies such cognitive activity/ brain activity? What
does it mean to talk of 'feeling'? Can a more precise account
be given of this rather vague, but seemingly necessary, word?
What 'qualitative feel' is common to all poetic effects and
what distinguishes the 'feel' of different poetic effects? How
do poetic effects relate to aesthetic effects in general? (We
cannot talk of wide arrays of implicatures, for example, in the
cases of paintings or music). I will address these questions in
the rest of this chapter and in Chapter 8.
7.3 Qualia and Consciousness.
'We will never understand what philosophers call 'qualia'.'
Francis Crick. Quoted in The Independent, 23rd May, !994.
The main concern of literary art, as of all art, is the accurate
expression and communication of the qualitative or phenomenal
aspects of experience. Rey (1980) used the term 'emotional
qualia' to refer to the qualitative aspects of emotional states.
I will extend the notion of qualia in the direction suggested by
Rey and use the term 'aesthetic qua/ia' to refer to the
qualitative aspects of aesthetic experience and of poetic
effects more specifically. Before developing the notion of
aesthetic qualia in the next section, it is first necessary to
consider the more fundamental notion of 'qualia' as it is
discussed and debated in the philosophy of mind literature.
There are many phrases used to paraphrase or define the term
'qualia': it refers to the phenomenal or qualitative aspects of
experiences, to the 'raw feel' of experience, or to 'what it is
like' to have particular experiences. The phrase 'what it is like
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to....' was popularised by Nagel's article What is it like to be a
bat? (Nagel 1974). Much of the discussion of qualia
concentrates on perceptions and sensations, on what it is like
to see the colour red, for example, or what it is like to have a
headache. Other issues are raised by considering the broader
issue of what it is like to be a member of another species, a
bat for example. What that something is is impossible for a
human being to imagine, however much it is possible to know
about bat physiology, bat behaviour or bat brains.
The debate that the notion of qualia gives rise to can be briefly
illustrated by looking at the following two frequently cited
problems. One is known as 'the inverted qualia problem'. We
might agree on using the term 'red' to describe object A, and
the term 'green' to describe object B, but we could never be
sure, given the purely subjective nature of such experience,
whether my experience of what it is like to see red, is not your
experience of what it is like to see green, and vice versa. There
is no third person perspective we can take on 'redness' or
'greenness' as phenomenal experiences. Another way of putting
this is that there is no is/seems distinction. There is no way
of knowing whether a particular quale of yours in response to a
simple stimulus is identical to a quale of mine in response to
that same stimulus. The problem here is that, given the
subjective nature of qualia, can anything interesting ever be
known or said about them?
Another problem is known as 'the absent qualia problem'. A
machine may process information in an apparently rational
way. Though there is a sense in which the machine thinks, it is
not aware of having thoughts. A chess computer, for instance,
manages to play a game of chess, but it does not experience the
game of chess as its human opponent does. It follows that
rational thought, even rational behaviour, is not evidence that
a thinking creature experiences qualia. Qualia seem to be; but
are they? The problem here is that, given that machines
(including brains) can process information perfectly well
without qualia, do we need to bother about them in explaining
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how minds work? Aren't they just an epiphenomenal extra?
Many people think that qualia are important and cannot be
ignored. They often cite the following story (originally told in
Jackson (1982)) to support this view. Jackson's point is to
show that knowing 'what it is like' to have an experience is
distinct from the position of knowing everything there is to
know objectively about the nature of that experience. The story
goes as follows. Mary is a brilliant scientist who has spent her
life shut up in a strictly controlled room displaying only
various shades of black, white and grey. She has become the
world's greatest expert on the physics, chemistry and biology
of the visual experience of colour. She knows, for example,
about retinas and the interplay of retinal cones, that each
experience of a particular type of colour or shade is produced
by unique ratios of activity in the cones. Were Mary to be
released from the room, however, she would discover
something about the visual experience of colour that she did
not already know: she would discover 'what it is like' to see
red, blue and green. It follows that there are some facts about
colour experience which cannot be known by the natural
sciences.
The qualia issue is hotly debated by philosophers of mind. The
main problem is one of how qualia can fit into a functionalist
and materialist view of mind (which is a version of the
problem of how nonpropositional effects can be accounted for
within pragmatic theory.) There are three basic positions
adopted by philosophers of mind with regard to qualia: (I) a
compatibilist position, combining the belief that there are
qualia with an adherence to a functionalist and materialist
view of mind; (ii) an incompatibilist position that accepts
qualia and sees this acceptance as a challenge to or rejection
of functionalist/materialist positions; (iii) an incompatibilist
view that rejects qualia in the defence of functionalist and
materialist positions. (See Shoemaker (1991) for a succinct
summary of these various positions.)
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states of matter to
the mental must
the supervenience
physical properties
brain states entail
The main worry about qualia is how they fit into a broader
picture of the mind. I will take one step back at this point to
raise some other general philosophy of mind issues in order to
provide some perspective on the qualia issue. Dualism and
panpsychism aside, philosophy of mind is chiefly concerned
with the problem of describing the properties of minds and
trying to explain how it is that material brains can come to
have these nonphysical properties. According to Fodor, taking
the view that thinking creatures are 'material through and
through' raises three major questions: '1. How could anything
material be conscious? 2. How could anything material be
about anything? 3. How could anything material be rational?'
(Fodor 1992:5).
The third of these questions is the one that (following Turing)
it is now widely believed can be answered within a theoretical
cognitive science framework. Material states of machines (of
whatever kind) may correspond to symbols having semantic
content. Changes of states can be driven purely by the material
properties of symbols. A certain material state of the machine,
corresponding to one set of symbols, will cause another
material state of the machine, corresponding to a different set
of symbols. As these symbols have a semantic content, the
machine by changing state and manipulating symbols also
manipulates semantic content and can be designed to do this in
a rational way. Just as an appropriately programmed computer
is a machine that displays rationality, so the human mind is a
similar kind of machine, where electrochemical changes in
brain states, rather than, say, electrical conductivity, display
rationality. Rationality, in other words, can be a property of
material entities.
It is generally assumed that for physical
have these kinds of mental property,
supervene on the physical. According to
thesis mental properties cannot vary while
remain constant. In other words, identical
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identical mental states, but not vice versa. As supervenience
is one-way dependence, no identity of mental-type properties
and physical-type properties is implied.
The mental and material are linked by causal role. A given
brain state determines a mental property if and only if the
brain state has the causal role definitive of the supervening
mental property. While this explains how brains can process
information, it does not explain how this information is about
things in this or some other possible world. Nor does it explain
how we can be aware of this information. Mental states not
only interact rationally with other mental states, they refer
outwards to states of affairs in the world. They may also have
qualitative properties. Functionalist accounts of mind may
offer an explanation of rational information processing, but
they cannot, it seems, account for other important mental
properties. In particular, as I shall argue, they cannot account
for those mental properties that are central to aesthetic
experience.
What does it mean to say that symbols have semantic content?
This question is a version of Fodor's second question - the
question of aboutness or intentionality, otherwise known as
Brentano's problem. How could a set of symbols, or a brain
state, be about states of affairs out there in the world?
Brentano, in fact, pointed out that things are much more
complicated than that last question would suggest. Beliefs
(and desires) can be about things that do not even exist. We can
have beliefs about ghosts, or about Madame Bovary. Beliefs can
also be about other beliefs or desires. The property of
intentionality is one that is peculiar to minds. Clearly
Brentano's thesis, that mind facts are not reducible to brain
facts (how can matter be about things?) represents the
strongest possible challenge to the strong materialist position
that holds that facts about mental states are identical to facts
about brain states. Philosophers are, however, beginning to
suggest ways in which this second question may be answered
by developing theories of content (for example, Fodor himself
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in Fodor (1990)).
Fodor's first question is, in his own view, the most
problematic. As Fodor himself puts it:
'Nobody has the slightest idea how anything
material could be conscious. Nobody even knows
what it would be like to have the slightest idea
about how anything material could be conscious. So
much for the theory of consciousness.' (Fodor
1992: 5)
Consciousness is a property of mind that is clearly humanly
interesting; it is not, perhaps, Fodor suggests, a property that
is scientifically interesting. To put this another way:
consciousness matters to us as human beings - it probably
matters more than anything else; it may, however, because of
its subjective nature, be something that we cannot ever get to
have interesting theories about.
It should be noted that this is becoming a contentious point.
There are not only philosophers, but also psychologists who
think that, while it may be the case that nobody knows what it
is like for something material to be conscious, there are
aspects of consciousness that can be fruitfully researched.
Marcel (1988:121), for example, argues that:
'reference to consciousness in psychological
science is demanded, legitimate, and necessary. It
is demanded since consciousness is a central (if
not the central) aspect of mental life. It is
legitimate since there are as reasonable grounds
for identifying consciousness as there are for
identifying other psychological constructs. It is
necessary since it has explanatory value, and since
there are grounds for positing that it has causal
status.' (Marcel 1988:121).
Assuming the qualia issue to be part of the problem of
consciousness, I will simply point out that reference to qualia
is demanded since it is a central (if not the central) aspect
of poetic effects and aesthetic experience.
Current discussions of consciousness do not usually treat
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consciousness as a unitary phenomenon. We can have access to
and be conscious of certain of our thoughts. We can also be
conscious of qualitative states, of itches, tickles, the redness
of red and what it is like to be sad. The qualia problem is a
part of the problem of consciousness: how mere matter can
have qualitative properties is part of the broader problem as to
how mere matter can be conscious at all.
Nagel (1974) regards qualia as important and would like to
have a theory of them, but concludes that such a theory is
impossible. He argues that qualitative or phenomenal
properties of mind, by their very nature, elude a treatment in
physicalist or materialist terms:
'If physicalism is to be defended, the
phenomenological features must themselves be
given a physical account. But when we examine
their subjective character it seems that such a
result is impossible. The reason is that every
subjective phenomenon is essentially connected
with a single point of view, and it seems
inevitable that an objective, physical theory will
abandon that point of view.' (Nagel 1974:176).
He goes on to argue that there is a 'dialectically relevant
difference between phenomenological facts and physical or
neurophysiological facts.' The latter can be studied as
objective facts open to third-person perspective; the
phenomenological character of experience cannot be studied in
the same way, as it is only available to a first-person
perspective.
The argument that phenomenal awareness, and consciousness
more generally, are beyond our comprehension, and hence
beyond the bounds of theory, may make use of the notion of
epistemic boundedness. Everyone would agree that there is just
so much that a frog can understand about the world, however
much it tries. A frog certainly cannot understand the world as
a human does. Its input systems limit what the frog actually
sees and hears; it has no language with which to develop and
communicate thoughts; it lacks the rich array of concepts that
humans are able to employ in thought; it is unable to
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metarepresent beliefs and desires. The sad thing (for the frog)
is that there is nothing it can do about this situation: the
mind/brain of the frog is epistemically bounded in a variety of
ways which makes its understanding of the world fall short of
human understanding.
Humans are also likely to be epistemically bounded. The
epistemic boundedness thesis involves the idea that there are,
as Fodor puts it: 'endogenously determined constraints on our
mental capacity........on the beliefs that we can entertain'.
(Fodor 1983:120). Certain concepts, certain thoughts may
simply be beyond the capabilities of our mind/brains. It may
even be that phenomenal consciousness, like free will, is
something we will just never get a grasp of. In the evocative
phrase used by Nagel 'the world extends beyond the reach of
our minds.' (Nagel 1986:90). (For further discussions of
epistemic boundedness see Chomsky 1988:147-151; Fodor
1983:120-126).
Those who hold the view that consciousness remains an
insurmountable problem for a science of the mind take the
view (known as the emergence thesis) that consciousness must
have emerged from matter when matter reached a certain level
and type of organisation. (See, for example, McGinn's account
of his dialogue with extraterrestrial philosophers in McGinn
(1993).) In the beginning there were just lumps of matter,
obeying the laws of physics. Then in (at least) one odd corner
of the universe some of these lumps developed into living
organisms. Later, some of these living lumps developed
consciousness: they got to know what it was like to be the kind
of lumps of matter that they were. Later still, when what it
was like to be the kinds of lumps of matter that they were
became a lot more complex, art was invented to explore this
complexity.
The question for philosophy is why did some lumps of matter
get to be conscious and not others? Also, what was it about
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the former lumps that allowed them to get to be conscious?
Some philosophers seek to demystify the problem by treating
qualia and consciousness as epiphenomenal (for example,
Dennett 1993). Such 'demystifiers' believe it is possible to get
on with cognitive science without bothering too much about
qualia. 'Mysterians', on the other hand, believe that the failure
to explain qualia and consciousness, including the failure to
explain how mere matter got to be conscious, presents a
serious obstac'e. Whether it will always remain an obstacle is
debatable. Nagel makes the following suggestion:
'The strange truth seems to be that certain
complex, biologically generated physical systems,
of which each of us is an example, have rich
nonphysical properties. An integrated theory of
reality must account for this, and I believe that if
and when it arrives, probably not for centuries, it
will alter our conception of the universe as
radically as anything has to date.' (Nagel 1986:51).
If it is possible to conduct research into aspects of qualia/
consciousness then one interesting question to pursue must be
the issue of what mental representations and processes need
to be conscious. The point of the absent qualia problem is that
consciousness is not generally necessary for intelligent
behaviour. In fact most of the information processing that goes
on in our minds is unconscious. The mental representations and
mental processing taking place in our input modules are clearly
inaccessible to consciousness. Much of our thinking to do with
acquired skills does not need to be conscious, though a lot of it
that isn't could be (e.g. driving, playing tennis). The interesting
thing about such activities is that if we do stop to think about
the mechanics of what we are doing then we start to make
mistakes. The other interesting thing is that we only need to
be conscious when things go wrong, when we are faced by a
problem.
The phenomenon of blindsight (which has been fairly
extensively researched) provides a clear example of how the
mind can process and represent information of which it is not
conscious. Experiments have been conducted during which
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people whose field of vision is limited consistently make
correct 'guesses' about the presence of objects in that part of
their field of vision in which they claim to be blind. Mental
representations are constructed despite the fact that the
blindsighted person has no conscious visual awareness of them.
Consciousness is clearly, then, not essential to all mental life.
It might be suggested, as it has been by demystifiers, that it is
not essential at all, that it is epiphenomenal, an evolutionary
by-product, an accompanying event outside the chain of
causation. Of course, one might turn this argument around and
ask, if consciousness is merely a collateral product of mental
processing why it is not a collateral product of all mental
processing? Minds might not need consciousness for much of
what they do, but perhaps they need it for some of what they
do.
The qualia debate (like the broader consciousness debate, of
which it is a part) is a lively one. Whether qualia are
considered to be a mystery, a problem, or simply a collateral
product of the mind, they cannot be ignored. One thing,
however, is sure: minds certainly need qualia if they are going
to have aesthetic experiences.
7.4	 Aesthetic Qualia.
Despite the many debates concerning the status of qualia, any
attempt to characterise aesthetic experience - or, more
narrowly, literariness or poetic effects - has to take the
notion of quatia seriously. In Marcel's terms, reference to it is
'demanded' because of its centrality. Rey (1980) uses the
notion of 'emotional qualia' to describe what he calls 'just
plain "feelings of", for example, fear, embarrassment,
affection, hope, joy.' (Rey 1980:177). I shall use the term
'aesthetic qua/ia' to refer to a special kind of emotional
qualia, involving an intense, precise and focussed phenomenal
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state. Aesthetic qualia as phenomenal states should play a
central role in a pragmatic account of literary style. As Fabb
(1992) argues, the relevance theory account of poetic effects
suggests a way in which that might be done.
First I would like to develop the notion of aesthetic qualia in
relation to Rey's notion of emotional qualia. Emotional qualia
may be more or less intensely felt, more or less subtly
discriminated. Rey suggests that many of us, most of the time,
may be rather poor at discriminating our inner life, that 'as
reading Proust can often remind us, we are all probably much
poorer at introspection (knowing what we feel and
discriminating among our feelings) than we ordinarily
suppose.' (Rey 1980:178). Poetic or literary writing encourages
us to exercise and develop 'introspective acuity'. The aesthetic
qualitative experience it communicates is 'intense' and
'discriminating'.
The achievement of poetic effects requires a wide exploration
of context that reorganises encyclopaedic memory and
establishes and rearranges links between concepts. Developing
introspective acuity is partly a question of encouraging such
reorganisation and making the links and wide-ranging
contextual effects more salient. It is also, perhaps, partly a
question of distinguishing factual assumptions from
metarepresented sets of assumptions. But the kind of
introspective acuity to which Rey refers crucially involves the
evocation and creation of phenomenal states. Emotional qualia
may refer to the phenomenal aspects of all emotional states or
attitudes, including the stock emotions and stock attitudes
associated with narrow contexts. In the latter case, standard
and simplified sets of circumstances are exploited by second-
rate art to provide an easy trigger for horror, anger, disgust,
sadness or joy. Aesthetic qualia refer, more specifically, to
the phenomenal aspects of more complex experience,
associated with the exploration of extended contexts. They
require more effort to achieve, but offer more in return.
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Aesthetic qualia differ from emotional qualia in general, then,
in two crucial ways: they are more intense; they are more
discriminative and complex. This intensity and subtle
discrimination between feelings or phenomenal experiences
relates not just to the qualitative feel of emotion/attitude,
but also to perceptual states. Aldous Huxley pointed out in The
Doors of Perception that the quality of our perceptual-
phenomenal experience - what it is like to have certain
familiar visual experiences for example - may be affected by
chemical change in the body as a result of taking drugs like
mescalin. As Huxley wrote:
'Mescalin raises all colours to a higher power and
makes the percipient aware of innumerable fine
shades of differences, to which, at ordinary times,
he is completely blind.' (Huxley 1954: 25).
Huxley is making the same point here about the intensity
('raises......to a higher power') and discrimination ('innumerable
fine shades of difference') of phenomenal experience. He goes
on to suggest that mescalin allows us the kind of visual
experiences that are more familiar to artists and which
artists attempt to express and communicate.
The same intensities and powers of subtle discrimination are
available to the other senses and are put to use, for example,
in wine-tasting and perfumery. The point here is that a diverse
group of people may receive the same perceptual information -
they may be looking at the same landscape or the same pair of
trousers (to use one of Huxley's examples), they may be
sniffing the same perfumes or tasting the same wines - but
the qualitative or phenomenal aspect of such experiences will
be different. Some will have more intense experiences than
others; some will have experiences that allow for more subtle
discriminations to be made. The inverted qualia problem has
raised the possibility that our qualitative experiences are
different in kind. Here I am suggesting that they are likely to
be different in degree. Aesthetic qualia refer to phenomenal
experiences that are 'raised to a higher power' and that may be
expressed in terms of 'innumerable fine shades of differences.'
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7.5	 PrecisIon and Indeterminacy.
Because the phenomenal character of our experiences is
capable of subtle discrimination, it has often been argued that
the precise and accurate expression and communication of such
experiences are essential. John Middleton Murry, for example,
in The Problem of Style, argues that expressing a feeling or
emotion precisely is the central problem of style. In
particular, as has already been noted, he values metaphor as a
device for achieving such precision: 'metaphor is essential to
the precision of language......try to be precise and you are bound
to be metaphorical.' (Middleton Murry 1922:75). When Middleton
Murry uses the words 'feeling' and 'emotion' in this context I
understand him to intend phenomenal state 'attitude', or what I
have otherwise been referring to as phenomenal or qualitative
(aspects of) experience.
The pragmatic account of metaphor discussed in Chapter 4
emphasised the indeterminacy of what is communicated by
poetic metaphor. This, it is argued, is due to the lack of a clear
boundary between implicatures and implications, between
those assumptions clearly intended by the communicator and
those accessed on the responsibility of the addressee alone.
The question arises: how is this indeterminacy about what is
communicated by a poetic metaphor consistent with Middleton
Murry's claim about the precision of metaphor?
Before answering this question I will consider Middleton
Murray's argument about precision in a little more detail. To
illustrate one of his central points about style he sets himself
the task of attempting to put his own feelings into words as he
sat preparing his lectures on style:
'At the moment I am writing these words, I am
distinctly depressed. I have left the composition
of these lectures too long, and I am pressed for
time; I am very doubtful whether I shall be able to
systematize my emotions. The place where I am
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living is supposed to be in perpetual sunshine. That
is the only reason for living there. The wind is
howling; the sky is overcast; and there has not
been a really fine day for a fortnight...' (Middleton
Murry 1922:68).
Such a description, Middleton Murry claims, does not really
communicate his feeling at all clearly or precisely. The reader,
he writes, now 'knows some of the circumstances; by
exercising his imagination he can evoke in himself an
emotional condition that may be similar to mine; but there is
no telling. I have not communicated my emotions to him.'
(Middleton Murry 1922:68).
What Middleton Murry has done in this passage is provide a
generalised statement or thought about his feelings: 'I am
depressed'. All such thoughts are interpretations of feelings or
phenomenal states. In saying 'I am depressed' he communicates
a thought about his feeling and not the feeling itself. He also
describes the weather - 'howling wind', 'overcast sky' - as a
way of indirectly communicating his own feeling. 'Howling
wind' and 'overcast sky' activate phenomenal memories of a
fairly standard kind, memories which support each other and
serve to make the feeling of depression marginally more
precise.
The problem, as Middleton Murry sees it, is for the writer to
'find some symbol which will evoke in [the reader] an
emotional reaction as nearly as possible identical with the
emotion [the writer] is feeling.' (Middleton Murry, 1922:68).
This point is similar to the one Larkin makes, in The Pleasure
Principle, that, in seeking to communicate what he calls 'an
emotional concept', a poet seeks to 'construct a verbal device
that will reproduce this emotional concept in anyone who cares
to read it, anywhere, any time.' (Larkin 1983: 80).
Middleton Murry makes a second attempt at finding some
symbol to express his feelings:
'I am depressed; depressed by the prospect of
crowding the work of a year into three weeks; by
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living sunless in a house and town that were built
only for sunshine. A cold wind prowls around the
windows. The peach-tree in the garden came into
flower too soon; the cold and the wind have
stripped it. I too have been premature.' (Middleton
Murry 1922:74).
He insists that this passage is not presented as a great
achievement of style. It is, however, presented as stylistically
superior to the first passage. He considers it to be more
compact, more forceful, more focussed and clearer. The images
used to express his feeling are slightly more original. In the
second passage the wind 'prowls' rather than 'howls'. Both are
metaphors, of course, though he argues that 'howl' is so
conventional that it no longer merits its metaphorical status.
Although conventional metaphors can be brought back to life in
an appropriate context, it is generally the case that, given no
encouragement to do otherwise, the same small set of
relatively strongly communicated implicatures are
communicated. Alternatively, the word 'howl' may simply refer
to a range of sounds of a certain kind, including the sounds that
strong winds make. The encyclopaedic entries attached to the
concepts WIND and PROWL are less commonly activated and
accessed at the same time. The reader is encouraged to seek
out properties of 'prowl' that may also be properties of 'winds.
The reader's ability to construct the relevant contextual
assumptions on the basis of assumptions stored at the
encyclopaedic entries attached to these concepts depends, in
other words, on the reader's previous experience and ability to
empathise and extend experience. Literary communication
generally depends upon knowing what it is like to have certain
experiences (in terms of rich phenomenal tone, rather than
simply sets of beliefs) and extends the range and depth of
these experiences; creative metaphor works in the same way
on a smaller scale. Middleton Murr .y argues that the concept
PROWL gives a better idea of 'the particular beastliness of the
wind with which I was inflicted.' Implicatures to do with the
wind being beast-like, threatening, frightening, dangerous, and
with the writer being encircled and trapped may be said to be
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communicated here. Alternatively, these assumptions may be
seen as making a contribution to the communication of a new
ad hoc concept related to the concept PROWL.
In a more original metaphor of this kind, the sense of accuracy
may derive, in part, from the greater salience of the particular
assumptions used either as implicatures or as contributing to
new concepts. The encyclopaedic entries of concepts remain
'open' until external context encourages a narrow range of
assumptions to become particularly salient for use in
inferential interpretation. As seen in an example from Chapter
3, the concept STUDENT contains a relatively rich
encyclopaedic entry. The presence of context from the
encyclopaedic entries of other concepts, such as THEATRE
TICKET or LIBRARY BOOK, makes certain entries in the
encyclopaedia attached to the concept for STUDENT
particularly salient. These might be assumptions to do, say,
with students paying half-price or students being able to
borrow books for one month. These are readily accessible
assumptions stored at the encyclopaedic entry for 'student'.
The thought communicated in this example is a simple one and
requires a determinate and easily accessible context. The
thought communicated by a poetic or creative metaphor needs a
more elaborate context. New concepts and assumptions have to
be constructed. Setting the context up in such a way that it
communicates the thought accurately is difficult. Because the
thought is elusive, metaphors and other figures are required in
order to bring together those encyclopaedic entries needed to
narrow down or contain the range of assumptions that form the
interpretation and to set up the process (outlined in Chapters 4
and 5) by which they do this. Middleton Murry makes the point
that his attempt to be more precise about his feelings led
automatically to the use of (creative) metaphors in order to
achieve this aim. He did not deliberately set out to invent
metaphors. A certain kind of thinking finds its natural
expression through metaphor.
Middleton Murry is not primarily trying to communicate
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information in this brief passage; he is trying to communicate
his experience of what it is like to be in the particular
situation in which he finds himself - late with his lectures,
and lousy weather outside. My suggestion has been that the
more extensive exploration of the concepts PROWL and WIND
trigger the evocation of phenomenal memories. It may be the
case that phenomenal memories are evoked whenever the
construction of contextual assumptions requires a
significantly greater amount of effort and energy. The wide-
ranging search for contextual assumptions, multiple
inferencing and increased salience of a wide array of
assumptions require a special kind of brain activity which,
perhaps, activates the store of phenomenal memories and
causes them to become more salient. I have been using the
term 'evocation' loosely to refer to the accessing of
phenomenal memories. It might be used to refer to this
particular process.
Middleton Murry also uses the premature peach-tree as
symbol/metaphor of his own condition - 'I too have been
premature'. Again this is a marginally more creative image
than that of the 'overcast sky'. But this is arguably not a
particularly successful symbol. The peach-tree would have
been more poetic without this final sentence which makes
unnecessarily explicit an assumption that the reader should
have been able to work out for himself. It is the reader's own
contribution to the inferential processes of constructing,
strengthening and drawing together the contextual
assumptions needed to achieve an interpretation that triggers
the evocation and communication of phenomenal memories.
The indeterminacy on the level of implicatures - which
assumptions does the writer intend to communicate? - is a
consequence of the intention to be as precise as possible about
the phenomenal tone of the experience. The activation of a
wide-range of assumptions (so wide that it clearly becomes
impossible to say which ones actually are communicated) helps
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to sharpen (make more accurate or precise) the phenomenal
tone of the experience communicated. The creative thought
(consisting of new concepts and the new simultaneously
accessed set of assumptions) is causally connected to the
intense, subtly discriminated phenomenal tone. Aesthetic
qualia derive from creative thoughts, so conceived.
7.6 Conclusion: phenomenality, memoire involontaire
and aesthetic pleasure.
One can accept Middleton Murry's argument without considering
his example to be a particularly successful use of a creative
metaphor to evoke precise feeling. I will return here to an
analysis of the poetic metaphors that I have already discussed.
First I will consider Sperber and Wilson's example of a poetic
metaphor, repeated here as (1):
(1) Son encre est pale. (His ink is pale.)
(said of Leconte de Lisle by Flaubert)
Leconte de Lisle's poetry evokes a feeling in Flaubert which he
attempts to communicate by bringing the concepts INK and
PALE together. The implicatures suggested in the analysis of
this example in Chapter 4 are not entirely satisfactory. One
problem is that there is a considerable degree of overlap
between the meanings they express. The other problem is that
they appear to be incomplete; although the list of implicatures
is indeterminate, it still seems that, whatever additions are
made to the list, they would not combine to fully express the
full force of what is intuitively communicated by the
utterance.
With regard to the first problem, it could be argued that the
metaphor contributes a new concept to the proposition
expressed by the utterance, rather than communicates a range
of weak implicatures. What Flaubert is communicating,
according to this idea, is that Leconte de Lisle's poetry is 'X'
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where 'X' is a new ad hoc concept close in some respects to
the concept PALE. In what respects might 'X' be close to
PALE? It may be that they share assumptions in their
encyclopaedic entries, though it is more likely that
assumptions have to be specially constructed for the occasion.
The construction of these new assumptions would have to take
into account assumptions in the encyclopaedic entry of INK,
and perhaps WRITING and POETRY: the assumptions constructed
would have to be able to be true of Leconte de Lisle's writing.
Alternatively (or additionally), it may be that the concept 'X'
is close to the concept PALE in terms of the phenomenal
memories it potentially evokes. If this is the case then it
might provide an answer to the second problem with the
implicature account mentioned above. There is something that
it is like to experience 'paleness' which corresponds to
something that it is like to experience Leconte de Lisle's
poetry. In order to understand and fully appreciate this
metaphor the reader needs a rich 'phenomenal entry' for the
concept POETRY. The attempt to understand and appreciate this
metaphor may, on the other hand, also lead to an enrichment of
this phenomenal entry: it may be that the phenomenal tone has
to be created, that what is being expressed is a feeling about a
kind of poetry that one had not considered before. Any set of
assumptions that one might use to describe what is
communicated would actually be thoughts about a phenomenal
memory or phenomenal tone (just as, on a much more trivial
level, 'I feel depressed' is a thought about a phenomenal tone).
In the Macbeth example, the reader, or spectator in the theatre,
uses what he knows about stickiness, and things sticking to
his hands, to understand how Macbeth feels about his murders.
What he knows may be in the form of assumptions which can be
used in an inferential process to yield implicatures. Such
implicatures as were discussed in Chapter 4, however, do not
seem to convey the force and expressive power of the
metaphor. It is likely that the metaphor is also used to evoke
the feeling (phenomenal memory) of what it is like to have
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something sticking to one's hands. Something of that feeling
can be used to communicate the particular feeling (phenomenal
tone) of Macbeth's obsessive and difficult-to-conceal guilt.
This is a highly creative process in that the reader must
metarepresent the sets of beliefs Macbeth was likely to have
had in order to see what feelings or phenomenal memories they
evoke.
This evocation of phenomenal memories also applies to poetic
epizeuxis and the poetic use of verse effects. There are many
ways in which language can be used to trigger such evocation
by encouraging more effort to be put into conceptual
exploration. The techniques of art, Shklovsky (1917) claimed,
work to slow down perception so that objects and experiences
can be perceived afresh. Art 'exists to make us feel things; to
make the stone stony.' Shklovsky's essay, discussed in
Chapter 2, may be interpreted as making a point about the
evocation of phenomenal memory.
Such evocations may also occur in the case of conventional
metaphors (a point made in Chapter 6 and repeated here). In
Chapters 4 and 6 I compared the following utterances, repeated
here as (2):
(2a) He was burning with anger.
(2b) He was very angry.
It is possible to argue that (2a) differs from (2b) not just in
terms of the assumptions made available by the concept BURN
(whatever they are) which enter into the final interpretation,
but also in terms of the phenomenal memories activated by the
concept BURN. There is something that burning is like that
being angry is also like.
The connection between phenomenal memories and
propositional memories is no doubt a complex one. I am
assuming that affective phenomenal memories can be activated
by rhetorical figures and schemes used poetically, in such a
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way that one can come to have the feeling as a result of
reading the words. This is not necessarily the case with
perceptual phenomenal memories, however. Sperber (1975)
suggests that smells and certain visual phenomena such as
colours are stored differently in memory. In Sperber
(1975:115-123), he claims that smells belong to the field of
symbolism: they are evocative in the sense that symbols in
general are evocative. The human sense of smell can
distinguish hundreds of thousands of smells, even though
smells are not lexicalised and stored independently in memory.
As in the case of tastes we are only able to talk about them
metonymically, in terms of their causes or effects: the smell
or taste of garlic or kumquats, the smell of a rose, or freshly
fallen snow. Sperber notes that: 'Our knowledge about different
smells figures in the encyclopaedia not in an autonomous
domain, but scattered among all the categories whose
referents have olfactive qualities.' (Sperber 1975:116).
Colours, on the other hand, have lost their metonymic
character - they may be fully lexicalised and hierarchically
organised. But visual phenomena also have a phenomenal aspect
stored in memory which can be highly activated in certain
circumstances (for example, after taking mescalin, as Aldous
Huxley pointed out).
Sperber makes the further point that smells cannot normally
be retrieved from memory through recall (at least, by most
people); they can only be retrieved from memory through
recognition. To compensate this fact, Sperber argues, such
kinds of perceptual memories are powerful in the way they
evoke associated memories. He compares the effect of a smell
to 'a magician who plucks a long multi-coloured string of
handkerchiefs out of a top hat that seemed empty.' (Sperber
1975:117).
This account of perceptual phenomenal memory is suggestive
with regard to poetic effects and aesthetic experience in
general. In particular it recalls Proust's aesthetics, which is
also based on there being two distinct types of memory. In
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'Swann Explained by Proust', Proust (1988:234-236) explains
that his work 'is dominated by the distinction between
involuntary and voluntary memory'. The one type of memory can
be willed; the other comes spontaneously and unannounced.
Voluntary memory is 'a memory of the intellect and of the
eyes', whereas involuntary memory may be awoken by smell or
taste. Voluntary memory usually falsifies the past; involuntary
memory, on the other hand, is more trustworthy. This
distinction between kinds of memory corresponds to Sperber's
distinction between memory retrieval as recognition and
memory retrieval as recall. Recall is voluntary in Proust's
terms; recognition is involuntary. But recognition may or may
not evoke a large remembrance of times past. Where the long
multi-coloured string of coloured handkerchiefs is pulled out
of the hat this evokes an aesthetic experience, as it did in the
case of Proust/Marcel's exquisite pleasure upon experiencing
the 'perfume' of a petite madeleine dipped into tea. Of the
memories brought back by the madeleine, Proust observed that
'he could have remembered them no doubt, but without their
colour or their charm' - without, he might have added, the vivid
sensation of phenomenal memory and the awareness of
innumerable fine shades of differences. For Proust it is only to
involuntary memories (and phenomenal memories) that the
artist should go for the raw material of his work.
Proust notes that the workings of involuntary memory may be
intensely pleasurable and that this pleasure is equivalent to
aesthetic pleasure. Works of art, insofar as they yield
aesthetic effects, trigger involuntary memory. It might be said
that the physiological reaction to the special kind of
processing that leads to poetic effects is, or often can be,
experienced as a pleasurable one. This raises the question
(among others) as to whether there is any evolutionary sense
to aesthetic experience and aesthetic pleasure. Appreciating
landscapes, making sculptures or singing songs are hardly
likely to confer any evolutionary advantage in themselves.
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Roger Fry posed the question from the point of view of
someone interested in pictorial art: 'Biologically speaking, art
is blasphemy. We were given our eyes to see things, not to look
at them' (Fry 1920; 1981:33). The senses developed as a means
of providing accurate information about the world as quickly
and economically as possible. As Fodor (1983) argues, the
evolutionary advantage of encapsulated input modules was to
decode domain specific representations quickly and reliably
into a common language of thought. Given the evolutionary
background, Fry argues, it remains puzzling that we should
take pleasure from the process of looking at things, that we
should find objects, groups of objects, shapes and colours,
beautiful in themselves. The same holds for the other senses.
The sense of smell does not simply provide information, it is
enjoyed in perfumes. The tastes of foods and drinks also are
indulged and enjoyed for the sheer qualitative feel of the
experience. There is no doubt that qualia, intensely felt, are
pleasurable, as even the demystifiers are happy to admit. In a
section of Dennett (1993) entitled 'Enjoying Our Experiences',
Dennett has a heading where he quotes Wilfred Sellars, 'over a
fine bottle of Chambertin, Cincinnati, 1971', as saying: 'But
Dan, qualia are what make life worth living!' Qualia are worth
indulging for qualia's sake. Again, Dennett (1993:383) quotes
Shoemaker (from the Tufts Colloquium 1988) as saying: 'If
what I want when I drink fine wine is information about its
chemical properties, why don't I just read the label?' It is
possible to learn to become more sensitive to, and to
discriminate between, subtly differing tastes and smells, and
to obtain more pleasure from them as a result. In the same way
it is possible to become more sensitive to the stylistic effects
of language and, thereby, obtain more pleasure from its skilful
use.
The aesthetic sense, I would argue,
intuitions about relevance. It reflects
costs and benefits of processing. At
visual phenomena - shapes, textures,
colours - may simply be easier or
is crucially tied to
a sensitivity to the
basic level, certain
colours, mixtures of
ss costly in visual
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most aware had better survival chances. Humphrey (1992)
argues that consciousness conferred a biological advantage
through allowing those who possessed it to 'understand,
respond to and manipulate the behaviour of other human
beings.' (Humphrey 1992:36).) The more intense phenomenal
awareness associated with aesthetic qualia, while not in
itself biologically advantageous, reflects the basic advantage
of being accurately aware of one's surroundings.
While the aesthetic sense is not in itself a biological
necessity, then, it has developed out of the biological need to
represent qualitative phenomena accurately and economically.
We go on wanting more intense and subtly discriminated
qualitative experiences, just as we go on wanting to find out
the truth about language or the laws of physics. We no longer
need such accurate representations, but the motivation and
enjoyment of seeking them out remains. It is in this sense that
the aesthetic sense is crucially tied to intuitions about
relevance.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
In the Introduction I raised the following related questions: how
should literariness - what is essentially literary about the
experience offered by literary artworks - be defined?; what gives
a literary work of art its aesthetic value?; what kind of a
thought is a 'poetic thought'? From the standpoints of literary
criticism and aesthetics the answers would involve an
interpretation and evaluation of a particular reading experience
or of a type of reading experience. From the standpoint of a
literary theory grounded in pragmatic theory the answer would be
in the form of characteristic mental representations and mental
processes. I have switched freely between the terms 'poetic
thought'! 'poetic effects' and the more general 'aesthetic
experience'. This invites the further question: if it is possible to
define a 'poetic representation', what relationship would this
have to a more general aesthetic representation? In other words,
what do poetic effects have in common with other kinds of
aesthetic effects?
l.A.Richards (1924) asked much the same set of questions, but
without the benefit of current theories of cognition and
communication. What has made these big questions manageable
here is first, the development of a theory of style (including
poetic style) in relevance theory, and secondly, the fact that I
have mainly concentrated on small-scale poetic effects (namely,
the effects achieved by poetic metaphor, poetic epizeuxis and
metrical variation).
I would argue, however, that the account of these small-scale
effects makes a significant contribution to the study of
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literariness. I have tried to show (in the case of the central
metaphor from Seamus Héaney's poem Digging) how (potentially
creative) metaphors are not necessarily particularly poetic in
single utterances. They become richer when contextual
assumptions made salient through the processing of other
utterances give direction to the exploration of the encyclopaedic
entries of concepts made available by the metaphorical utterance
itself. The wider context causes certain assumptions within the
encyclopaedic entries that are explored to become more highly
activated and, hence, makes them easier to process and use in the
construction of further assumptions. As a general point, it is
always artificial (and misleading to some degree) to analyse a
single utterance independently of the wider context in which it
occurs. If metaphor, epizeuxis or metrical variation (or any other
rhetorical device) occur within a poem, then the poetic effects
they may achieve are generally greatly enhanced by the context
provided by the rest of the poem.
I began in Chapter 1 by distinguishing intrinsic from extrinsic
approaches to literary studies (a distinction that could equally be
made within linguistics). I argued that of the two main 'intrinsic'
questions, the question what is a literary artwork? is
philosophically, but not theoretically, interesting. This is
because 'artwork' is an interpretive term and an answer to the
question depends on a wide variety of historical, cultural and
other factors. The other question - what is aesthetic
experience? - is theoretically interesting if it can be answered
in terms of characteristic patterns of mental representations
and processes, triggered as involuntary responses to certain
sensory or linguistic stimuli.
Alternative theoretical approaches were criticised in Chapter 2,
on the grounds that they fail to account for literariness and
aesthetic value. Literariness cannot be defined in terms of the
linguistic properties of texts, because linguistic properties by
themselves do not provide sufficient conditions for poetic
effects/ aesthetic experience. Neither can literariness be defined
in terms of social conventions, whether they be semiotic
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principles, special purpose maxims (involving suspension of the
standard conversational maxims) or special purpose sets of
literary discourse reading strategies. No approach based solely on
social conventions can explain how stylistic effects are achieved
on-line. Treating the aesthetic as socially constructed rather
than as a genuine psychological phenomenon trivialises aesthetic
experience and leads to an impoverished sense of what it is that
literary artworks communicate. Literary artworks qua artworks
do not simply, or centrally, communicate sets of propositional
meanings.
Most popularised versions of current Literary Theory hold that
the linguistic sign is inherently unstable, and that language is a
system of differences that can be analysed or discussed
independently of human minds. The meanings given to texts are
provided by other social or ideological 'texts'. In this view there
is nothing cognitive worth studying. Given the prevalence of such
views, I will sum up some of the main points of disagreement
between this 'neo-Kantian relativist' approach and the approach
to language and communication assumed in this thesis. I have
argued that the notion of 'linguistic sign' that Literary Theorists
work with is too simple: meaning is not a unitary phenomenon and
a concept does not consist of one entry. The meanings that
concepts, and language generally, communicate are clearly not
fixed, but this instability is not due to the nature of the
linguistic sign - it can be explained in terms of principle-
governed sensitivity to context. The argument that language is
metaphorical through-and-through and can have no direct
reference to states of affairs in the world may be countered by
the argument that it is not utterances but thoughts that relate to
states of affairs in the world. An utterance may be metaphorical:
the thoughts that it communicates are not. I also argued that the
view of context as a set of separate ideas imposed upon texts
from outside is misguided. Context is accessed via encyclopaedic
entries. Communicators, therefore, have a large measure of
control over what contextual assumptions will be used by
addressees. The contextual exploration triggered by the text,
which happens in milliseconds, is the aspect of processing which
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yields poetic effects. One can go on to place what is
communicated within a broader context (within the framework of
a religious, political, philosophical set of ideas, for example),
but this broader context cannot explain what is communicated or
the stylistic effects achieved.
It is important to stress again that it has been impossible to do
full justice here to the complex range of ideas expressed by
Literary Theory (or by the other literary theories referred to in
Chapter 2). The main purpose has been to consider a range of
possible positions on the question of literariness. It is probably
fair to say, however, that there is a general opposition in
Literary Theory both to literary criticism (which vainly strives
to expound non-existent stable meanings) and to linguistic
theory, pragmatic theory, and, by extension, literary theory of the
kind proposed here (which are essentialist and realist with
regard to theories). The effect of such views has been to attempt
to curtail the range of question-types which it is considered
legitimate to ask within literary studies. Here I have argued for a
more liberal approach. The intrinsic approach depends on the
existence of a theoretically unencumbered literary criticism to
provide the intuitions about literary style which theory has to
account for. Many of the theoretical and anti-theoretical views
referred to in Chapter 2, like many of the ideas and models
currently discussed within literary stylistics, fail to offer any
account of literary style, or of the varieties of literary style. I
have argued that the only theoretical approach likely to provide
an adequate theory of style is one that is grounded in cognitive
pragmatic theory.
In Chapter 3 I provided an outline account of relevance theory,
before introducing a more detailed cognitive pragmatic analysis
of metaphor (Chapter 4) and epizeuxis (Chapter 5). In Chapter 4 I
attempted to show how metaphors could vary in their stylistic
effects, using the relevance theory notion of weak implicature.
Metaphors could be more or less rich or poetic depending on the
range and strength of implicatures. I then suggested an
alternative account of metaphors as new ad hoc concepts, again
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within a relevance theory framework.
After arguing that the varied stylistic effects achieved by
metaphorical utterances depend on the relative accessibility and
range of contextual assumptions, I discussed the organisation of
assumptions in encyclopaedic entries. I suggested that
contradictory assumptions might co-exist in encyclopaedic
memory if some assumptions are stored directly as factual
assumptions, and others stored indirectly. In the latter case they
would be metarepresentations of beliefs, perhaps true in some
other possible world (e.g. that of a novel) or perhaps accepted as
true by some cultural or social group. This would explain the
standard effects achieved by certain conventional metaphors:
beliefs metarepresented as belonging to a social group would be
readily accessible to interlocutors who are manifestly members
of that group. Otherwise, I argued, there is no need for a
hierarchical ordering of assumptions in encyclopaedic memory:
assumptions are entirely context-sensitive.
In Chapter 5 I showed how the mere fact of repetition cannot be
directly linked to a specific kind of effect. A pragmatic account
is therefore required to explain the variety of effects achieved.
In the case of poetic epizeuxis the repetition encourages wide-
ranging contextual exploration and the communication of a wide
array of weak implicatures. This can only happen when there are
appropriately rich encyclopaedic entries to explore and when
easily accessed metarepresented sets of assumptions do not
short-circuit a more wide-ranging contextual search.
I also argued that it should be possible to explain verse effects
in cognitive pragmatic terms. To explain the poetic use of
metrical variation, for instance, I suggested that unexpected
strong stress within a metrical line allows for speedier and
lengthier conceptual access. More processing effort and time
goes into conceptual access and, as a consequence, a wider array
of contextual assumptions are used to achieve contextual effects.
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The general conclusion of Chapters 4 and 5 was that poetic
effects can be explained pragmatically in terms of processing
demands leading to an extensive exploration of encyclopaedic
entries, extensive inferencing, and the making marginally more
salient of a wide range of assumptions in the search for an
interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. The
poetic effects are richer, or have more aesthetic value, when a
greater number of assumptions are accessed or when more
assumptions are constructed rather than directly accessed from
memory. These assumptions may be communicated as weakly
manifest implicatures. They may - at least in the case of poetic
metaphors - contribute to the construction of new ad hoc
concepts. In the light of these conclusions a 'poetic thought' or
'poetic representation' might be characterised as a highly
complex thought involving the simultaneous accessing of a large
number of assumptions.
But this account of poetic effects is, I have argued, incomplete.
It leaves out the affective dimension widely recognised to be
central to literary communication. Poets and literary critics
loosely use the terms 'emotion' or 'feeling' to refer to this
affective dimension: the poet's task is to express her feelings as
precisely as possible, to 'put her feelings into words'.
Using ideas from cognitive science and philosophy, I
distinguished emotion as a temporary state from attitude as a
long-term affective state, attached to a conceptual address.
Emotions as temporary states have physiological, behavioural,
cognitive and qualitative properties. I have suggested that
attitudes are, in part at least, phenomenal memories or memories
of the qualitative aspects of emotional states. When poets and
literary critics talk of 'emotion' or 'feeling' they are really
referring to attitudes or phenomenal memories, as discussed in
Chapter 6. In the case of poetic effects encouragement is given
not simply to explore encyclopaedic entries, but also to evoke
phenomenal memories. Phenomenal memories from a variety of
conceptual sources are used to create new phenomenal states.
The communication of these new phenomenal states typically
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involves adjustments to long-term attitudes.
In Chapter 7 I discussed the notion of qualia and suggested that,
whatever the philosophical position adopted to this highly
problematic concept, it is central to the characterisation of
aesthetic experience. I used the term 'aesthetic qualia' to refer
to the phenomenal aspects of poetic effects and aesthetic
experience. Aesthetic qualia are qualia which are intensely
experienced and which, because of the wide-ranging context in
which they occur, are subtly discriminated. The aesthetic effects
achieved by the evocation of these precise phenomenal states are
caused by a special kind of pragmatic processing, involving a
wide-ranging search through context, as described above. This
pragmatic processing can be explained in terms of the standard
search for an interpretation consistent with the principle of
relevance: no special interpretive machinery is required. (This
view contrasts, for example, with the standard 'Empirical Study
of Literature' view, which takes it for granted that there are
special principles to guide the 'literary reading process'.) The
special cognitive processing and effects are accompanied by a
special kind of brain activity which evokes the precise and
intense phenomenal state and which is experienced as 'aesthetic'.
In other words, a certain kind of electrochemical activity in the
brain 'feels' aesthetic.
It is useful to compare aesthetic effects with humour. In the
case of jokes the pragmatic garden-pathing which encourages the
rapid construction of an alternative context is accompanied by
particular physiological effects, which may include laughter. In
the case of aesthetic effects, the rapid activation and
construction of context, involving an evocation of phenomenal
states, is accompanied by particular physiological effects, that
are quite different in kind and, for the most part, of a more
subtle nature than in the case of humour.
A poetic representation, then, involves the simultaneous
activation and accessing of a wide range of assumptions, which
are made marginally more salient, together with the evocation of
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intense subtly discriminated phenomenal states. The sense of
aesthetic value and pleasure derive from the intensity and
precision of phenomenal tone.
Aesthetic experience can be achieved by a variety of art forms:
for example, by painting, sculpture, and music. What is common
to all these ways of achieving an aesthetic experience is the
intensity and precision of the affective phenomenal state that is
evoked. What varies is the means of achieving this state. In the
case of paintings, for example, the representations triggered in
the mind consist of visual representations and the affective
phenomenal states evoked in the process of forming these visual
representations. An 'aesthetic representation', as what painting,
music and literature have in common, is the kind of intense,
precise phenomenal state that has been described. Such a state
can only be achieved by means of sensory representations and
processing, or by means of conceptual representations and
processing. A poetic representation or thought is, therefore,
simply a means of achieving an intense and precise phenomenal
state. Pragmatic theory, and relevance theory in particular,
provides the account of how poetic representations are achieved
in terms of conceptual representations and processing and, hence,
the basis for an account of how aesthetic representations may be
achieved.
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